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Exactly how franking credits influence the Australian equity market has sparked contro-
versy among academics, regulators, politicians and practitioners since the introduction
of the dividend imputation system in July 1987. Australia applied a classical tax system
where corporate earnings are taxed twice, once at the corporate level and the second at
the personal level on distributed dividends before July 1987. After the introduction of the
imputation system to remove the double taxation, Australian resident shareholders who
receive fully franked dividends are able to obtain a credit for the corporate tax that has
already been paid. The discussion in the Australian Government (2014, 2015) triggers
controversy among academics and practitioners on whether the imputation system should
be modified or even completely revoked. The main topic of the debate is “whether frank-
ing credits are priced in the market”. Despite much theoretical and empirical research, the
evidence is mixed, and there is little consensus. This thesis enhances our understanding of
the pricing of franking credits by providing evidence in the comparative pricing studies,
the ex-dividend day studies, and the franking credit balances studies. The first research
chapter provides direct evidence that differences in the tax systems between Australia and
the UK, especially dividend imputation tax credits, are a statistically-significant factor
in explaining this premium between the Dual-Listed Company (DLC) twins of BHP and
Billiton. This chapter extends the comparative pricing studies literature by proposing a
method to compare the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) prices of DLC twins in
the comparative pricing studies of franking credits. The second research chapter explores
the implications of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance by proposing the expla-
nation that individual investors irrationally overvalue dividends and franking credits due
to behavioural finance reasons. This chapter contributes to the existing ex-dividend date
studies literature by examining the impact of dividends and franking credits surrounding
the ex-dividend date using a longer horizon. The third research theme further investi-
gates the market valuation and determinants of franking credit balances to fill in the gap
in franking credit balances studies, which has been scarce to date. Each of these studies
shows that franking credits are valuable in the hands of resident shareholders and that they
are reflected in the market capitalization of firms. Finally, our results provide direct evi-
dence on the debate of whether the imputation system should be abandoned in Australia.
Our findings suggest that the imputation system should not be removed without a change
iv
in other tax rules (e.g., personal tax rate). Share prices in Australia are predicted to drop
sharply if Australia abandoned the imputation system while retaining the same personal
income tax system regime.
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1.1 Background and motivation
Exactly how franking credits affect the Australian equity market has sparked controversy
among academics, regulators, politicians, and practitioners since the introduction of the
dividend imputation system in July 1987. Before July 1987, Australia applied a classical
tax system in which corporate earnings are taxed twice, first at the corporate level and
second at the personal level on distributed dividends. After July 1987, the imputation sys-
tem was introduced, and the double taxation of corporate earnings was amended. Under
the Australian dividend imputation system, Australian resident shareholders who receive
fully franked dividends are able to obtain a credit for the corporate tax that has already
been paid, and thus pay additional tax only when their marginal tax rate is higher than
the corporate rate, while non-resident investors are unable to claim the franking cred-
its (Australian Taxation Office, 2020h). Excess franking credits became refundable after
regulatory changes in 2000. The motivation for introducing the imputation system was to
integrate the corporate tax system with the personal tax system (Australian Government,
2015). The imputation system ensures that a firm’s profits distributed as franked dividends
to domestic shareholders are taxed only once at investors’ marginal personal tax rates.
Franking credits play a vital role in the Australian economy. As evidence, in the Aus-
tralian Government (2015), it is estimated that approximately $19 billion of franking
credits have been distributed to individual investors, superannuation funds, companies,
and charities, $10 billion of which has been credited directly into other Australian firms’
revenues. Furthermore, an estimated value of $12 billion of franking credits was allocated
to non-resident investors who were unable to collect the franking credits. Despite these
benefits, the imputation system is under risk of being modified due to its unattractiveness
to international investment communities and also a gradual increase in required rates of
returns, as documented in Australian Government (2014).
The discussion in Australian Government (2014, 2015) triggers controversy among
1
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academics and practitioners on whether the imputation system should be modified or even
completely revoked. The main topic of the debate is “whether franking credits are priced
in the market”. Despite much theoretical and empirical research, the evidence is mixed,
and there is little consensus. This thesis enhances our understanding of the pricing of
franking credits by examining the mispricing of BHP Billiton ADR twins, the irrational
exuberance during the ex-dividend period, and the market valuation of franking credit
balances. Each of these studies shows that franking credits are valuable in the hands of
domestic resident shareholders and that they are reflected in the market capitalisation of
firms, thus providing insights on the debate of whether the imputation system in Australia
should be abandoned or modified.
1.2 The controversy around the proposed termination of
the imputation system
The debate escalated when some controversial issues were canvassed in Australian Gov-
ernment (2014) and again in Australian Government (2015). Although the imputation
system provides significant benefits, several issues need to be addressed due to the glob-
alisation of the Australian market. Australian Government (2014) argued that franking
credits distort Australian’s allocation of funds by incentivising Australian residents to
favour domestic investments. At the same time, it also brings negative impacts on Aus-
tralia’s competitiveness in the international arena in terms of investment equality and op-
portunities for those non-Australian residents. In addition, the imputation system is noted
to exist within a tax system with a relatively high corporate tax rate, which contributes to
an increase in the required rate of return for non-resident investors to some extent, as well
as for domestic investors. However, there is yet insufficient empirical evidence to support
these assertions (Davis, 2016; Ainsworth, Partington, and Warren, 2016b), especially ev-
idence that outlines potentially adverse consequences that would arise if the imputation
system was removed.
From an investor’s perspective, the imputation system offers a subsidy to Australian
resident investors. Franking credits reduce the tax wedge of Australian resident investors,
specifically those investors whose marginal tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate
(Australian Taxation Office, 2020a). Whist Australia arguably has relatively high individ-
ual tax rates compared to many international economies, its effective tax rate on franked
dividends is low compared to other Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) countries that adopt a classical tax system in which dividends are
subject to double taxation (Davis, 2016). Davis (2016) argues that if the Australian gov-
ernment shifts from the imputation system to a classical system in which the corporate
tax rate generates the same amount of government tax revenue, low tax-rate investors’
2
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welfare would be undermined due to distributional consequences and share prices would
be substantially and negatively impacted. From a corporation perspective, the imputation
system also provides considerable benefits. Many studies, for example, Davis (2016) and
Pattenden and Twite (2008), reach a consensus that the imputation system significantly
benefits the Australian economy by reducing leverage and increasing the dividend payout
ratio, thus contributing to market stability. If the imputation system were replaced with a
classical system, the existing corporate structure and dividend policy would be distorted
in an unfavourable direction.
Nevertheless, there is no general agreement on the impact of the imputation system on
share prices and the cost of equity. In theory, in the case of the after-tax return, if the tax
wedge is low, the net income that the firm needs to generate to meet investors’ required
rate of return would also be lower if the tax on the distribution of that income is lower.
Ainsworth et al. (2016b) assert that franking credits reduce the cost of equity as well as
increase share prices. However, Lajbcygier and Wheatley (2012) and Siau, Sault, and
Warren (2015) argue that it is of importance to consider not just the Australian resident
investors’ required returns but also foreign investors’ in the examination of the tax credit
impact on the equity pricing as foreign investors are not eligible to receive any tax benefits
under Australian imputation regulations.
The central question of the debate is whether franking credits are priced in the mar-
ket - a topic that remains unclear. Several scholarly papers have attempted to shed light
on this question. The pricing of franking credits is an empirical issue as there is a lack
of theoretical explanation. There are three main streams of literature that investigate the
pricing of franking credits. The first stream is comparative pricing studies that examine
the value of franking credits by comparing the prices of instruments that are the same in
their underlying aspects but differ in their entitlement to franking credits (e.g., McDon-
ald, 2001; Cannavan, Finn, and Gray, 2004). The second stream is ex-dividend drop-off
studies based on the assumption that the dividend price drop-off on the ex-dividend date
should be equal to the sum of dividend amount and the franking credits (e.g., Brown and
Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 1994; Walker and Partington, 1999; Bellamy and Gray, 2004;
Beggs and Skeels, 2006; Feuerherdt, Gray, and Hall, 2010; Vo, Gellard, Mero, and Au-
thority, 2013; Ainsworth et al., 2016b). The third stream is the required rate of return
studies that investigate the relationship between franking credits and the required rate of
return (e.g., Wood, 1997; Lajbcygier and Wheatley, 2012; Siau et al., 2015). However,
the empirical evidence is mixed, and the debate is still inconclusive. Therefore, evidence
on the implications of removing the dividend imputation tax system needs to be provided
before the system is substantially modified or even abandoned.
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1.3 Rationale for the research chapters
This thesis provides insights on the debate of whether the imputation system should be
abandoned in the Australian equity market by providing direct evidence on whether frank-
ing credits are priced and enhancing our understanding of how franking credits are priced.
The first research chapter aims to explain the price premium of BHP ADR twins. BHP
Billiton was formed in 2001 when BHP in Australia merged with Billiton in the UK to
form a Dual-Listed Company (DLC). The ADRs for BHP and Billiton trade on the NYSE,
and despite these two securities having the same US dollar-denominated dividends, the
BHP ADR generally sells at a premium to the Billiton ADR, though that premium has
considerable time-series variation. We investigate whether differences in the imputation
tax systems that apply to dividends in Australia and the UK [which results in BHP sell-
ing at a premium on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) relative to Billiton on
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), after allowing for exchange rate adjustments] help
explain the time-series variation in the premium of the ADR prices. The findings con-
firm that imputation tax differences are a significant determinant of the premium. Theo-
retically, this chapter modifies the original Gordon Growth Model (GGM) (Gordon and
Shapiro, 1956) and the original Residual Income Model (RIM) (Ohlson, 1995) by re-
placing distributed dividends and residual income with after-tax dividends and after-tax
residual income which incorporate personal tax rates and franking credits. This chapter
extends the literature on the application of GGM and RIM as it provides evidence that tax
factors should be considered in these two valuation models. Empirically, this chapter pro-
vides direct evidence that differences in the tax systems between Australia and the UK,
especially dividend imputation tax credits, are a statistically-significant factor in explain-
ing this premium between the BHP twins documented in the existing literature (Froot and
Dabora, 1999; Bedi, Richards, and Tennant, 2003; De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk,
2009; Su, Yi, Hooper, and Dutta, 2013). Finally, this chapter thus extends the compara-
tive pricing studies literature by providing direct evidence that imputation tax credits are
capitalised into equity prices.
The second research chapter explores the implications of the ex-dividend period irra-
tional exuberance in the following three steps. Firstly, while most existing ex-dividend
drop-off studies intentionally restrict their investigation window to short periods around
the ex-dividend day, this present investigation examines the price movements during a
100-day window surrounding the ex-dividend date. Secondly, the investigation employs
a behavioural finance based individual dividend clientele argument to explain individual
investors’ investment decisions in response to the irrational exuberance. In particular,
the investigation places emphasis on the irrationality of investors in their over-valuation
of dividends and franking credits, and their preference to take a long position before the
ex-dividend date and to sell those securities afterwards. The empirical results in this
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chapter contradict other taxation-induced literature (Feldstein and Green, 1983; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986; Redding, 1997; Brav and Heaton, 1998; Allen, Bernardo, and Welch,
2000). Thirdly, the investigation incorporates franking credits in the individual dividend
clientele and the irrational exuberance arguments. Overall, the findings suggest individual
investors irrationally overvalue dividends and franking credits due to behavioural finance
reasons (Gordon, 1963; Lintner, 1964; Dennis and Strickland, 2002; Barber and Odean,
2013), and hence shifts from a long position to a short position during an ex-dividend
event, thus contributing to the ex-dividend period exuberance. Besides, there is no direct
evidence that relates foreign ownership with the valuation of franking credits. Ultimately,
this chapter extends the ex-dividend drop-off studies literature by examining the overall
influence of dividends and franking credits for the whole ex-dividend period.
This third research theme further investigates the valuation of franking credit balances
via a determinant analysis and value relevance analysis. The literature on these stud-
ies has been scarce, with Heaney (2009) being the first to investigate the topic. How-
ever, Heaney’s (2009) research does not differentiate between individual and institutional
shareholders; and domestic investors or international investors. This present investiga-
tion extends Heaney’s (2009) research by incorporating ownership characteristics into
the franking credit balances studies. Tanza (2014) follows Heaney (2009) to extend the
literature. This chapter extends and improves Tanza’s (2014) value relevance model by
applying a log-transformation to reduce the skewness and improving his model to reduce
multicollinearity. The determinant analysis examines the determinants contributing to the
increasing cumulative level of franking credit balances. The fixed effects panel data OLS
regression provides strong evidence of a size effect that the level of franking credit bal-
ances increases with firm size and weak evidence of an international focus effect that the
level of franking credit balances increases with international ownership. We also find an
individual dividend clientele effect that the level of franking credit balances decreases
with individual ownership. Value relevance studies explore whether franking credit bal-
ances are priced in the market. We find significant evidence that franking credit balances
are priced in the market, and one dollar of franking credit is worth 1.4 dollars in firm
value. Further, this chapter relates the market valuation of franking credit balances to firm
size and international focus and finds that the market valuation increases with firm size
but decreases with international focus. Overall, this chapter extends the franking credit
balances studies literature, which has been scarce to date with Heaney (2009) and Tanza
(2014) being the only closely relevant studies through improvements in their data source
and methodology.
Each of these three research themes provide direct evidence to answer the question of
whether franking credits are priced in the Australian and international equity markets.
Our findings are consistent with evidence of some researchers (e.g., Brown and Walter,
1986; Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 1994; Walker and Partington, 1999; McDon-
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ald, 2001; Vo et al., 2013; Ainsworth et al., 2016b), while they contradict the evidence
of other researchers (e.g., Cannavan et al., 2004; Bellamy and Gray, 2004; Beggs and
Skeels, 2006; Feuerherdt et al., 2010). Overall, our results provide direct evidence on the
pricing of franking credits, thus contributing to the debate of whether the imputation sys-
tem should be abandoned in Australia. Our findings suggest that the imputation system
should not be removed without a change in other tax rules (e.g., personal tax rate). Share
prices in Australia are predicted to drop sharply if Australia abandoned the imputation
system while retaining the same personal income tax system regime.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is structured with six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the whole thesis. Chapter
2 describes the Australian imputation tax system and reviews the four main streams of the
literature, which are comparative pricing studies, ex-dividend drop-off studies, required
rate of return studies and other studies. Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 address the
hypotheses, data, methodology and results for three research themes respectively. Chapter
6 summarises the key findings of the three research themes and draws the main conclu-





This chapter reviews the literature on the market pricing of franking credits. It begins with
an introduction that outlines the main elements of the Australian imputation tax system,
with particular attention to changes in rules related to franking credits in Section 2.2.
This chapter then reviews the theoretical studies about the valuation of franking credits
in Section 2.3. Next, this chapter presents empirical and experimental literature on the
debate of whether franking credits are priced in the market in Section 2.4. Three main
streams of literature and other studies are described in this part. Finally, this chapter
concludes in Section 2.5.
2.2 Australian tax system
2.2.1 Imputation system versus classical system
Before July 1, 1987, Australia was operating under a classical tax system, which imposes
double taxation on corporate earnings. The first tax is the corporate tax on corporate
taxable income. The second tax is the personal income tax payable on distributed div-
idends. On July 1, 1987, Australia changed the tax system, moving from the classical
tax system to the current system, which is known as the “imputation tax system” with
the ultimate objective of eliminating the double taxation of corporate earnings. Under the
imputation tax system, investors can offset their tax payable on distributed dividends via
the reimbursement of franking credits. (Australian Taxation Office, 2020h).
Under the imputation system, corporate entities can distribute dividends with franking
credits that can be used by resident investors to offset the personal income tax. Suppose
a company pays out all of its after-tax net income as a dividend DIV to an Australian
resident investor, the amount of the attached franking credits is equal to part or all of the
corporate taxes τc that the company has paid on its income (Australian Taxation Office,
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2020a). The grossed-up dividend or “franked” dividend is equal to a cash dividend with
franking credits. The net (after-tax) dividend received (DIV/(1− τc)∗ (1− τp)) is equal
to the grossed-up dividend after the personal income tax τp.
A specific comparison of cash flow from a company to investors between the imputa-
tion tax system and the classical tax system is shown in Table 2.11. The table shows an
example under the dividend imputation system where an Australian resident tax-paying
investor with a 47% personal income tax rate (including a 2% medical levy) obtains a net
dividend of $37.1. In contrast, an investor under a classical system only receives $25.97
after the corporate tax and the personal income tax with the same payout ratio of 70%.
Under a dividend imputation system, an Australian resident tax-paying investor receives
a net dividend that is 43% higher than that under a classical system.
1The tax rates in Australia in 2019-2020 are used in this table. Historical corporate tax rates and personal























Table 2.1: Comparison of cash flow between the imputation system and the classical system
This table compares the cash flow from a company to investors through cash dividends between the dividend imputation tax system and the classical tax system. The table
assumes an operating income of $120, an interest payment of $20, a corporate tax rate of 30%, a payout ratio of 70%, and a personal tax rate of 47% in both the imputation and
classical system and the dividend is fully franked in the imputation system. All numbers in the table are in Australian dollars. This table is sourced from Cannavan et al. (2004)
with amendments.
Cash flow Imputation system Classical system
General expression Num General expression Num
Company level
Operating income XO 120 XO 120
Less interest payment XD (20) XD (20)
Taxable income XO−XD 100 XO−XD 100
Less corporate tax (XO−XD)(τc) (30) (XO−XD)(τc) (30)
After-tax net profit (XO−XD)(1− τc) 70 (XO−XD)(1− τc) 70
Payout ratio pr 70% pr 70%
Cash dividend (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49 (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49
Stockholder level
Cash dividend (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49 (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49
Franking credits (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ τc 21
Gross dividend (XO−XD)∗ pr 70
Personal tax liability (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ (τp) (32.9) (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr ∗ (τp) (23.03)
Franking credit offset (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ τc 21
Net tax payment (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ (τp− τc) (11.9) (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr ∗ (τp) (23.03)
Net (After-tax) dividend (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ (1− τp) 37.1 (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr ∗ (1− τp) 25.97
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2.2.2 Fully franked dividend, partly franked dividend, and unfranked
dividend
A dividend can be distributed with fully franked imputation credits, partly franked credits,
or without credits (i.e., unfranked) in Australia. Fully franked dividends are dividends that
are distributed from net profit after corporate tax and carry imputation credits of the maxi-
mum corporate tax rate (Australian Taxation Office, 2020p). Rational application of Aus-
tralian tax laws ensures firms will make dividends fully franked when possible (Cannavan
et al., 2004). Only in the circumstances where firms have not paid Australian corporate
tax on all of its profit, due perhaps to tax deductions arising from losses from previous
years or when they receive net profits from overseas, will unfranked dividends with no
imputation credits be distributed. Partly franked dividends are a mix of fully franked and
unfranked dividends (Pattenden and Twite, 2008). Table 2.22 shows the differences in
the cash flow from the company to its investors through a fully franked dividend, a partly
franked dividend, and an unfranked dividend with the same payout ratio of 100%. The
fully franked dividend is generated by Australian sourced income, and the unfranked div-
idend is generated by foreign sourced income. The partly franked dividend (75% in this
example) can be interpreted as a mixture of a fully franked dividend with a weight of
75% and an unfranked dividend with a weight of 25%. Table 2.2 indicates that under the
dividend imputation system, an Australian resident investor obtains a net dividend of $53
when receiving a fully franked dividend. In contrast, the Australian resident investor only
obtains $39.75 if the dividend is unfranked. When 75% of the cash dividend is attached
with franking credits, the Australian resident investor receives a net dividend of $49.69.
The comparison is based on the assumption that the income of all three scenarios is $100
and that the corporate tax rate is 25% for foreign income and 30% for domestic income.
2The tax rates in Australia in 2019-2020 are used in this table. Historical corporate tax rates and personal























Table 2.2: Comparison of cash flow of cash dividends with different levels of franking credits attached
This table compares the cash flow from a company to investors of fully franked, partly franked, and unfranked dividends. The table assumes an Australian sourced taxable income
of $100 for fully franked dividend, a foreign-sourced taxable income of $100 for unfranked dividend, a mix of Australian sourced taxable income of $75 and foreign-sourced
taxable income of $25 for partly franked dividend, a corporate tax rate of 30% in Australia and 25% in a foreign country, a payout ratio of 100%, and a personal tax rate of 47%.
All numbers in the table are in Australian dollars. This table is adapted from Cannavan et al. (2004) with amendment.
Cash flow Fully franked Partly franked Unfranked
Company level
Australian sourced taxable income 100 75 0
Less Australian corporate tax (30) (22.5) 0
Australian after-tax net profit 70 52.5 0
Foreign-sourced taxable income 0 25 100
Less foreign corporate tax 0 (6.25) (25)
Australian after-tax net profit 0 18.75 75
After-tax net profit 70 71.25 75
Payout ratio 100% 100% 100%
Cash dividend 70 71.25 75
Stockholder level
Cash dividend 70 71.25 75
Franking credits 30 22.5 0
Gross dividend 100 93.75 75
Personal tax liability (47) (44.06) (35.25)
Franking credit offset 30 22.5 0
Net tax payment (17) (21.56) (35.25)
Net (After-tax) dividend 53 49.69 39.75
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2.2.3 Eligibility of franking credits
This section investigates the eligibility rule on franking credits under the current tax regu-
lations in Australia. Specifically, the entities that are eligible to distribute franking credits
and four communities of investors are discussed. Since investors, depending on their sta-
tus for tax purposes, vary significantly with regard to their accessible tax benefits from
franking credits, it is critical to consider the differences among the four investor commu-
nities.
According to the definition in Australian Taxation Office (2020e), a “franking entity” is
an entity taxed at a corporate tax rate. It can be a company, limited corporate partnership,
corporate unit trust, or public trading trust. However, a company acting in its capacity
as trustee of a trust and mutual life insurance companies are excluded in this definition.
Investors in franking entities, if eligible, can obtain franking credits directly or indirectly
through a trust or a partnership. The franking credits do not need to be grossed-up in
individual investor’s tax account as they have been grossed-up in the trust and partnership
income.
There are four investment communities: (1) Australian taxpaying residents, (2) Aus-
tralian superannuation funds, (3) Australian tax-exempt residents, and (4) international
investors. Under the imputation system in Australia, franking credits can only be imputed
against the personal tax obligations of Australian residents, which means investors in the
first community are entitled to offset their tax liabilities with franking credits conditional
on their tax rates (Australian Taxation Office, 2020f). Nevertheless, the tax advantages
derived from the franking credits were not enjoyed by every domestic investor, specifi-
cally, not by those defined in low-income brackets (the second and third communities),
until the introduction of tax rebate in July 2000. In particular, investors whose credits ex-
ceed their tax liabilities used to have unused franking credits since they could not obtain
a refund of their (excess) franking credits. The July 2000 tax rebate described as rule 4 in
Section 2.2.5 made these unused or excess franking credits accessible, and thus increased
the value of imputation credits for investors in low tax brackets. In contrast, the fourth
investment community, which are international shareholders (or commonly referred to as
foreign residents for tax purposes), is not eligible to claim tax credits on their dividends
(Australian Taxation Office, 2020p). A comparison of cash flows of different categories
of investors is shown in Table 2.33, which assumes that the corporate tax rate is 30%, the
personal income tax rate is 47%, the superannuation income tax rate is 15%, the payout
ratio is 100%, and the taxable income is $100. Table 2.3 shows that an Australian resi-
dent investor receives a net dividend of $53, which is 43% higher than the net dividend of
$37.1 obtained by international investors4. The difference is the same as the one between
3The tax rates in Australia in 2019-2020 are used in this table. Historical corporate tax rates, personal
income tax rates, and superannuation funds income tax rates are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
4Table 2.3 assumes a tax rate of 47% on the cash dividend for both Australian and international in-
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investors under the imputation system and the classical system discussed in Table 2.1. The
net dividend received by superannuation funds increased from $70 to $85 after the intro-
duction of the tax rebate in 2000. Similarly, tax-exempt investors experience a growth in
net dividend from $70 to $100 that is equal to the taxable income of the corporate after
2000.
vestors, so as to compare the tax treatments between Australian investors and international investors when
controlling for personal income tax rates. It is possible that the international investors are in a tax bracket
with tax lower than 47%, but this does not help a comparison. Further, even if an international investor is in
a country where the income rate is lower than the income tax rate in Australia, this does not mean that these























Table 2.3: Comparison of cash flow of different tax brackets of investors
The table compares the cash flow from a company to investors for different tax brackets of investors. The table assumes a taxable income of $100, a corporate tax rate of 30%,
a payout ratio of 100%, a income tax rate of 47% for Australian resident and international investors, 15% for superannuation funds and 0% for tax-exempt. All numbers in the
table are in Australian dollars. This table is developed for this research.
Cash flow Australian International Superannuation funds Superannuation funds Tax exempt Tax exempt
resident investors investors (before 2000) (after 2000) (before 2000) (after 2000)
Company level
Taxable income 100 100 100 100 100 100
Less corporate tax (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
After-tax net profit 70 70 70 70 70 70
Payout ratio 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Cash dividend 70 70 70 70 70 70
Stockholder level
Cash dividend 70 70 70 70 70 70
Franking credits 30 0 30 30 30 30
Gross dividend 100 70 100 100 100 100
Personal tax liability (47) (32.9) (15) (15) (0) (0)
Franking credit offset 30 0 15 30 0 30
Net tax payment (17) (32.9) 0 15 0 30
Net (After-tax) dividend 53 37.1 70 85 70 100
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2.2.4 Franking account
Corporate tax entities keep an account called a “franking account” which records the
undistributed franking credits at the year end. The franking credits account records the
amount of tax paid each year that a franking entity can pass on to its shareholders as
franking credits. The franking account balance accumulates when the corporate entity
does not allocate all of its available franking credits. In contrast, the franking account
balance decreases when the corporate entity distributes franking credits or receives a tax
refund (Australian Taxation Office, 2020e). The franking credit balances rollover from
one financial year to the next. The franking account is in surplus if the sum of franking
credits exceeds the sum of franking debits, and it is in deficit vice versa. The Simplified
Imputation System (SIS) that penalises a corporate entity with a deficit franking account
was introduced in 2002. Specific details of the SIS are described in rule 5 in Section 2.2.5.
2.2.5 Evolution of the Australian imputation system
After the introduction of the imputation tax system in 1987 in Australia, five major tax
regime changes are highly relevant to franking credits. 1) Superannuation funds are eli-
gible for franking credits after 1988; 2) anti-streaming rules were introduced to prevent
dividend streaming in 1990; 3) holding period rules and related payments rules were im-
plemented in 1997 to prevent trading of franking credits; 4) investors can claim a cash tax
rebate for unused franking credits in 2000; 5) a SIS was introduced which converts the
franking account from a “tax profit” basis to a “tax paid” basis. This section discusses
these rule changes.
Rule 1: 1988 Superannuation funds are eligible to receive franking credits5. When
the income tax was first introduced in Australia in 1915, superannuation funds were not
taxed at all. Before 1983, end benefits could be paid out as a lump sum or an annuity.
Only 5% of the lump sum was taxed at marginal rates, while all annuities were taxed at
marginal rates (Reinhardt and Steel, 2006). The tax advantages of lump sums attracted
more taxpayers to shift their retirement income to lump sum. This issue was addressed
by the reform introduced in 1983 that increased the lump sum to 15% for amounts below
a specified threshold and 30% for amounts above the threshold (Reinhardt and Steel,
2006). A further revision was the reform made in 1988 that superannuation funds, friendly
societies, and selected deposit funds are required to pay income tax and capital gains tax
at a flat rate of 15%. Meanwhile, they are eligible for franking credits (Commonwealth
of Australia, 1989).
Rule 2: 1990 Anti-streaming rules6. Although the imputation system passes the benefit
of corporate tax to its investors as franking credits, not all investors value the franking
5See Commonwealth of Australia (1989).
6See Australian Taxation Office (2020d)
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credits equally, which creates an incentive for a company to stream franked dividends to
those investors who most value the franking credits (Fisher, 1999). Specifically, under
the dividend streaming scenarios, companies preferred to pay an unfranked cash divi-
dend with a relatively higher amount to investors who do not value franking credits, such
as international investors and investors with low tax liabilities, before the introduction
of tax rebate rule in 2000 (Beggs and Skeels, 2006). The Australian taxation office ap-
plied a range of measures to prevent the streaming of dividends, including initial anti-
avoidance provisions, specific anti-streaming provisions, third-generation provisions, and
capital benefits anti-streaming rules (Fisher, 1999). Ultimately, anti-streaming rules were
introduced in 1990 to penalise companies that directly distributed their franking credits to
investors who most benefited from the franking credits (Beggs and Skeels, 2006). After
the introduction of anti-streaming rules, firms have to apply the same rules to distribute
franking credits to all investors equally, which reduces investors’ ability to absorb the full
benefits of franking credits.
Rule 3: 1997 Holding period rule and related payments rule7. The taxation office
applied the “holding period rule” and the “related payments rule” to restrict the eligibility
of franking credits in 1997 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). Investors might not be
eligible to claim the franking credits if they violate these two rules. If the amount of an
investor’s franking credits is equal to or more than $5,000, the investor has to meet both
the “holding period rule” and the “related payments rule” no matter whether he holds the
shares in one parcel or a portfolio consisting of multiple parcels. Conversely, if the amount
of an investor’s franking credits is less than $5,000, the investor only needs to meet the
“related payments rule”. The part of franking credits that do not meet the requirements
is not able to be claimed (Australian Taxation Office, 2020g). Both these rules aim to
prevent the potential arbitrage opportunities of indirect trading of franking credits (Beggs
and Skeels, 2006). The “holding period rule” was introduced in Australia after July 1,
1997. To claim the franking credits, the investor needs to hold the shares for at least 45
days (90 days for preference shares, not counting the day of acquisition or disposal). The
rule applies to each purchase of shares. The rule takes effect when the amount of total
franking credits that can be claimed for the year of income is above $5,000 (equivalent to
a fully franked dividend of $11,666 for a firm with a corporate tax rate of 30%). If the
investor is in a partnership or a beneficiary of a trust, both the investor and the partnership
or trust must obey the rule (Australian Taxation Office, 2020g). The “related payments
rule” was applied in Australia after 7:30 pm (AEST) on May 13, 1997. A related payment
stands for a payment that transfers the franked dividend entitlement to someone else. The
rule states that the investor who makes or is going to make a related payment has to hold
the shares for at least 45 days (90 days for preference shares) to claim the franking credits
(Australian Taxation Office, 2020n).
7See Commonwealth of Australia (1999)
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Rule 4: 2000 Tax rebate for unused franking credits8. Before 2000, excess franking
credits were wasted if the franking credits exceed the investor’s tax liabilities. For ex-
ample, a tax-exempt investor was unable to claim the franking credits as there is no tax
liability; superannuation funds cannot utilise the excess franking credits as their franking
credits are more than their tax liabilities. The tax rebate for unused franking credits was
enacted in July 2000 and made the excess or unused franking credits able to be claimed by
both individual investors and superannuation funds (Australian Taxation Office, 2020m).
This rule creates an incentive for low taxpayers to seek franking credits (Beggs and Skeels,
2006). The effect of this rule on various investors is shown in Table 2.3.
Rule 5: 2002 SIS9. With the introduction of the SIS on July 1, 2002, all Australian cor-
porate tax entities are required to convert their franking account from a “tax profit” basis
to a “tax paid” basis (franking balance reported at June 30, 2002, will be converted with a
conversion rate of 30/70) (The Treasury, 2002). Prior to the SIS, franking accounts were
recorded on a “tax profit” basis that the franking credit balances raised from an amount
that is equal to the after-tax profits. Under the SIS, franking accounts were recorded on
a “tax paid” basis based on the payment or the rebate of taxes. This rule requires that
taxes will be recorded in the franking account only when they are paid or received rather
than accrued. For instance, dividends distributed after a firm’s financial year would not
be recorded in the franking account in the annual report of the current financial year. In
addition, corporate tax entities are able to utilise their franking account to offset their
Australian corporate tax or even obtain a cash rebate. Moreover, if the corporate entity
distributes more franking credits than its franking account, it receives a penalty that is
equal to the deficit.
2.2.6 Capital gains tax (CGT)
The capital gains tax (CGT)10, introduced on September 20, 1985, in Australia by the
Hawke/Keating government, was applied to capital gains from the disposal of any asset
purchased on or after that date. Any asset purchased prior to September 20, 1985, is
regarded as a pre-CGT asset and is not subject to CGT. Prior to September 20, 1999, an
“indexation method” was implemented. The part of capital gains caused by inflation was
not taxed on an asset held for more than one year, so as to eliminate taxation of inflationary
gains. For assets held for less than one year or sold with a loss, indexation was not
used in determining gains and losses. Twenty percent of the capital gain was included in
taxable income and the calculation of the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, and all capital gains
were taxed at the personal income tax rate. The “indexation method” was not used for
capital gains on assets held for less than one year. CGT rules were modified by replacing
8See Australian Taxation Office (2020m)
9See The Treasury (2002)
10See Australian Taxation Office (2020b,o)
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Table 2.4: Comparison of capital gain taxes and income taxes between in-
dividual investors and superannuation funds
The table compares capital gain taxes and income taxes between individual investors and superan-
nuation funds before and after 1999, assuming income tax plus medicare levy is 47% for individual
investors and 15% for superannuation funds, and capital gains are on assets held for at least 12









(before 1999) (after 1999) (before 1999) (after 1999)
Income tax 47% 47% 15% 15%
Capital gain tax 47% 23.5% 15% 10%
the “indexation method” with the “discount method” in 1999. The “discount method”
provides a discount on capital gain taxes to both individual investors and superannuation
funds to different extents. Table 2.411compares the capital gain tax rate and the income
tax rate between individual investors and superannuation funds before and after 1999. For
individual investors (including partners in partnerships and trusts), capital gains realised
within 12 months of purchase are taxed as ordinary income (with the top personal income
tax rate being 47%) while capital gains on assets held for longer than 12 months are taxed
at half that of ordinary income (equivalent to half of the top personal income tax rate
of 23.5%). For superannuation funds, the capital gains tax (10%) is two-thirds of the
income tax (with the income tax rate of superannuation funds being 15%). In addition,
this special tax exemption of 50% was no longer applicable to foreign and temporary
residents after May 8, 2012 (Australian Taxation Office, 2020b,o). Table 2.4 indicates
that individual investors have a comparative tax advantage in capital gains over personal
income compared with superannuation funds after 1999 because an individual’s capital
gains tax is only half of its personal income tax while a superannuation fund’s capital
gains tax is two-thirds of its personal income tax, even though superannuation funds has
absolute tax advantages in both personal income and capital gains.
2.2.7 International imputation tax systems
According to a study by Ainsworth (2016), five countries in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), namely Australia, Canada, Chile, Mex-
ico, New Zealand, and the non-OECD member, Malta, have adopted full imputation tax
systems. Korea and the United Kingdom, however, operate a partial imputation system
where tax credits are less than the total amount of corporate taxes. Ainsworth (2016) also
notes that several developed countries have shifted away from imputation systems. For
11The tax rates in Australia in 2019-2020 are used in this example. Historical capital gain tax rates and
income tax rates for both individual investors and superannuation funds are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix
A.
18
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
instance, the imputation tax system was implemented in Germany until 2001, Italy until
2004, Finland and France until 2005, and Norway until 200612.
In addition, Southeast Asian nations like Singapore and Malaysia have gone further,
moving from an imputation system to a tax system where dividends are not taxed at all
(Hennig, 2004; Teck, 2006). The removal achieves an even more substantial tax advan-
tage in dividend income. Also, it should be noted that the original imputation system
in Singapore and Malaysia, before being removed, significantly differed from the one in
Australia in that shareholders receive a tax benefit no matter whether they are domestic
investors or international investors and irrespective of whether the corporate entity has
paid corporate taxes on income.
Overall, although several countries have removed the imputation tax system, the jus-
tifications of removing these systems overseas are not directly applicable to the case of
Australia because there are considerable differences between Australia and these coun-
tries regarding the political and economic conditions and, more importantly, the removed
imputation systems overseas are not the same as the one implemented in Australia.
2.3 Theoretical literature
This section reviews the theoretical literature that provides the basis and insight for com-
monly employed empirical models where the impacts of franking credits on security pric-
ing are estimated. Franking credits are valuable in theory, but whether they are priced in
the market depends on the tax status of marginal investors. Unfortunately, franking cred-
its are not allowed to be traded in the market due to many restrictions, described in rule 3
in Section 2.2.5, designed and introduced in order to ensure treasury revenue. Therefore,
there is no consensus on the market price of franking credits.
Officer (1994) proposes two parameters γ (gamma) and θ (theta) which are widely used
by Australian regulators and researchers as shown in the following valuation equation:
MV F = Xo ∗ γ/(1− τc)∗ τc = Xo ∗PR/(1− τc)∗θ , (2.1)
where MV F is the market price of franking credits, Xo is the operating income, τc is the
corporate tax rate. There are three parameters within this framework. The payout ratio
(PR): the percentage of a firm’s after-tax net profit that has been distributed to investors as
12Germany shifted from the imputation tax system in January 2001 to a “half-income” system where
50% of the dividend is taxed for individuals while firms do not pay tax on dividends received. The moti-
vation for the shift includes reducing the personal tax rate on dividends and the corporate tax rate Endres
and Oestreicher (2000); OECD (2007, 2016), strengthening Germany’s international competitiveness, at-
tracting foreign investment, increasing retained earnings, and eliminating the discrimination against foreign
investors based on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Similarily, ECJ is a common determining factor
contributing to the removal of the imputation system in Finland, France, Italy, and Norway (Bernstein,
2004; Graetz and Warren Jr, 2007; Hietala, 2006; Economic Review Committee, 2002; Ainsworth, 2016).
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cash dividends. Theta (θ): the percentage of market value of distributed franking credits
to its face value. Gamma (γ): the percentage of corporate tax that is a pre-collection of
the personal income tax for the investor. θ is commonly less than one as most firms avoid
distributing all of their profits to investors and re-invest part of their profit for future cash
flow. γ is calculated as the product of PR and θ . Take an example that a firm distributes
70% of its profits to investors and all investors in that firm claim and utilise their franking
credits. θ is 100% in this case; however, γ is only 70% as only 70% of corporate tax
paid has been distributed to investors. γ has an upper bound of θ and it reaches the upper
bound when and only when PR is 100% (Cannavan et al., 2004).
According to the case in Table 2.5, the company earns an operating income of $100 and
pays a corporate tax of $30, thus obtaining an after-tax net income of $70. The company
then distributes its income with a payout ratio (PR) of 70% as a cash dividend of $49
with attached franking credits of $21. The remaining $21 (e.g., the undistributed after-tax
profit) would be re-invested in the firm operations. Assuming the market value of the
distributed franking credits to its face value (θ ) is 35%, the market price of distributed
franking credits will be $7.35. Table 2.5 shows the detailed calculation of the market























Table 2.5: Calculation of the market value of franking credits
This table shows the calculation of the market value of franking credits. The table assumes an operating income of $120, an interest payment of $20, a corporate tax rate of 30%,
a payout ratio of 70%, a θ of 35%. All numbers in the table are in Australian dollars. This table is developed for this research based on Officer (1994).
Cash flow General expression Numerical example
Company level
Operating income XO 120
Less interest payment XD (20)
Taxable income XO−XD 100
Less corporate tax (XO−XD)(τc) (30)
After-tax net profit (XO−XD)(1− τc) 70
Payout ratio pr 70%
Cash dividend (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49
Stockholder level
Cash dividend (XO−XD)(1− τc)∗ pr 49
Franking credits (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ τc 21
Percentage of market value of franking credits θ 35%
Market value of franking credits (XO−XD)∗ pr ∗ τc ∗θ 7.35
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2.4 Empirical literature
The tax regulation and theoretical literature indicate that franking credits are valuable to
Australian resident investors but valueless to non-resident investors because of the differ-
ences in eligibility as discussed in Section 2.2.3. Although the Australian tax authority
interprets γ as the value of franking credits at the point of creation (Officer, 1994), most
literature seeks to estimate the value of θ instead of γ (Cannavan et al., 2004). If all share-
holders of a firm are international investors and tax-exempt, θ will be zero. On the other
hand, θ will be 100% if a firm is held by only domestic tax-paying investors. However, in
reality, the equity owners of most firms are a mixture of different classes of investors who
value franking credits or do not value franking credits. θ thus depends on the tax status
of marginal investors.
This section illustrates the empirical literature about the evidence of whether franking
credits are priced or what is θ . No consensus emerges. Three main approaches, including
ex-dividend drop-off studies, comparative pricing studies, and the required rate of return
studies, are commonly used in the extant literature. Ex-dividend drop-off studies infer
θ by comparing the price drop-off with cash dividend and franking credits on the ex-
dividend date. Comparative pricing studies infer θ by comparing price differences in a
pair of stocks with the same instrument but different entitlement to franking credits (e.g.,
underlying equity and futures). The required rate of return studies infer θ by investigating
whether franking credits can reduce the required rate of return. Some other approaches,
including price level studies, tax statistic studies, and franking credit balance studies, are
also adopted in the extant literature. Price level studies investigate whether franking cred-
its are incorporated in long-term share prices. Tax statistic studies examine the percentage
of franking credits distributed that are utilised by Australian resident investors. Franking
credit balance studies estimate the value of franking credit balance. Although there are
various methodologies to estimate θ , the evidence is mixed and there is no consensus on
whether franking credits are priced.
2.4.1 Ex-dividend drop-off studies
The most commonly used approach in the existing literature is ex-dividend drop-off stud-
ies. The examination is based on the theory that the dividend price drop-off on the ex-
dividend date should reflect the market value of the cash dividend. Boyd and Jagannathan
(1994) conclude in their paper that “over the last several decades, the one-for-one marginal
price drop has been an excellent (average) rule of thumb”. Under the imputation tax sys-
tem, the price drop-off of a fully franked dividend should be the market value of the cash
dividend and its attached franking credits. The valuation of franking credits is inferred by
regressing the dividend drop-off on the cash dividend and franking credits.
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2.4.1.1 Dividend ex-dividend drop-off studies
These studies originate from the debate on the existence of dividend clienteles. Miller and
Modigliani (1961) first proposed the theory that a firm’s dividend policy cannot affect its
market value and that capital gains and dividends are of equal value to investors in a
perfect market without transaction costs and taxes. That is, in their setting, the share
price on the cum-dividend date is the sum of the current dividend and the present value
of dividends in the future, while the share price on the ex-dividend date is the present
value of dividends in the future. Therefore, the price drop-off on the ex-dividend day (the
difference in share prices between the cum-dividend date and the ex-dividend date) should
be equal to the amount of cash dividend in a perfectly efficient market. The equation can
be expressed as:
E|Pc−Pe|= DIV, (2.2)
where Pc is the share price on the cum-dividend date, Pe is the share price on the ex-
dividend date, DIV is the dollar amount of cash dividend per share.
However, in an imperfect world in which taxes and transaction costs need to be con-
sidered, the conversion between dividends and capital gains cannot be costless due to the
asymmetry between dividends and capital gains in tax rules, transaction costs, and other
factors. These inefficiencies and imperfections might lead to clienteles. Therefore, the
price drop on the ex-dividend day might not be the same as the dividend. This is sup-
ported by Campbell and Beranek (1955) and Durand and May’s (1960) findings that the
ex-dividend price drop is significantly less than the amount of cash dividend. An exten-
sive literature attempts to explain why the ratio of the price drop to cash dividend per
share (defined as drop-off ratio) is not equal to one.
Elton and Gruber (1970a) propose a tax explanation to account for the drop-off ratio.
Elton and Gruber (1970a) claim that taxes cause the price drop-off ratio to not be equal
to one and accordingly that marginal tax rates of investors can be inferred from the price
drop-off ratio. Elton and Gruber (1970a) investigate the drop-off ratio of all listed firms
that have paid a dividend during the period between April 1, 1966, and March 31, 1967,
on the New York Stock Exchange. They provide evidence that the average drop-off ratio
of US firms is less than one (around 77%) and that there is a positive relationship between
dividend yields and drop-off ratios. Further, they derive an expression between the drop-







where τp is the personal income tax rate, τcg is the capital gain tax rate. Their equilibrium
pricing expression indicates that implied tax rates are negatively correlated with drop-off
ratios. Therefore, a positive relationship between dividend yield and drop-off ratio means
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a negative correlation between the implied tax rates and the dividend yield. This finding
provides evidence in support of Elton and Gruber’s (1970a) hypothesis that firms with
higher dividend yields attract more investors in relatively low tax brackets than lower
dividend yield firms. Their conclusion supports a tax-induced clientele effect.
Kalay (1982) re-examines the ex-dividend events both empirically and theoretically.
Empirically, the author makes adjustments to eliminate potential biases, but the drop-off
ratio is still less than one, and the correlation between the price drop-off ratio and the
dividend yield is still positive in the US market. The empirical results are consistent
with Elton and Gruber’s (1970a) findings. However, Kalay (1982) questions the taxes
explanation and proposes an alternative explanation (e.g., transaction costs). He modifies
Elton and Gruber’s (1970a) model and finds that the drop-off ratio should fall into a no
profit opportunities bound based on the assumption that no short-term traders can obtain










where P = (E(Pc) +E(Pe))/2, αP is the expected transaction costs of “a round trip”.
This bound relies on the fact that short-term capital gains and personal income are taxed
equally. Kalay (1982) adds that the drop-off behaviour evidence provided by Elton and
Gruber (1970a) can also be explained by the no profit opportunity bounds and concludes
that the marginal tax rate of investors cannot be inferred from the price drop-off ratio. His
argument are bolstered by Ainsworth, Lee, and Walter’s (2020) findings that contradicts
Elton and Gruber’s (1970a) tax explanation but is consistent with Kalay’s (1982) transac-
tion cost explanation by investigating the ex-dividend drop-off events in the US between
1993 and 2012.
Bali and Hite (1998) provide another plausible explanation, namely a discrete tick sizes
explanation. They develop a simple model that predicts that the price drop-off should be
less than the total dividend but greater than the dividend minus one tick. This model in-
troduces a new angle using market microstructure rules to explain the drop-off. Take an
example, a dividend of 30 cents is distributed, and the tick size is 12.5 cents. The expected
price drop-off would be 25 cents due to the tick size restriction since no one would pay
37.5 cents for the dividend. Moreover, they regress the ex-dividend price drop-off ratio
on the nearest tick price below the dividend. They fail to reject the hypothesis that the co-
efficient on the closest tick price below is one. They conclude that the discreteness in tick
size offers a third explanation for the observed drop-off ratio behaviour in the US mar-
ket. Subsequently, various microstructure issues, including bid-ask bounce, illiquidity,
spreads, and order imbalances, have been investigated.
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2.4.1.2 Franking credits ex-dividend drop-off studies
Under the imputation system, if both dividends and franking credits are fully priced, the
price drop-off should be equal to the cash dividend and its attached franking credits as
shown below:
E|Pc−Pe|= DIV +FC, (2.5)
where FC is the dollar amount of franking credits per share. This becomes the premise of
ex-dividend drop-off studies approach to estimate θ .
A large body of literature attempts to estimate θ in countries outside of Australia.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) examine the impact of a major tax reform13 in 1971 on
ex-dividend day events in Canada. The tax reform increases the value dividends relative
to capital gains through changes in franking credits and capital gain taxes. However, the
price drop decreased after the implementation of this tax reform. The unexpected initial
drop after the tax reform might be due to the uncertainty in the valuation of franking cred-
its. McDonald (2001) improves Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan’s (1994) model
to infer θ in and finds the evidence that the price drop-off is $1.26 for a cash dividend
of $1 with franking credits of $0.43. He concludes that θ is between 50% and 67% in
Germany14. In the UK, Poterba and Summers (1984) provide evidence that a tax reform
that introduced a partial imputation system in 1973 had a substantial effect on the excess
return on the ex-dividend day. Bell and Jenkinson (2002) investigate the impact of a tax
reform that pension funds became unable to obtain the unused imputation in July 1997
in the UK. They find that the average drop-off ratios dropped from 0.84 to 0.73 after
the tax reform. Poterba and Summers (1984) and Bell and Jenkinson’s (2002) findings
support that franking credits are priced in the UK. Rantapuska (2008) finds evidence that
domestic investors engage in overnight arbitrage by shifting from a long position to a
short position around the ex-dividend date to obtain dividends and franking credits while
foreign investors and tax-exempt are on the opposite side. Similarily, Chen, Chow, and
Shiu (2013) and Tseng and Hu (2013) find the evidence that price drop-off increased after
the introduction of the imputation system in 1998 and domestic investors engage in arbi-
trage around the ex-dividend date in Taiwan. Compared with Finish and Taiwan taxation
law that allow investors to buy and sell stocks with franking credits on the same date, the
Australia market has the holding period rule and related payment rule15 to eliminate the
direct trading of franking credits, which makes their evidence not applicable directly to
the Australia imputation system.
13In 1971, the dividend franking credits rate was 20%, the provincial tax credit was 28%, and capital
gains are not taxed. In 1972, dividends were grossed up by 33%, the franking credits rate was 20%, the
provincial tax rate of the net federal tax was 30.5%, and capital gains were taxed as half of the ordinary
income tax rate. Overall, a dollar of dividends worth 20% more in 1972 than that in 1971
14Before 2001, Germany apply an imputation system with franking credit rate of 30%. Germany removed
the imputation system in January 2001 as discussed in Section 2.2.7.
15This is rule 3 described in Section 2.2.5.
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2.4.1.3 Australian franking credits ex-dividend drop-off studies
Brown and Walter (1986) give the first insight into the Australian ex-dividend day be-
haviour, by providing evidence that the average price drop-off ratio is around 75% be-
tween 1973 and 1984. The evidence suggests that Australian shareholders discounted
dividends relative to capital gains by around 25%. Their data are, however, drawn from
periods before the introduction of the imputation system. Their findings can be used
as benchmark data to examine the influences of Australian tax laws changes after 1984.
They suggest further research to investigate the impacts of the imputation system on the
ex-dividend price drop-off after its establishment in July 1987.
Following Brown and Walter’s (1986) paper, Brown and Clarke (1993) find that the av-
erage drop-off ratio dropped rather than increased after the introduction of the imputation
tax system, which coincides with Lakonishok and Vermaelen’s (1983) findings in Canada,
while it thereafter increased significantly after the extension of the imputation system to
superannuation funds in July 198816. Although the average drop-off ratio is still signifi-
cantly less than one after 1987, they estimate a θ of 80%. Bellamy (1994) supports Brown
and Clarke’s (1993) argument that franking credits are priced by providing evidence that
the average drop-off for fully franked dividends is more significant than that for unfranked
dividends from 1987 to 1992. He also notes that firms that pay fully franked dividends in-
creased their dividend payments compared with firms that pay no or little franking credits
and that firms increased their dividend payments after the introduction of imputation.
Hathaway and Officer (1995) investigate the value of franking credits by regressing the
price drop-off ratio on the ratio of franking credits over dividends as shown below:
Pc−Pe
DIV




Their findings show that the price drop-off of $1.00 can be explained by cash dividend
component (theoretical value of $1.00) of $0.80 and franking credits component (theoret-
ical value of $0.43) of $0.20 from 1986 to 2004. This indicates a θ of 50% in the market
where some investors do not place value on franking credits and some other investors
place a high value on franking credits. In contrast, Beggs and Skeels (2006) use a sim-
ilar regression model but come to an opposite conclusion using the same sample period.
They extend Hathaway and Officer’s (1995) model by applying a similar approach with
the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) estimator using weights from the auxiliary
regression shown below:
l̂nε2 = λ0 +λ1 ∗W +λ2 ∗G+λ3 ∗Pc +u, (2.7)
where ε are Ordinary Lease Squares (OLS) residuals from the last equation. Consistent
16This is rule 1 described in Section 2.2.5.
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with the existing literature, the gross drop-off ratios are significantly less than one. How-
ever, inconsistent with Hathaway and Officer’s (1995) finding that examines the same
period, the franking credit drop-off ratios are insignificantly different from zero. The
findings indicate that franking credits are not priced in the market if cash dividends are
fully priced. Bellamy and Gray (2004) address the issue that the results of ex-dividend
studies are very sensitive to the econometric models and sample selection and the market
value of cash dividends and franking credits cannot be estimated respectively in the previ-
ous literature. Therefore, they argue that franking credits are worthless as cash dividends
are assumed to be fully priced between 1995 and 2002 in Australia.
Following Hathaway and Officer (1995) and Beggs and Skeels’s (2006) work, an exten-
sive literature has attempted to estimate θ and provided conflicting evidence. Gray (2008)
extends Hathaway and Officer (1995) and Beggs and Skeels’s (2006) methodology and
documents a θ of 28% from 1998 to 2006. Gray, Hall, and Costello (2011) re-examine
the ex-dividend drop-off events between 2000 and 2010 and estimate a θ of 35%. Minney
(2010) adjusts Bellamy and Gray’s (2004) model by regressing the daily return plus the
dividend yield less the return on the sector on the ex-dividend date on franking credits
yield to examine θ from 2000 to 2009. Over the period, θ is 24% from 2001 to 2005
and 53% from 2006 to 2009. The author attributes the increased valuation of franking
credits to the shift of marginal investors to superannuation funds who have an incentive
to obtain franking credits. Feuerherdt et al. (2010) contribute to the existing literature by
investigating the ex-dividend price drop-off for hybrid securities, which have higher div-
idend yields and are less sensitive to market returns compared with ordinary shares. The
average drop-off ratios are significantly less than one. The evidence indicates that frank-
ing credits are not priced. Vo et al. (2013) argue that the estimates of θ in the previous
literature are inaccurate due to the high multicollinearity between the cash dividend and
the franking credits. They propose a sensitivity analysis to estimate the range of θ instead
of a definite value. The findings indicate a range of θ between 30% and 55% from 2001
to 2012. Cannavan and Gray (2017) improve Hathaway and Officer (1995) and Beggs and
Skeels’s (2006) OLS methodology by employing a generalised least squares to reduce the
inverse relationship between dividend yield and the variance of residuals from 2001 to
2016. The findings indicate a θ of 35%.
2.4.1.4 Summary of ex-dividend drop-off studies
In summary, the ex-dividend drop-off studies are the most widely used method to infer
θ through regressing ex-dividend drop off against the face value of cash dividends and
franking credits. However, the estimates of θ are conflicting across the existing studies.
In addition, the existing literature has some limitations. Firstly, Cannavan et al. (2004)
and Siau et al. (2015) address the limitation that inferring the θ from the drop-off ratio is
driven more by short-term traders rather than a firm’s marginal shareholders. Miller and
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Scholes (1982) and Poterba (1986) point out that the estimate of the value of dividends
from the ex-dividend date is a poor estimate of the value that long-term investors place on
dividends. Based on this, McDonald (2001) further argues that the value of franking cred-
its that long-term investors place on them and inferred from ex-dividend drop-off studies
is also an inferior estimate. They focus on the pricing difference on specific dividend
events but ignore the whole price movements in the long term. Secondly, Cannavan et al.
(2004) and Siau et al. (2015) also document that noise might affect the share prices and
the sample cannot represent the true population. Further, the taxation factor is not the only
determinant of the ex-dividend price drop, which can be easily affected by other factors
such as transaction costs (Kalay, 1982; Eades, Hess, and Kim, 1984; Lakonishok and Ver-
maelen, 1983; Karolyi, 1998; Bali and Francis, 2011), market microstructure (Dubofsky,
1992; Bali and Hite, 1998), and risk (Heath, Jarrow, and Morton, 1988; Grammatikos,
1989; Fedenia and Grammatikos, 1993; Michaely and Vila, 1995). Thirdly, separately
identifying the value of franking credits and cash dividends is difficult econometrically
(Dempsey and Partington, 2008). Bellamy and Gray (2004) and Cannavan et al. (2004)
claim that the estimate of θ is poor due to multicollinearity issues between franking cred-
its and dividends as franking credits can only be distributed when attached to dividends.
Gray (2008) argues that the estimate of θ depends heavily on the assumed valuation of
cash dividends (Hathaway and Officer, 1995) or coefficients generated from regression
(Beggs and Skeels, 2006). Fourthly, Wood (1997) argues that the assumption that θ is
constant over the sample period and across all firms is unrealistic. Lastly, Walker and
Partington (1999) mention that the comparison between the ex-dividend price and the
cum-dividend price is not contemporaneous because the ex-dividend price is observed on
the ex-dividend date, which is typically one day after the cum-dividend date.
2.4.2 Comparative pricing studies
The second stream of literature is comparative pricing studies. These studies examine θ
by comparing prices of one pair of stocks that are the same in their underlying but only
differ in dividends and their entitlement to franking credits (franking credits are received
in one asset but not in another asset).
The first method that has been developed is the contemporaneous comparison between
the cum-dividend shares and ex-dividend shares. As discussed above in Section 2.4.1.2,
ex-dividend drop-off studies are limited by the non-contemporaneousness between the
cum-dividend shares and ex-dividend shares (Walker and Partington, 1999). The fact that
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) allows investors to trade cum-dividend shares dur-
ing the ex-dividend periods provides researchers with a natural environment to compare
the cum-dividend shares and ex-dividend shares contemporaneously. This is due to the
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fact that the book closure date17 happens five business days after the ex-dividend date.
Walker and Partington (1999) infer the combined value of franking credits and dividends
by comparing the cum-dividend shares during the ex-dividend period and ex-dividend
shares from January 1995 to March 1997 and find that the instantaneous drop-off ratio
is 1.23, which can reject the null hypothesis that drop-off ratio is equal to one. Their
findings indicate that θ is around 90%.
The most commonly used methodology in the comparative pricing studies is the com-
parison between the underlying and their derivatives. McDonald’s (2001) extracts frank-
ing credits by comparing DAX 30 index and DAX 30 index futures. The author finds a
θ between 65% and 89% in futures price before 1994, and 65% afterwards. Twite and
Wood (2003) conduct similar research to estimate a θ of 45% by comparing Individual
Share Futures contracts (ISFs) with their underlying from 1994 and 1995. Cannavan et al.
(2004) extend McDonald’s (2001) equilibrium model by relating the valuation of frank-
ing credits to the price of the derivatives (ISFs) or Low Exercise Price Options (LEPOs)
in Australia. They find that the holding period rule and the related payments rule18 in-
troduced in 1997, devised to prevent the purchase and selling of franking credits, affects
the value of tax credits. θ is around 50% before 1997 but subsequently drops to zero.
However, Cummings and Frino (2008) find contradictory results by inferring θ from the
comparison of the index futures prices and their underlying securities during the period
from 2002 to 2005 and find a θ of 52%.
An alternative methodology is comparing the prices between the underlying stocks and
their ADRs that are mainly held by US investors who are unable to claim the franking
credits. Jun, Alaganar, Partington, and Stevenson (2008) and Jun and Partington (2014)
propose this approach by comparing the prices on the ex-dividend date between the un-
derlying stocks in Australia and their ADRs. Jun et al. (2008) find that the ex-dividend
drop is lower for ADRs than their underlying, especially for those securities with franking
credits. Jun and Partington (2014) document that the pricing of Australian ADR dividends
is less than its par value, but the pricing of underlying stocks is higher than its par value
and attribute the pricing differences to the franking credits. Their findings indicate that
θ is from 15% to 25% in the market. Besides, the merger between Conzinc Riotinto of
Australia (CRA) in Australia and Rio Tinto – Zinc (RTZ) in the UK provides Chu and
Partington (2008) a natural environment to infer θ by comparing the price difference be-
tween bonus shares with franking credits and old shares without franking credits. They
find that shares carrying franking credits tend to have a higher market value than those
without franking credits. The premium of market value over face value disappears when
the stock goes ex-dividend.
17The book closure date is the cut-off date that determines whether investors are able to claim the divi-
dend.
18This rule is rule 3 described in Section 2.2.5.
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In summary, the most popular methodology in comparative pricing studies is to in-
fer θ by comparing underlying stocks and their derivatives. They overcome some men-
tioned issues in ex-dividend studies such as the noise and market microstructure effects
(Kalay, 1982; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983; Eades et al., 1984; Karolyi, 1998; Can-
navan et al., 2004; Siau et al., 2015), non-contemporaneous comparison between the cum-
dividend shares and ex-dividend shares (Walker and Partington, 1999) and the difficulty
to separate dividends and franking credits (Bellamy and Gray, 2004; Cannavan et al.,
2004) described in Section 2.4.1.4. However, there are still some limitations. Firstly, the
estimate of the valuation of franking credits from derivatives might be poor. McDon-
ald (2001) and Cannavan et al. (2004) document that transaction costs in futures con-
tracts including brokers’ commission fees, administrative, monitoring and set-up costs
prevent certain investors from investing in futures contracts and that this leads to different
marginal investor bases between underlying and futures contracts. Therefore, compar-
ing prices between derivatives and their underlying is misspecified and might produce
poor estimates for marginal investors (Lajbcygier and Wheatley, 2012). Secondly, like
ex-dividend studies, the comparative pricing studies also focus on the price differential
around specific ex-dividend events but ignore the overall pricing movement in the long
term (Siau et al., 2015).
2.4.3 The required rate of return studies
The third stream of literature estimates the value of franking credits by relating the re-
quired rate of return with franking credits. This methodology is based on the theory
that franking credits should reduce the required rate of return (Officer, 1994). However,
whether franking credits lower the required rate of return in practice depends on the iden-
tity of marginal investors. Lajbcygier and Wheatley (2012) claim that “the impact of
credits on the returns that investors require on equity will depend to a large extent on
whether equity markets are segmented or – aside from an inability of foreign investors
to redeem credits – integrated”. More specifically, if the equity markets are independent
of the international market, franking credits can reduce the required rate of returns as
the marginal investors are more likely to be domestic investors. In contrast, if the equity
markets are integrated with the international market, franking credits cannot reduce the
required rate of returns as the returns of a small open economy are dominated by inter-
national investors who do not value franking credits at all. Researchers in the required
rate of return studies estimate the value of franking credits by regressing cross-sectional
risk-adjusted returns on risk-adjusted franking credits yield.
The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965)
assumes that taxes on capital gains and dividends are the same. However, Officer (1994)
argues that the assumption is invalid as under an imputation system taxes on dividends are
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lower than those on capital gains and investors receive a higher cash flow due to the frank-
ing credits. He derives an amended version of CAPM19 in which weighted average cost
of capital (WACC) incorporates franking credits under Australian dividend imputation
system.
E( ´r jt) = r f t +β j[E(rmt + τmt)− r f t ], (2.8)
where E( ´r jt) is the expected return after company tax before personal tax, E(rmt) is the
expected return on the market portfolio, τmt is the valuation of franking credits in the
market portfolio, r f t is the risk-free rate. Officer’s (1994) version of CAPM is widely
applied by Australian regulatory authorities.
Wood (1997) extends Monkhouse’s (1993) model by replacing multiple investors with
two groups of investors who can either (i) utilise franking credits or (ii) who cannot and
finds an estimate of θ of 60%. Faff, Hillier, and Wood (2000) provide indirect evidence
to the extant literature by noting that the slope between beta and return is steeper after
the introduction of the imputation system in 1987 in Australia. In particular, assuming
that dividend yield is negatively correlated with the risk, the beta is positively related to
returns. They attribute the increase of risk premium to franking credits by employing
an “imputation-adjusted CAPM” and conclude that franking credits are capitalised in the
market.
Lajbcygier and Wheatley (2012) investigate the relation between risk-adjusted equity
returns and risk-adjusted credit yields by applying five models (the CAPM, the interna-
tional CAPM, the Fama-French two-factor models, the Fama-French three-factor model
and the Chen-Novy-Marx-Zhang (CNMZ) alternative three-factor moded) using monthly
data from 1987 to 2009 and find no evidence that franking credits cannot reduce the re-
quired rate of return. More specifically, the authors first estimate the risk each month
using the data of the previous 60 months and calculate a security’s franking credit yield.
They find no relationship or even a positive relationship rather than a negative relationship
between equity returns and franking credit yield across all models, regardless of whether
they use models that assume segmented markets or integrated international markets.
2.4.4 Other studies
Price level studies investigate the influence of franking credits on long-term price levels.
The central hypothesis is that if franking credits are priced in the market, the pricing levels
of securities with franking credits will be higher (Officer, 1994; Dempsey and Partington,
2008). Siau et al. (2015) examine θ by investigating the impacts of franking credits on
price levels under Gordon and Gordon’s (1997) discounted cash-flow (DCF) valuation
model with input from forecasts and Ohlson’s (1995) clean surplus accounting model
19Monkhouse (1993), Wood (1997), Lally (2000), Lally and Van Zijl (2003), and Dempsey and Parting-
ton (2008) also conducts similar research and develop different versions of CAPM.
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for 468 listed securities from 1996 to 2011. Their overall findings fail to uncover any
relationship between franking credits and pricing levels.
Tax statistics studies investigate the valuation of franking credits from tax statistics.
Some researchers (Handley and Maheswaran, 2008; Hathaway, 2013) examine the util-
isation ratio of franking credits (the percentage of franking credits used by Australian
resident investors in franking credits received by investors) using tax statistics from the
annual ATO publication. Handley and Maheswaran (2008) find that the utilisation ratio
of franking credits that have been claimed by investors is 67% from 1990 to 2000 and
81% from 2001 to 2004. They attribute the increase to the tax rebate for unused frank-
ing credtis20. Hathaway (2013) updates the utilisation ratio to 68% using tax-statistic
data from 1988 to 2011; the author raises his concerns that θ and γ are unclear using the
tax-statistic data.
Dividend reinvestment plan (DPR)21 studies relate firms’ decision to utilise DPR with
franking credits. Firms are more likely to utilise DPR after the introduction of frank-
ing credits in 1987 (Chan, Mccolough, and Skully, 1995) and even more after the in-
troduction of a cash rebate of unused franking credits in 2000 described in rule 4 in
Section 2.2.5 (Abraham, Marsden, and Poskitt, 2015b). The relationship between util-
isation of DPR and the level of franking credits is positive in financial firms (Abraham
et al., 2015b) but negative in non-financial firms (Abraham, Lau, and Marsden, 2019).
Following Chan et al. (1995) and Abraham et al.’s (2015b) work, Abraham, Dempsey,
and Marsden (2015a) propose a tax-explanation that DRP reduces the cost of capital of
firms to the increasing utilisation of DPR after 1987 and 2000.
Another stream of studies examines the significance of franking credits on dividend
policy. Balachandran and Nguyen (2018) find that the post-Kyoto 22 reduction in dividend
payout ratio is lower for companies under an imputation environment than those under a
classical tax system. Balachandran, Khan, Mather, and Theobald (2019) add that firms
operating under an imputation tax system are more likely to pay a dividend and have a
higher payout ratio.
Franking credit balances studies provide a new angle by examining the pricing of frank-
ing account balances. This methodology is based on the assumption that if franking cred-
its are priced in the market, franking credit balances should also be priced by investors.
Heaney (2009) uses a sample of firms that report franking credit balances in their annual
report on ASX between 2001 and 2006. He applies fixed effects panel analysis and un-
covers evidence that investors in small companies place a higher valuation of franking
credits than those in larger companies. In addition, larger companies are more inclined
20This is rule 4 described in Section 2.2.5.
21A DPR enables investors to reinvest their dividends in newly issued shares without transaction costs
(Dammon and Spatt, 1992).
22The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that commits state parties to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to meet national reduction targets
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to accumulate franking credit balance than smaller companies. However, this estimate is
poor due to his lack of ownership data.
There are some other studies that document direct or indirect evidence on the impact
of franking credits on the Australian equity market. Balachandran and Nguyen (2004)
find evidence that the price reaction to the announcement of special dividends are not
statistically different between fully franked dividends and unfranked dividends.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter introduces the Australian tax system and reviews both theoretical and empir-
ical literature that investigate the market pricing of franking credits. Although franking
credits are valuable to Australian resident investors in theory, the evidence on the esti-
mates of the θ in the extant literature is mixed and remains broadly disputed due to a
variety of methodological approaches, each of which has different estimation limitations.
Whether franking credits are priced in the market is debatable. This thesis contributes
to the literature by providing empirical evidence to answer this question, as well as ad-
dressing some of the limitations mentioned above, in the following three chapters. Each




The Curious Case of A Price Premium
between BHP and Billiton ADRs
3.1 Introduction
BHP Group was formed in 2001 when the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited
in Australia merged with the Anglo–Dutch Billiton Plc in the United Kingdom (UK) to
form a Dual-Listed Company (DLC). A DLC (also referred to as a “Siamese twin”) is a
structure where two firms contract to combine their management teams, operations, and
cash flows while retaining separate shareholding identities and stock exchange listings. In
this case, BHP Group Limited (BHP) and BHP Group Plc (Billiton)1 share the same board
of directors, operations, and dividends, while BHP is primarily listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX) and Billiton is primarily listed on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE)2. The equalisation ratio between BHP and Billiton is one to one. In addition, BHP
and Billiton are cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as BHP Group
Limited American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and BHP Group Plc ADRs, which are
referred to as BHP ADRs and Billiton ADRs respectively. In fully integrated and efficient
financial markets, even though the underlying company is listed on different exchanges,
the two ADRs should have the same price because both securities receive the same US
dollar denominated dividends and have the same voting rights. However, the evidence
indicates that there is a significant and substantial premium for the BHP ADR over the
Billiton ADR that is regarded as an anomaly to the market efficient theory (Barberis and
Thaler, 2003).
Following Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and Dabora’s (1999) claim that stock
prices are influenced by the trade location, a considerable body of literature attempts to
identify factors that might explain price differences between DLCs twins. For the mis-
1BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Limited Plc changed their names to BHP Group Limited and BHP
Group Plc effectively on November 19, 2018.
2BHP Group also has a secondary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
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pricing between the BHP twins, Su et al. (2013) investigate several economic differences
(between Australia and the UK), including currency risk, gross domestic product (GDP),
the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the consumer price index (CPI), the official cash
rate (ORC), national current account, imports, exports, government debt, business confi-
dence, and 10-year government bonds. As a general conclusion, the empirical research
to date indicates that the mispricing between the BHP twins cannot be arbitraged away,
and no one individual factor is sufficient to fully explain the empirically observed time
variation in the premium (De Jong et al., 2009; Su et al., 2013).
This chapter investigates the role of taxation differences in the dividend franking credit
arrangements (i.e., the extent to which the dividend imputation system is more complete
in Australia than it is in the UK)3 and the top marginal personal dividend tax rate differ-
ences between Australia and the UK in the mispricing of the BHP twins. Our empirical
investigation focuses on the premium to the ADRs rather than the underlying assets since
both ADRs are denominated in US dollars and both securities trade in the same time zone.
Accordingly, this chapter does not need to consider exchange rate risk and possible lead-
lag information effects addressed by Copeland and Copeland (1998) and Bedi et al. (2003)
in comparing the share prices of the ADRs. The central research design investigates the
hypothesis that tax differentials significantly explain (both statistically and economically)
the pricing differences between the BHP and the Billiton ADRs. This chapter applies
two multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regressions to test this hypothesis.
The first regression investigates the direct relationship between price divergences and tax
rate differences due to franking credits and personal taxes. The second regression uses
the relative price differences between BHP and Billiton ADRs as the dependent variable
with the main independent variable being the relative differences in estimated prices using
the Gordon Growth Model (GGM) derived by Gordon and Shapiro (1956) and Residual
Income Model (RIM) derived by Ohlson (2001) to value the after-tax dividend streams
of both ADR holders. Our findings indicate that differences in the tax systems between
Australia and the UK, especially dividend imputation tax credits, are a significant factor
in explaining this premium between the BHP twins.
This chapter makes four main contributions to the literature. First, this chapter uses tax
factors to explain the mispricing between the BHP twins while the literature about BHP
mispricing is limited (Froot and Dabora, 1999; Bedi et al., 2003; De Jong et al., 2009; Su
et al., 2013). Second, the study in this chapter shifts from analysing DLC twins to the
comparison between their counterpart twin ADRs to remove the effect of timezone dif-
ference and exchange rate risk addressed by previous literature (Copeland and Copeland,
1998; Bedi et al., 2003). Third, by proposing the new approach that compares the prices
of two instruments which are same in their underlying but differ in their entitlement to
3As will be explained below in more detail, Australia has an almost “full” imputation system, while the
UK has a “partial” imputation system.
35
CHAPTER 3. THE CURIOUS CASE OF A PRICE PREMIUM BETWEEN BHP AND
BILLITON ADRS
franking credits (i.e., ADRs of DLC twins), this chapter extends the comparative pricing
studies (McDonald, 2001; Cannavan et al., 2004; Chu and Partington, 2008; Jun and Part-
ington, 2014) reviewed in Section 3.2.4. Finally, this chapter provides direct evidence to
the debate that whether franking credits are priced in the market discussed in Section 2.4.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides evidence on
the mispricing and briefly reviews the related literature and describes the main differences
in the dividend imputation tax systems between Australia and the UK. Section 3.3 elabo-
rates the research hypotheses and the objectives of this study. Section 3.4 and Section 3.5
describe the data collection and research methodology. Section 3.6 presents the results,
and Section 3.7 concludes and discusses the original contribution of this research.
3.2 Literature review
This literature review consists of four parts. Section 3.2.1 provides a brief background of
the merger between BHP and Billiton. Section 3.2.2 contains literature related to investi-
gating price differences of the underlying assets and their ADRs. Section 3.2.3 focuses on
studies about price differences between ADR twins. Section 3.2.4 reviews the literature
of comparative pricing studies.
3.2.1 The background of the BHP and Billiton merger
BHP Group is a leading global resources company and is well known to investors all over
the world. BHP Group, formerly known as BHP Billiton, was formed when the Broken
Hill Proprietary Company Limited in Australia merged with the Anglo–Dutch Billiton
plc in the UK on June 29, 2001, creating the world’s leading diversified resources group.
BHP is the second Australian company entering into a DLC structure4. As mentioned
above, a DLC is a corporate structure where two companies combine their operations and
cash flows through an equalisation agreement but retain separate shareholder identities
and stock exchange listings. The DLC structure means that BHP and Billiton separately
maintain their listings on ASX and LSE. However, both companies share the same board
of directors. The equalisation ratio is one to one, which means that one share bought on
ASX or LSE should have the same economic value because they have the same dividend
streams and have equal voting rights. However, this expectation is not empirically sup-
ported. From Fig. 3.1, BHP in Australia has traded at a premium compared with Billiton
in the UK for most of the last decade. It is also clear from Fig. 3.1 that there is consid-
4The first DLC in Australia is Rio Tinto Group, which is a British-Australian international metals and
mining company with the head office in the UK and a management office in Australia. In 1995, The Rio
Tinto – Zinc Corporation (RTZ) and Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) merged into a DLC with separate
management and a one to one equalisation ratio. Rio Tinto Group is listed on the LSE as Rio Tinto Plc and
the ASX as Rio Tinto Limited. However, Rio Tinto Group does not have ADR twins.
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Fig. 3.1. The figure plots the prices of BHP on ASX and Billiton on LSE (in USD) during the
period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Share price data are collected from Bloomberg after
adjusting for exchange rates to USD.
erable variation through time in the size of this premium and that there have been some,
albeit limited, periods where BHP shares traded at a price below Billiton. The price dif-
ference between the BHP twins is referred to as the mispricing. The mispricing between
DLC twins is usually regarded as an anomaly to the market efficiency theory (Barberis
and Thaler, 2003).
Why is there a substantial price premium between BHP on ASX and Billiton on LSE?
Before answering this question, another question as to why there is no instantaneous ar-
bitrage opportunity between these twin securities needs to be addressed because if the
price premium can be arbitraged, the price premium will not persist. However, these twin
securities are not exchangeable. Specifically, an investor cannot buy a share of BHP on
ASX and sell it directly on LSE to implement an instantaneous riskless arbitrage strategy
(Bedi et al., 2003). Returning to the original question, possible explanations for the pre-
mium between BHP and Billiton are exchange rate risk (Copeland and Copeland, 1998;
Bedi et al., 2003) and different trading time zones (Su et al., 2013). BHP ASX is traded in
Australian dollars, and Billiton LSE is traded in British pounds. In addition, the trading
session on ASX is earlier than LSE, and there is no overlapping trading period between
ASX and LSE. According to evidence provided by Su et al. (2013), a cross-listed com-
pany spillover effect flows from the earlier time zone market (ASX) to the later time zone
market (LSE). To resolve this currency and timezone issue, this chapter moves the focus
(see Section 3.2.2) from the underlying assets to their ADRs. This chapter first demon-
strates that there is an almost perfect mapping from BHP (and Billiton) to their US ADRs.
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3.2.2 BHP, Billiton and their respective ADRs
ADRs are negotiable receipts issued by a bank to represent a specified number of the
underlying stocks of a non-US company. The ADR ratio is defined as the number of
non-US shares represented by a single ADR. The ADR ratio for BHP ADR and Billiton
ADR is two. It indicates that one BHP ADR represents two shares of BHP on ASX, and
one Billiton ADR represents two shares of Billiton on LSE. ADRs provide US investors
with opportunities to trade non-US securities without having to invest directly overseas
and hence shield US investors from currency risk. Although Hong and Susmel (2003) and
Barberis and Thaler (2003) show arbitrage opportunities between prices of the underly-
ing and their ADRs, most literature arrives at the conclusion that there is no opportunity
to profit through arbitrage between underlying assets and their ADRs. As shown by Bedi
et al. (2003), the price premium between ADRs and their underlying security is negligible
because they are fully fungible (convertible), and hence any premium would have already
been eliminated by arbitrage. Any small price difference between an underlying asset and
its ADR is most likely related to transaction costs and asynchronous price observations.
This is consistent with early evidence provided by Kato, Linn, and Schallheim (1990),
Park and Tavakkol (1994), Miller and Morey (1996) and Karolyi (1998) who find there
are no arbitrage opportunities between underlying assets and their ADRs. Koumkwa and
Susmel (2008) extend these studies by demonstrating that price spreads between under-
lying assets and their ADRs reduce by more than 50% in two business days when using
a non-linear adjustment model. Some studies posit other reasons to explain the price
spreads. Hsu and Wang (2008) investigate a sample of 37 ADRs in China, Hong Kong,
Japan, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan from 1993 to 2006 and attribute the price spreads
between underlying stocks and ADRs to heterogeneous expectations, which is assumed
to be measured by trading volume and macroeconomic events. Grossmann, Ozuna, and
Simpson (2007) apply a fixed-effects panel data model and show that ADR mispricing
is more severe when transaction costs (bid-ask spread) are higher, dividend payments are
lower, or the T-bill interest rate is higher. Other possible explanations for the mispricing
between underlying assets and their ADRs are exchange rate risk, different trading time
zones, and transaction costs.
Overall, the review of the relevant literature suggests that the price difference between
underlying assets and their ADRs should be close to zero. The rest of this section presents
an empirical comparison of the prices between BHP on ASX and Billiton on LSE and
their ADRs on NYSE. Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3 below show that, compared with the price
divergence between DLC twins in Fig. 3.1, the spread between the underlying stock and
its respective ADRs on NYSE is much smaller. Arbitrage activities ensure this very close
relationship in prices, because each ADR represents exactly two units of the underlying
stock. The remaining spread between the underlying assets and their respective ADRs can
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Fig. 3.2. The figure plots the prices of BHP on ASX and half BHP ADR on NYSE (in USD) during
the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Share price data are collected from Bloomberg
after adjusting for exchange rates to USD.
Fig. 3.3. The figure plots the prices of Billiton on LSE and half Billiton ADR on NYSE (in
USD) during the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Share price data are collected from
Bloomberg after adjusting for exchange rates to USD.
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Table 3.1: Regression of daily shares prices of BHP and Billiton on half
of their ADRs
This table shows estimated coefficients, standard errors and R-squared from OLS regressions of
the daily share price of BHP and Billiton on half of the daily price for their respective ADRs for
the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018.
BHPt = β1×BHP ADRt + εt Billitont = β1×Billiton ADRt + εt
β1 1.003 0.998
R2 99.90% 99.94%
be attributed to differences in time zone and currency exchange rate uncertainties. While
the ADRs can be directly exchanged for the underlying stocks, BHP shares, and Billiton
shares are not directly exchangeable. Hence the premium between the two underlying
securities can be substantial.
This chapter regresses the daily prices of BHP and Billiton on the prices of a half
share of the BHP ADR and Billiton ADR (because an ADR represents two units of the
underlying stock) respectively for the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Table
3.1 demonstrates the fact that BHP and Billiton prices and their respective ADRs trade at
almost the same price. This finding is consistent with the generally accepted view from
prior empirical studies that price differences between underlying assets and their ADRs
are close to zero. In addition, the slight divergences in Table 3.1 between the underlying
assets and their ADRs can be ascribed to time-zone differences5 and foreign exchange
risk.
3.2.3 The pricing of BHP ADR and Billiton ADR
As shown in Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3 above, the prices of BHP (Billiton) and its ADR are
almost the same. Consistent with Fig. 3.1, Fig. 3.4 indicates that the price differentials
between the ADR twins still exist. There is still a substantial price premium between
the ADR twins. As there is no time zone difference or exchange rate risk, there must
be other fundamental factors that contribute to the mispricing. Traditional finance the-
ory hypothesises that the equity price is unrelated to the trading location if international
financial markets are perfectly integrated. A significant body of literature attempts to ex-
plain the price divergences between cross-listed stocks or dual-listed stocks. Rosenthal
and Young (1990), Bodurtha Jr, Kim, and Lee (1995) and Froot and Dabora (1999) first
present the idea that stock prices are influenced by the trade location since each “twin
stock” has a strong correlation with the market in which it is traded. Their conclusion
indicates that international markets are partially segmented, and share prices are signifi-
cantly influenced by country-specific investor sentiment. So, according to Rosenthal and
5ASX is traded from 00:00 UTC to 06:00 UTC, LSE is traded from 08:00 UTC to 16:30 UTC, and
NYSE is traded from 14:30 UTC to 21:00 UTC.
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Fig. 3.4. The figure plots the prices of half BHP ADR on NYSE and half Billiton ADR on NYSE
(in USD) during the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Share price data are collected
from Bloomberg.
Young (1990), Bodurtha Jr et al. (1995) and Froot and Dabora’s (1999) arguments, BHP’s
price on the ASX would increase when the Australian market is rising. However, Rosen-
thal and Young (1990) and Froot and Dabora (1999) do not provide specific underlying
factors that cause location differences.
Following the influential work of Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and Dabora
(1999), an increasing body of literature reports evidence on the impediments to arbitrage.
Rosenthal and Young (1990), Bodurtha Jr et al. (1995) and Froot and Dabora’s (1999) idea
are bolstered by Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003), Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005)
and Greenwood and Sosner (2007) who all agree that the pervasive price divergences
between DLC twins or cross-listed companies should be attributable to the location of
trade, investors’ sentiment, and the manner of trading. Chan et al. (2003) examine price
movements after the trading location of the Jardine Group companies moved to Singa-
pore from Hong Kong. They provide evidence that Jardine Group share prices become
less correlated with the Hong Kong market and more correlated with the Singapore mar-
ket after the move. Barberis et al. (2005) apply a univariate analysis and find that stocks
experience considerable growth in beta after being added to the S&P 500 index and a
significant fall in beta after being deleted from the S&P 500 index. The replacement of
30 stocks in the Nikkei 225 Index in April 2000 offered Greenwood and Sosner (2007)
a natural experiment for uncovering a large increase in the correlation of trading vol-
ume of added stocks and stocks remaining in the Index. What are other possible factors?
Copeland and Copeland (1998) claim that the exchange rate is a significant explanatory
factor of the country return by investigating the Dow Jones global industry indices. You,
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Parhizgari, and Srivastava (2012) find that market trading volume has a significant impact
on increasing market efficiency. However, the previous literature does not provide suf-
ficient evidence that fundamental factors such as currency risk, liquidity, and tax factors
can fully explain the price premium. There is no direct research on the mispricing be-
tween the ADR twins. Although some literature investigates the mispricing between their
underlying twins, the possible reasons for the price premium are complex and, to date,
somewhat illusive (Bedi et al., 2003; De Jong et al., 2009; Su et al., 2013). Bedi et al.
(2003) extend Froot and Dabora’s (1999) work by demonstrating the existence of ongo-
ing price differentials in 14 DLC twins including BHP and Billiton. They suggest that
some DLC twins are not convertible into each other and thus attribute the mispricing to
the lack of exchangeability between the assets, instead of fundamentals, such as liquidity
differences and taxation factors. More specifically, since investors cannot directly convert
a BHP share on ASX to Billiton share on LSE, a BHP ADR cannot be directly converted
to a Billiton ADR on NYSE. The ADRs are distinctly different stocks. Investors can-
not expect a riskless arbitrage profit through taking a long position in Billiton ADR and
a short position in BHP ADR. Although the lack of exchangeability explains why there
is no riskless arbitrage opportunity, it does not explain the mispricing. De Jong et al.
(2009) examine price differences in a sample of 12 DLC twins, including BHP Group,
Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, ABB, and other companies from 1980 to 2002. They imple-
ment an arbitrage strategy with an abnormal return of 10% based on the assumption that
price premium will converge by considering brokerage commission fees, bid-ask spread,
short-sale constraints, and capital requirements. However, they find that the annual id-
iosyncratic volatility is more than 30% and the daily value at risk is around -4%. Their
main conclusion is that uncertainty in convergence dates and idiosyncratic risk impede the
operation of arbitrage. Su et al. (2013) regress the premium between BHP ASX and Billi-
ton LSE on many fundamental factors, including currency risk, the particular stock index
selected, GDP, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, CPI, ORC, national current ac-
count, imports, exports, government debt, business confidence, and 10-year government
bonds from 2001 to 2011 and report that there is no strong evidence to indicate that BHP
and Billiton prices are converging and that no single fundamental factor can fully explain
the price differences.
This chapter hypothesises that tax factors are responsible for this premium. Bedi et al.
(2003) however argue that tax factors do not explain the price differences of 12 DLC twins
since marginal investors might be foreign investors. Froot and Dabora (1999) report that
tax-induced investor heterogeneity cannot explain all the price spreads for three DLC
twins: Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading PLC; Unilever N.V. and
Unilever PLC; and SmithKline Beecham and Beecham Group. Graham (2013) maintains
that security returns are affected by personal taxes. He cites several papers to support his
argument including (i) Auerbach (1983) who points out that certain investors pick stocks
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according to firm-specific dividend-price ratios due to tax-related clientele preferences,
(ii) Constantinides (1983) and Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2001) who argue that capital
gains taxes influence investors’ investment and consumption decisions, and (iii) Seida and
Wempe (2000) who suggest that investors are more likely to realise their capital gains and
are reluctant to realise their capital losses when the capital gains tax rate increased with
the passage of the 1986 Tax Act. In addition, McGrattan and Prescott (2005) suggest that
the effective marginal tax rate on dividends is negatively correlated with the value of the
stock market by providing evidence that the total value of corporations doubled from 1960
to 2000 due to the decrease of the effective marginal tax rate. This evidence suggests that
tax rates might play an important role in pricing equities. Accordingly, tax differences
between Australia and the UK might contribute to the price divergences between BHP
and Billiton ADRs. The evidence on whether the pricing of ADRs is determined by tax
rules in the US is conflicting. Jun et al. (2008) and Jun and Partington (2014) find that the
ex-dividend drop-off is smaller for ADRs than underlying stocks in Australia due to the
high cum-price in Australia relative to that in ADRs and argue that the prices of ADRs are
affected by US tax rules rather than Australian taxes. However, Kadapakkam, Meisami,
and Shi (2010) show a contradictory finding that the ex-dividend price drop is equal to
the dividend, which indicates that the prices of ADRs are affected by tax policy in the
home market, rather than the US. This chapter provides evidence on whether the prices of
ADR are affected by the tax rules of the home market. These differences in taxes between
Australia and the UK will be discussed in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.4 Comparative pricing studies on the valuation of franking cred-
its
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, comparative pricing studies extract the value of franking
credits by comparing prices of one pair of stocks that are the same in their underlying
but only differ in dividends and their entitlement to franking credits (franking credits are
received in one asset but not in another asset). This chapter extends the comparative
pricing studies (McDonald, 2001; Cannavan et al., 2004; Chu and Partington, 2008; Jun
and Partington, 2014) by proposing the new approach that compares the prices of two
instruments which are same in their underlying but differ in their entitlement to franking
credits (i.e., ADRs of DLC twins).
3.2.5 The role of tax differences
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, Australia changed the tax system, moving from the clas-
sical tax system to the imputation tax system with the ultimate objective of eliminating
the double taxation of corporate earnings after July 1, 1987. From 1973 to 1999, the
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UK was operating under an imputation system in which shareholders are able to obtain
franking credits that are equal to the corporate tax. After April 1999, the franking credit
rate decreased from 20% to 10%, and there is no refund of unused franking credits. Al-
though both Australia and the UK have imputation systems, they are quite different in
their details. Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B provide historical corporate tax rate,
franking credit rate and top marginal personal income tax rate in Australia and the UK
from 2001 to 2018.
Although the cash dividends paid to shareholders are the same for BHP and Billiton
(and their ADRs), the franking credit rates and the personal dividend tax rates are different
between Australia and the UK. For example, in 2018, the franking credit rate is 30% in
Australia, whereas it is 10% in the UK. Similarly, the top marginal personal dividend
tax (plus a Medicare levy of 2%) is 47% in Australia while it is 38.1% in the UK. These
differences in the taxation system, as well as differences in the corporate tax rates, cause a
difference in the net (after-tax) dividend. This is hypothesised to cause investors to arrive
at different present values for the future dividend streams of the two securities. Table 3.2
compares the cash flows from the company to shareholders between BHP and Billiton in
the financial year 2017-2018. It shows that BHP shareholders receive a net dividend of
$53 which is 7% higher than the net dividend of $49.52 obtained by Billiton shareholders.
Table 3.2: Comparison of cash flows and the effective rate from the com-
pany to investors between BHP ASX and Billiton LSE
The table reports the differences in cash flow from the company to investors through cash divi-
dends between BHP ASX and Billiton LSE in 2018. The table assumes a personal dividend tax
rate (plus a 2% of Medicare levy) of 47% in Australia and 38.1% in the UK. BHP and Billiton
share the same cash dividend of $70. All numbers in the table are in US dollars.
Cash flow BHP shareholder Billiton shareholder
Company level
Cash dividend 70 70
Stockholder level
Cash dividend 70 70
Franking credits 30 10
Gross dividend 100 80
Personal Tax Rate 47% 38.1%
Personal tax liability (47) (30.48)
Franking credit offset 30 10
Net tax payment (17) (20.48)
Net (After-tax) dividend 53 49.52
The effective rate 24.29% 31.22%
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3.3 Research hypothesis
According to efficient market theory, and in the absence of tax distortions, the share prices
of the ADR twins should be the same because they have identical US-dollar denominated
dividend payments. Although several researchers have attempted to find fundamental fac-
tors contributing to the different pricing of the ADR twins, no existing research explains
why there is a substantial premium for the BHP securities. Some research has drawn at-
tention to tax differences as a possible explanation (Bedi et al., 2003; Froot and Dabora,
1999). Bedi et al. (2003) claim that tax factors are unable to explain the price deviations
as investors in a third party country do not have tax advantages. However, their argument
is invalid if a marginal investor is not from the same third party country.
This chapter examines whether differences in taxation arrangements, including frank-
ing credit rates and personal dividend tax rates between the UK and Australia, play a
significant role in explaining the price divergence of BHP and Billiton ADRs. Tax dif-
ferences affect the net received dividend, and this might influence investors’ valuation of
the respective stocks. This chapter focuses on the premium between two ADRs, instead
of two DLC twins because the ADRs are dominated in US dollars, and they trade in the
same time-zone. The testable hypothesis is shown below:
Hypothesis 3.1: The price premium between BHP and Billiton ADRs can be significantly
explained by differences in taxation arrangements between Australia and the UK.
3.4 Data collection
Dividend data and the ex-dividend date for BHP and Billiton are collected from the BHP
Group website. Book value of equity, net income, and other accounting data are collected
from annual reports. Further, this chapter also retrieves daily stock prices, the cost of
equity for the BHP ADR and the Billiton ADR6, the exchange rate and control variables
[including the market index (FTSE 100, ASX 200, S&P 500), liquidity proxies (trading
volume and the total number of shares outstanding for BHP ASX, Billiton LSE, BHP
ADR NYSE, and Billiton ADR NYSE)] from Bloomberg. Historical tax rates, franking
credits, GDP, CPI, export, import, current account, and the unemployment rate for both
Australia and the UK are sourced from the respective government websites. Tick-by-tick
6There are two traditional formulas to estimate the cost of equity – the dividend capitalization model and
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The cost of equity used in this thesis is provided by Bloomberg.
Bloomberg uses the CAPM to calculate the cost of equity as shown below.
Cost o f equity = R f +β ∗ (Rm−R f ) (3.1)
where R f is the risk-free rate measured as the rate of return paid on risk-free investments such as Treasuries.
β is a measure of risk calculated by regressing the company’s stock return on a relative index return using
two years of historical weekly data. Rm is the required rate of return of the market. This method of
calculation does not need to consider currency and capital structure changes, i.e., it is a levered equity beta.
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bid and ask prices for calculating lagged daily time-weighted bid-ask spread are obtained
from Thompson Reuters Tick History (TRTH). ADR ownership holdings of BHP and Bil-
liton are collected from Thompson Reuters Ownership Data (S34) in Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS). This database contains the number of shares of BHP and Billiton
traded on US markets as ADRs. The sample is from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018.
3.5 Methodology
This chapter extends Grossmann et al.’s (2007) method and applies multivariate OLS
linear regression to test hypothesis 3.1. First, this chapter constructs a dependent variable
to measure the actual price premium in Section 3.5.1. Second, this chapter constructs
two independent variables to capture changes in tax differences between Australia and
the UK - the effective tax rate difference dummies in Section 3.5.2 and estimated price
premium in Section 3.5.3. This chapter then constructs the estimated price premium using
the GGM in Section 3.5.4 and the RIM in Section 3.5.5. Next, this chapter discusses the
control variables that could help explain the premium drawing on the previous literature
and summarises the variables in Section 3.5.6. Finally, this chapter describes the model
specification, which investigates the impact of the effective tax rate difference dummies
and the estimated price premium on the magnitude of the actual price premium in Section
3.5.7.
3.5.1 Dependent variable
Similar to Grossmann et al. (2007), this chapter uses the daily price premium as the de-
pendent variable to measure the magnitude of price deviations. The daily price premium
(PRt) is calculated by using daily closing BHP ADR price minus daily closing Billiton
ADR price divided by their average as:
PRt =
BHP ADRt−Billiton ADRt
(BHP ADRt +Billiton ADRt)/2
, (3.2)
where BHP ADRt is the daily closing price for BHP ADR at time t, and Billiton ADRt is
the daily closing price for Billiton ADR at time t.
3.5.2 Independent variable – the effective tax rate difference dum-
mies
The first independent variable is the effective tax rate difference dummy variables that
capture the changes in tax differences on distributed dividends to investors directly. The
advantage of this measure is that it captures the absolute difference in the taxes on divi-
dends, which incorporates both franking credit rate and the top marginal personal dividend
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tax rate. The formulas for calculating the effective tax rates in the UK and Australia and
their differences are shown below:









where Di f f τe,t is the effective tax rate difference between the UK and Australia at time
t, τe,t,UK is the effective tax rate in the UK at time t, τe,t,AUS is the effective tax rate in
Australia at time t, τp,t,UK is the top marginal personal dividend tax rate in the UK at time
t, Ft,UK is the franking credit rate in the UK at time t, τp,t,AUS is the top marginal personal
dividend tax rate in Australia at time t, Ft,AUS is the franking credit rate in Australia at
time t, τm,t,AUS is the Medicare levy rate in Australia at time t.
From Table 3.27, BHP shareholders receive a net dividend of $53 which is around 7%
higher than the net dividend of $49.52 obtained by Billiton shareholders. The effective
tax rate in Australia τe,t,AUS that described in Eq. (3.5) is 1-(1-47%)/(1-30%) = 24.29%.
The effective tax rate in the UK τe,t,UK that described in Eq. (3.4) is 1-(1-38.1%)/(1-10%)
= 31.22%. The effective tax difference Di f f τe,t described in Eq. (3.3) is calculated by
using τe,t,UK minus τe,t,AUS. Thus, the effective tax rate difference Di f f τe,t is equal to
6.93% calculated by 31.22%-24.29%. This means that investors in the UK have to pay
6.93% more tax than Australian investors when receiving the same amount of dividend.
Table 3.3 shows the changes in the historical effective tax rate difference between the
UK and Australia based on Eq. (3.3). There are five changes: 1) the effective tax rate dif-
ference increased from -1.43% to 1.43% caused by a decrease of 2% in the top marginal
personal dividend tax rate in Australia on July 1, 2006; 2) the effective tax rate differ-
ence increased from 1.43% to 12.54% caused by an increase of 10% in the top marginal
personal dividend tax rate in the UK on April 6, 2010; 3) the effective tax rate difference
decreased from 12.54% to 6.99% caused by a decrease of 5% in the top marginal personal
dividend tax rate in the UK on June 6, 2013; 4) the effective tax rate difference decreased
from 6.99% to 6.27% caused by an increase of 0.5% in Medicare levy in Australia on July
1, 2014; 5) the effective tax rate difference increased from 6.27% to 6.93% caused by an
increase of 0.6% the top marginal personal dividend tax rate in the UK on April 6, 2016.
Annual tax rate changes effectively on April 06 in the UK and on July 01 in Australia.
Five dummy variables (i.e., effective tax rate difference dummies) constructed to cap-
7The tax rates in Australia in 2017-2018 are used in this table. Historical corporate tax rates and personal
income tax rates are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
8The calculation is described in Eq. (3.3) in Section 3.5.2.
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Table 3.3: The effective tax rate difference and effective tax rate difference
dummies between the UK and Australia
The table reports the effective tax rate difference and effective tax rate difference dummies between
the UK and Australia from 2001 to 2018. The effective tax rate difference (Di f f τe,t) is calculated
as the effective tax rate in the UK (τe,UK) minus the effective tax rate in Australia (τe,AUS)8. The
effective tax rate difference dummy change date is the first ex-dividend date after the tax change
date as discussed in Section 3.5.2. The ex-dividend dates are obtained from Table B.3 in Appendix
B.
Date from Date to τe,UK τe,AUS Di f f τe,t Dummy Effective tax rate
change date difference dummies
Jul 1, 2001 Jun 30, 2006 25% 26.43% -1.43%
Jul 1, 2006 Apr 5, 2010 25% 23.57% 1.43% Sep 6, 2006 D1
Apr 6, 2010 Apr 5, 2013 36.11% 23.57% 12.54% Sep 8, 2010 D2
Apr 6, 2013 Jun 30, 2014 30.56% 23.57% 6.99% Sep 4, 2013 D3
Jul 1, 2014 Apr 5, 2016 30.56% 24.29% 6.27% Sep 3, 2014 D4
Apr 6, 2016 Apr 5, 2018 31.22% 24.29% 6.93% Aug 31, 2016 D5
ture the changes in effective tax difference between the UK and Australia are also shown
in Table 3.3. Which date should be used for the effective tax dummy change date? In
this chapter, the effective tax rate difference dummy change date shown in Table 3.3 is
the first ex-dividend date after the effective tax rate change date as this ex-dividend date
is the date when investors’ welfare is first impacted by the tax rate change.
D1, D2 and D5 indicate a widening of the tax rate difference. The coefficient on these
three variables is expected to be positive and significant, revealing that tax rate differen-
tials help explain the mispricing because in all cases the tax advantage of the Australian
system increased relative to the UK. D3 and D4 proxy for decreases in the tax advantage
of Australia relative to the UK. Hence, the coefficient on these two dummies is expected
to be negative and significant to support our tax-based explanation.
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1, if date is after September 6, 2006 when the first dividend goes ex-dividend





1, if date is after September 8, 2010 when the first dividend goes ex-dividend





1, if date is after September 4, 2013 when the first dividend goes ex-dividend





1, if date is after September 3, 2014 when the first dividend goes ex-dividend





1, if date is after August 31, 2016 when the first dividend goes ex-dividend
after the effective tax rate difference increases from 6.27% to 6.93%
0, otherwise
(3.10)
Before presenting formal regression results, this section depicts visual evidence of the
association between the ADR premium and the tax rate differential during our sample
period in Fig. 3.5. The volatile line represents the price premium. The stepped line
shows the tax difference for the UK relative to Australia. It seems that the share price is
anticipating the tax regime changes. A strong co-movement between the price premium
and tax difference is evident, suggesting that tax rate differences might explain the price
premium between these two ADRs.
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Fig. 3.5. This figure plots the actual price premium between BHP ADR and Billiton ADR and
the effective tax rate difference of the UK over Australia for daily observations in the period from
June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018. Share price data are collected from Bloomberg.
3.5.3 Independent variable – estimated price premium
This chapter estimates the price premium as the difference in estimated prices between the
BHP twins based on the net dividends, cost of equity, and growth rate using two popular
valuation models. The Estimated Price Premium E[PRt ] is calculated as
E[PRt ] =
E[BHP ADRt ]−E[Billiton ADRt ]
(E[BHP ADRt ]+E[Billiton ADRt ])/2
, (3.11)
where E[BHP ADRt ] is the daily estimated valuation of the BHP ADR at time t, and
E[Billiton ADRt ] is the daily estimated valuation of the Billiton ADR at time t. E[BHP ADRt ]
and E[Billiton ADRt ] are calculated using the GGM and the RIM as the sum of the present
value of future net dividend streams of both ADRs, as described below.
3.5.4 Gordon growth model
The GGM is a two-stage Dividend Discount Model (DDM) derived by Gordon and Shapiro
(1956). The DDM is one of the fundamental approaches to value a firm’s equity value.
A basic assumption of this model is that the value of a stock is equal to the present value
of all its future dividend payments, discounted by the firm’s cost of equity. The GGM is
a special case of the DDM when the dividend growth rate and cost of equity are constant
during a terminal estimation period.
This chapter applies a two-step GGM approach to calculating the estimated share prices
and extends it by incorporating franking credits and personal dividend tax. First, this
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chapter calculates the net dividends for both the BHP ADR and the Billiton ADR as
distributed dividends after the effective tax rate (franking credits, and personal dividend
tax rates) as:
DIVBHP ADRt = DIVt ∗ (1− τe,t,AUS), (3.12)
DIVBilliton ADRt = DIVt ∗ (1− τe,t,UK), (3.13)
where DIVt is the distributed dividend of both BHP ADR and Billiton ADR at time t,
DIVBHP ADRt is the net dividend of BHP ADR at time t, DIVBilliton ADRt is the net dividend
of Billiton ADR at time t.
Second, this chapter estimates the daily share prices using the two-stage GGM with net
dividends and discount rates for both BHP ADR and Billiton ADR. This calculation is
based on the assumption that investors predict the cash amount of all distributed dividends
during the first state9. Assuming the share price is estimated at time t, the first stage is
defined as the period between the time t and the time when the 6th dividend after time t is
distributed. The model also assumes that investors can predict the 7th dividend after time
t and uses this dividend to calculate the terminal value for the second stage. The second
stage stands for the infinite period starting after the distribution of the 7th dividend. The
growth rate is the geometric average of the return of dividends during the sample period.
The two-stage GGM is shown as:




















where E[BHP ADRt ] is the estimated BHP ADR price at time t, E[Billiton ADRt ] is the
estimated Billiton ADR price at time t, g is the assumed growth rate for the second stage.
The estimated prices of BHP and Billiton ADRs and half of the actual prices of BHP and
Billiton ADRs are shown in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7.
9It might be argued that investors cannot predict the exact amount of dividend prior to the announcement
date. Accordingly, a robustness test is examined that replaces historical dividends with estimated dividends
from a simple AR model based on previous dividends. Specific descriptions of the calculation of estimated
dividends are shown in Appendix D. The results of this robustness test are shown in Panel A in Table 3.7.
Similar conclusions are drawn using this alternative approach compared to those reported in this chapter.
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Fig. 3.6. The figure plots the prices of half of the estimated BHP ADR or half of actual BHP ADR
in the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2015. Share price data are collected from Bloomberg.
Fig. 3.7. The figure plots the prices of half of the estimated Billiton ADR or half of actual Billiton
ADR in the period from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2015. Share price data are collected from
Bloomberg.
52
CHAPTER 3. THE CURIOUS CASE OF A PRICE PREMIUM BETWEEN BHP AND
BILLITON ADRS
The GGM is a valuation model for estimating the intrinsic value of a stock based on
a series of future dividends growing at a constant rate. Farrell (1985) suggests that the
GGM better fits a company that pays a stable portion of its net income as a dividend. It is
also more suitable for a mature firm with a lower growth rate relative to the cost of equity.
BHP Group meets these two requirements during our sample period10. Given that the
discount rates of BHP ADR and Billiton ADR are similar or equal and the growth rates of
dividends of BHP ADR and Billiton ADR are identical, the deviation of estimated prices
between the ADR twins should only be determined by tax differences in net dividends.
3.5.5 Residual income model
The RIM proposed by Ohlson (2001) is an alternative technique to estimate the value
of equity. The RIM is similar to the DDM in its basic structure. Compared with the
DDM, it substitutes future residual earnings for dividend payments. The DDM provides
an advantage that it is more suitable for firms that do not pay dividends or have unpre-
dictable dividend flows. In addition, the RIM pays more attention to a firm’s economic
profitability instead of its accounting profitability. Almost all researchers reach the same
conclusion that the RIM and the DDM are equivalent in theory. However, Courteau, Kao,
and Richardson (2001), Francis, Olsson, and Oswald (2000), and Penman and Sougiannis
(1998) suggest that the RIM is superior to the DDM and show that they yield different
estimates. However, Lundholm and O’Keefe (2001) argue that the RIM and the DDM are
still equivalent empirically. The original RIM states that a firm’s equity value is the sum of
its book value and the present value of all its expected future residual income. In personal
finance, residual income means excess cash or disposable income. However, residual in-
come is defined as the earnings for that period less for the cost of equity. The charge is
the product of equity capital at the year beginning and cost of equity. The derivation of
the RIM is shown below as:







Xt+τ a = Xt+τ − r ∗bt+τ−1, (3.17)
where Xt+τ a is residual income, Xt+τ is the net income during a year ending t + τ , r is
the cost of equity, and bt+τ−1 is the book value of equity at the beginning of a year t + τ .
However, this chapter does not use the above formula directly. In Appendix C.1, this
chapter starts with the DDM and derives Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.17). These equations are
10BHP Group has recently suffered substantial losses associated with reduced commodity prices and a
tailings dam collapse that caused iron ore production at its jointly owned (with Vale Corporation) operations
in Brazil to be suspended. The dam collapse resulted in a substantial loss of human life. BHP’s dividends
were dramatically reduced following this disaster.
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the restatement of the DDM when the clean surplus relation is valid. This chapter then
incorporates tax factors, including the franking credit rate and personal tax rates, into the
derivation and finds that the original RIM cannot be derived because personal tax rates
are not constant each year. Finally, this chapter returns to the underlying starting setting
that share price is the present value of expected future net dividends discounted at the cost






E[bt+τ−1 +Xt+τ −bt+τ ](1−Td,t+τ)
(1−Ft+τ)(1+ r)τ
. (3.18)
If the clean surplus relation perfectly holds in the accounting statements, our amended








Hence, our valuation estimates would be indifferent to the DDM. However, the analysis
shows that the clean surplus relation does not hold perfectly in the BHP Group case11.
Irrespective of whether our model uses the GGM or the RIM, the independent vari-
able (the estimated price premium) is determined by net dividends, the franking credit
rates, the top marginal personal dividend tax rates, and the discount rates. In both these
approaches, since net dividends are identical for BHP ADR and Billiton ADR, only the
franking credit rates, the top marginal personal dividend tax rates, and the discount rates
cause differences in the valuations. Therefore, the estimated price premium captures the
tax differences between Australia and the UK on a daily basis.
3.5.6 Control variables
This chapter adds control variables that could explain the premium according to the pre-
vious literature (Pontiff, 1996; Copeland and Copeland, 1998; Froot and Dabora, 1999;
Bedi et al., 2003; Keele and Kelly, 2006; Grossmann et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2009; Su
et al., 2013). These variables are lagged log return premium of BHP over Billiton to con-
trol for autocorrelation; the daily log index return and exchange rate to control for market
return; bid-ask spread to control for transaction costs; lagged turnover ratio to control for
liquidity; GDP, CPI, imports, exports, current assets and the unemployment rate to con-
trol for macroeconomic indicators. All dependent variables, independent variables and
control variables are described in Table F.1 in Appendix F.
The OLS regression model normally assumes that there is no autocorrelation between
11The evidence of the violations of the clean surplus relation is shown in Appendix C.2, which shows
that except in the years where the group has a major merger or demerger (2003 and 2015), the sum of the
clean surplus violations is generally less than one percent of shareholders’ equity.
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time series residuals. Lagged log return premium is included to control the autocorrelation
(Keele and Kelly, 2006). Daily log index returns of ASX200, FTSE100, and S&P500 are
included in the model to control for market return as Froot and Dabora (1999) show that
the price difference between twin securities are correlated with the markets where they
are traded. Their findings are bolstered by Bedi et al. (2003), Grossmann et al. (2007),
De Jong et al. (2009), and Su et al. (2013). Even though both BHP ADRs and Billiton
ADRs are traded in the US, their underlying are traded in Australia and the UK. It is thus
reasonable to include the index returns in Australia and the UK in the model. Compared
with Grossmann et al. (2007) and other literature that investigates the price differential
between DLC twins, the exchange rate difference problem has been addressed by shifting
our focus to ADR twins. However, the log return of the exchange rate is still included as
Copeland and Copeland (1998) find the exchange rate positively impacts the market return
and thus contributes to the price premium. Transaction cost controls are also added due
to the findings of Grossmann et al. (2007) who claim that mispricing is more severe when
transaction costs are higher and Pontiff (1996) who argues that transaction costs reduce
security mispricing and impede potential arbitrage opportunities. This chapter follows
and extends Grossmann et al.’s (2007) methodology and uses the bid-ask spread12 as
the proxy for transaction costs. Lagged turnover ratio is included to measure liquidity
(Hu, 1997). Lagged turnover ratio is a better variable than trading volume to measure
liquidity as it captures capital structure changes, including splits, share dividends, and
share issues. Important economic indicators for Australia and the UK, such as GDP, CPI,
national current account, imports, exports, and the unemployment rate are controlled in
the model (Su et al., 2013). If the tax explanation holds, the ADR ownership holdings of
BHP and Billiton will affect the mispricing as Australian and the UK investors are eligible
for franking credits while US investors are not13. ADR di f f is added in the regression
in the robustness test as a proxy for the difference in ADR ownership holdings between
BHP and Billiton. ADR di f f is calculated as the relative difference in the percentage of
ADR ownership between BHP and Billiton shown as below:
ADR di f f t =
(BHP ADR ownership perct−Billiton ADR ownership perct)
(BHP ADR ownership perct +Billiton ADR ownership perct)/2
,
(3.20)
where BHP ADR ownership perct is the percentage of ADR ownership holdings of BHP,
Billiton ADR ownership perct is the percentage of ADR ownership holdings of Billiton.
This variable is expected to be negatively related with the mispricing. The increase of
the ADR di f f could be caused by either the increase of the percentage of BHP ADR
ownership or the decrease of the percentage of Billiton ADR ownership. If the percentage
12This chapter first adopts McInish and Wood’s (1992) method to calculate quoted spread for each instru-
ment and then calculated a weighted average of quoted spread weighting by eigenvector (Kalivas, 1999) as
quoted spreads for four instruments are highly correlated with each other.
13We thank Keith Godfrey for this suggestion.
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of BHP ADR ownership increases, BHP share prices will decrease as US investors place
a lower valuation of BHP than Australian investors for tax reasons14. If the percentage
of Billiton ADR ownership decreases, Billiton share prices will increase as UK investors
place a higher valuation of Billiton than US investors. Both these two cases contribute to
increased mispricing.
3.5.7 Model specification
Hypothesis 3.1 states that price differences between BHP and Billiton ADRs can be sig-
nificantly explained by differences in tax factors between Australia and the UK. To mea-
sure the relationship between the actual price differences and tax differences, this chapter
constructs three time-series OLS linear regressions by regressing the actual price differ-
ences on five dummy variables that capture the differences in effective tax rates between
the UK and Australia discussed in Section 3.5.2, and differences in estimated prices using
the GGM and the RIM respectively discussed in Section 3.5.3. These three equations are
shown below as:




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.21)




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.22)




Bi ∗Xi + εt . (3.23)
Hypothesis 3.1, developed from an inspection of the tax rate changes in Fig. 3.5, is that
the price premium should be significantly correlated with the tax dummies, i.e., d1, d2,
and d5 should be positive while d3 and d4 should be negative from Eq. (3.21). Also,
hypothesis 3.1 expects β1 in Eq. (3.22) and Eq. (3.23) to be positive.
3.6 Empirical results
This section presents the analysis across all relevant determinants. Further, it shows the
regression coefficients on tax explanatory variables, including the effective tax difference
dummy variables, estimated price premium using the GGM, and the RIM. Finally, this
section verifies the robustness of our findings by assuming that tax changes take effect
on various dates, and investors have the ability to obtain the tax change and dividend
14The evidence shows that “BHP (Billiton) and their respective ADRs trade at the same price” and the
argument that “US investors place a lower valuation of BHP than Australian investors for tax reasons” are
not contradictory because BHP (Billiton) and their ADRs are exchangeable. It is assumed that the marginal
investors of BHP are Australian investors - BHP sets the price, and BHP ADR follows that price.
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information in advance, estimating the GGM with estimated dividends derived from AR
model, and utilising monthly estimated GGM.
3.6.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.4 provides the summary statistics including the mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum value of each variable used in Eq. (3.22) and Eq. (3.23). This
allows the magnitudes and dispersions of the variables to be examined. The dependent
variable (PRt) in Panel A has a positive mean and median (0.1113 and 0.1158 respec-
tively), indicating that BHP ADR is priced higher than Billiton ADR on average during
our sample period. The estimated price premiums in Panel B based on the GGM and
the RIM present similar mean and median values, which are more than twice as high as
those for the actual price premium in Panel A. The standard deviation of estimated price
premium using the GGM and RIM is close to that of actual price premium, which indi-
cates the reliability of the estimating models. In addition, Panel C shows that all control
variables except weighted quoted spread have values close to zero for both the mean and
median.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in Eq. (3.22) and Eq. (3.23) from June 30,
2001 to June 30, 2018. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table F.1 in Appendix F.
Variable Mean Median Std. Min. Max.
Panel A: Dependent Variable
Price Premium PRt 0.1113 0.1158 0.0515 -0.0303 0.2801
Panel B: Dependent Variable
Estimated
Price Premium
GGM E[PRGGM,t ] 0.2097 0.1950 0.0558 0.1249 0.3064
RIM E[PRRIM,t ] 0.2223 0.2050 0.0617 0.1368 0.3422
Panel C: Control Variables
Lagged Log Return Premium LLRPRt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0121 -0.1276 0.3011
Index Australia rASX200t 0.0001 0.0000 0.0082 -0.0871 0.0563
Log Return UK rFT SE100t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 -0.0927 0.0938
US rS&P500t 0.0001 0.0000 0.0098 -0.0947 0.1096
Exchange Rate AUD rAUDt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0068 -0.0805 0.0658
Log Return GBX rGBXt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 -0.0814 0.0444
Weighted WSPt 8.3908 5.0558 7.4838 2.3399 58.8219
Quoted Spread
Lagged BHP ASX LT RBHP ASX ,t 0.0041 0.0036 0.0023 0.0004 0.0276
Turnover Ratio Billiton LSE LT RBilliton LSE,t 0.0016 0.0014 0.0012 0.0000 0.0115
BHP ADR LT RBHP ADR,t 0.0057 0.0047 0.0038 0.0000 0.0595
Billiton ADR LT RBilliton ADR,t 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009 0.0000 0.0092
GDP Australia rGDP,AUt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0018 -0.0123 0.0368
Log Return UK rGDP,UKt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0013 -0.0161 0.0254
CPI Australia rCPI,AUt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0032 0.0164
Log Return UK rCPI,UKt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0266 -0.6931 0.6931
Imports Australia rimports,AUt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 -0.1521 0.1051
Log Return UK rimports,UKt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0034 -0.1184 0.1084
Exports Australia rexports,AUt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0047 -0.0714 0.0977
Log Return UK rexports,UKt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0038 -0.1242 0.1165
Current Australia rCA,AUt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0273 -0.8307 1.0176
Account UK rCA,UKt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0431 -0.8973 1.4195
Log Return
Unemployment Australia rUR,AUt -0.0001 0.0000 0.0049 -0.0597 0.0785
Rate UK rUR,UKt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 -0.0764 0.1038
Log Return
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3.6.2 Regression results
Table 3.5 reports the OLS regression results of Eq. (3.21), Eq. (3.22), and Eq. (3.23).
Panel A in Table 3.5 shows that the coefficients on D1, D2, and D5 are 0.062, 0.0162,
and 0.0456 with t-statistics of 24.467, 8.25, and 22.801 respectively; all are significant at
1% level. D1, D2 and D5 represent the effective tax rate difference of the UK over Aus-
tralia growing from -1.43% to 1.43%, from 1.43% to 12.54%, and from 6.27% to 6.93%
respectively. The coefficients of these dummy variables are interpreted as the influence
of changes in the effective tax rate difference of the UK over Australia on the magnitude
of BHP mispricing. Positive signs on these three dummy variables are consistent with
the mispricing being more severe when the gap in the tax rate between Australia and the
UK increases. In addition, the coefficients on D3 and D4 are -0.0508 and -0.0304 with
t-statistics of -20.888 and -10.539 (both significant at 1% level). D3 and D4 represent the
effective tax rate difference dropping from 12.54% to 6.99%, and from 6.99% to 6.27%.
Negative signs on the third and fourth dummy variables indicate that the price divergences
become narrower when the tax rate gap decreases. The results are consistent with hypoth-
esis 3.1 that tax rate changes can explain the actual price premium, and the price of BHP is
higher than that of Billiton because of the higher effective tax rate in the UK than in Aus-
tralia (higher franking credits in Australia than that in the UK). The F-statistic is 210.4,
and it is significant at 1% level. Panel B indicates that the coefficient on the estimated
price premium using the GGM is 0.4146 with a t-statistic of 23.525 (significant at 1%).
This means that one percent growth in the estimated price premium leads to a 0.41 per-
cent growth in actual price premium. As discussed in Section 3.5.4, the estimated price
premium using the GGM is a daily proxy for tax differences by calculating the sum of the
present value of net dividend flows that are distributed dividends with attached franking
credits after subtracting personal dividend taxes. Hence we can argue that tax differences
are responsible for the change in the actual price premium. Panel C presents the regres-
sion results from the RIM model. The RIM differs from the GGM by substituting future
residual earnings for dividend payments, which fits more for firms paying unstable div-
idends, as discussed in Section 3.5.5. Panel C reports that the estimated coefficient on
the main independent variable, the estimated price premium, is 0.1633 with a t-statistic
of 11.1 (significant at 1%). The coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in esti-
mated price premium using the RIM contributes to a 0.16 percent increase in actual price
premium, which is consistent with statistics from the GGM-based estimation.
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Table 3.5: OLS Model Estimates
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from OLS Regression models




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.20)




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.21)




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.22)
where the independent variables are effective tax difference dummy variables D1−5 and the es-
timated price premium E[PRt ] using the GGM and the RIM in Panel A, B, and C, respectively.
The dependent variable PRt is the daily price premium calculated by the daily ratio of BHP ADR
price minus daily Billiton ADR price over their average. In Panel A, the independent variables are
five effective tax difference dummy variables D1−5 equaling to one after the first BHP ex-dividend
date that follows an effective tax difference change. In Panel B, the independent variable E[PRt ]
is the estimated price premium of BHP over Billiton ADRs estimated by the GGM. In Panel C,
the independent variable E[PRt ] is the estimated price premium of BHP over Billiton ADRs esti-
mated by the RIM. Xi stand for 23 control variables described below in Table F.1. The regression
uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018.
Panel Panel A Panel B Panel C
Model Eq. (3.21) Eq. (3.22) Eq. (3.23)












E[PRt ] 0.4164*** 0.1633***
(23.525) (11.1)
LLRPRt 0.2582*** 0.2972*** 0.2793**
(3.149) (2.921) (2.554)
rASX200t 0.044 0.0254 0.046
(0.778) (0.34) (0.561)
rFT SE100t -0.0795 -0.1198 -0.1602
(-1.314) (-1.548) (-1.795)
rS&P500t 0.0247 0.0588 0.0534
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(0.447) (0.823) (0.678)
rAUDt 0.1649** 0.1269 0.2495**
(2.121) (1.271) (2.167)
rGBXt -0.2751*** -0.1546 -0.318**
(-2.842) (-1.308) (-2.054)
WSPt 0.0002 -0.0009*** -0.0008***
(1.594) (-6.592) (-5.809)
LT RBHP ASX ,t 0.1648 0.9495** 1.4727***
(0.5) (2.39) (3.699)
LT RBHP ADR,t 6.9019*** 8.4852*** 10.8788***
(6.877) (7.752) (8.448)
LT RBilliton LSE,t -2.9332*** -4.0593*** -3.2705***
(-10.421) (-11.724) (-9.703)
LT RBilliton ADR,t 17.3152*** 11.3128*** 26.0712***
(12.329) (10.519) (12.638)
rGDP,AUt -0.519 0.0957 -0.003
(-1.111) (0.163) (-0.005)
rGDP,UKt 0.5855 1.9347 0.6882
(0.435) (1.224) (0.473)
rCPI,AUt 2.581** 0.6846 0.7317
(2.225) (0.449) (0.457)
rCPI,UKt -0.0005 0.0048 0.0232
(-0.015) (0.079) (0.351)
rimports,AUt -0.0103 -0.0345 -0.0584
(-0.095) (-0.256) (-0.393)
rimports,UKt -0.0831 -0.0151 1.2013
(-0.118) (-0.012) (1.063)
rexports,AUt -0.152 -0.0693 -0.1608
(-1.007) (-0.426) (-0.77)
rexports,UKt 0.0674 -0.5095 -1.1887
(0.09) (-0.496) (-1.096)
rCA,AUt -0.0006 -0.0056 0.0017
(-0.04) (-0.249) (0.056)
rCA,UKt 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0139
(0.099) (-0.006) (-0.506)
rUR,AUt -0.0416 0.0466 -0.1446
(-0.308) (0.216) (-0.642)
rUR,UKt 0.2875 0.6972 0.99**
(0.875) (1.681) (2.375)
Observations 3284 3284 2650
Adjusted R-squared 69% 49.8% 53.1%
F-statistic 210.4 130.1 109.5
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According to all panels in Table 3.5, the positive and significant coefficient on lagged
log return premium indicates that autocorrelation exists in the dependent variable (Keele
and Kelly, 2006). The coefficient on ASX Index log return is positive and the coefficient
on LSE Index return is negative, which is consistent with Froot and Dabora (1999), Bedi
et al. (2003), Grossmann et al. (2007), De Jong et al. (2009) and Su et al.’s (2013) findings
that share prices are influenced by the market return for the home country. The coefficient
on the log return of AUD is positive, and GBX is negative. The result confirms Copeland
and Copeland’s (1998) argument that the exchange rate is positively related to the market
return. The coefficient on the weighted spread in Panel B is negative and significant at
1%. This finding is consistent with Pontiff’s (1996) argument that transaction costs re-
duce mispricing but inconsistent with Grossmann et al.’s (2007) argument that transaction
costs are positively correlated with the mispricing. The coefficient on the lagged turnover
ratio is positive for BHP ASX and negative for Billiton LSE. Moreover, the mispricing is
positively correlated with the turnover ratios for both BHP ADR and Billiton ADR. The
coefficients on all economic indicators are insignificant and are unable to explain the price
premium, thus confirming the conclusion of previous literature (Froot and Dabora, 1999;
Bedi et al., 2003; De Jong et al., 2009; Su et al., 2013).
Overall, the analysis finds that the tax difference is a significant determinant of the
change in the actual price premium no matter whether we apply dummy variables that
capture the tax difference directly or implement daily valuation models, including the
GGM and the RIM based on dividends and the cost of equity. This confirms the tax ex-
planation hypothesis 3.1 but contradicts Froot and Dabora (1999) and Bedi et al.’s (2003)
suggestion that tax cannot explain the price premium between DLC twins, albeit they do
not formally test this proposition. Coefficients on most microstructure control variables
are significant, and most macro-economic variables are insignificant.
3.6.3 Robustness tests
This section provides the results of robustness tests. In the initial effective tax difference
model shown in Panel A in Table 3.5, the date on which the effective tax difference dum-
mies change is the first ex-dividend date after the tax rate change date. Table 3.6 replaces
the ex-dividend date with a date three months prior to the ex-dividend date, the tax change
date, three months prior to the tax change date, the dividend announcement date, and the
dividend payment date from Panel A to Panel E respectively. According to all Panels in
Table 3.6, the relationship between the price premium and effective tax difference dum-
mies still holds. Coefficients on other control variables are not shown in Table 3.6 as they






















































Table 3.6: Robustness tests of dummy variable model
This table reports the robustness result of multivariate OLS Regression in which independent variables are effective tax difference dummy variables. The dependent variable PRt
is the daily price premium calculated by the daily ratio of BHP ADR price minus daily Billiton ADR price over their average. The independent variables D1−5 are five dummy
variables equaling to one that captures the effective tax difference change. Five independent variables that proxy for effective tax difference dummy variables are used. In Panel
A, the dummy changes three months before the ex-dividend date. In Panel B, the dummy changes on the tax change date. In Panel C, the dummy changes three months before
the tax change date. In Panel D, the dummy changes on the dividend announcement date. In Panel E, the dummy changes on the dividend payment date. Xi stands for 23 control
variables are the same as those in Table 3.5 and not shown in this table. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from June 30,
2001 to June 30, 2018.




Bi ∗Xi + εt , (3.20)
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E
Dummy change date Three months before Tax rate Three months before Dividend Dividend



































































Observations 3284 3284 3284 3284 3284
Adjusted R-squared 73.9% 72.0% 74.3% 69.8% 68.1%
F-statistic 279.2 259.5 320.5 220.3 205.0
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This chapter also tests the robustness of the the GGM model by adopting a model that
predicts future dividends using a simple AR model15 (rather than using actual dividends
in the Panel B in Table 3.5) in Panel A in Table 3.7 and applying monthly observations (as
opposed to daily observations in Panel B in Table 3.5) in Panel B in Table 3.7. Panel A in
Table 3.7 illustrates that the coefficient on the estimated price premium using estimated
dividends by the AR model is 0.74, with a t-statistic of 55.016 (significant at 1%). This
indicates that one percent increase in the estimated premium using the GGM contributes
to a 0.74 percent increase in the actual premium. This coefficient is even larger than the
coefficient of 0.41 in Panel B in Table 3.5, and hence the use of actual dividends versus
estimating future dividends does not change the conclusion. Results in Table 3.5 are there-
fore not caused by allowing perfect foresight of the actual dividends. Again our results
support the proposition that tax differences are significant factors in explaining changes in
the actual price premium, even when the assumption that investors cannot get the informa-
tion about the exact amount of dividends is relaxed. Estimating our model with monthly
observations (rather than daily observations in Panel B in Table 3.5) does not change the
outcome materially. Panel B in Table 3.7 shows that the estimated coefficient on the esti-
mated price premium is 0.18, with a t-statistic of 1.86 (significant at 10%). Although the
explanatory power of the estimated premium is lower than daily observations, it is still
statistically significant. Thus we argue that tax differences are a significant determinant
of the change in the actual price premium, even when we use monthly data and use the
GGM to value the two ADRs and estimate the premium. The results for control variables
in Table 3.7 are also in line with those in Table 3.5 and therefore are not presented.
This chapter also tests the robustness of the model by adding ADR di f f in the regres-
sions. Table 3.8 reports the robustness results of the regressions. The tax explanation
still holds based on the coefficients on tax dummy variables and the estimated price pre-
mium of the GGM. Moreover, the coefficients on ADR di f f in both Panel A and Panel
B are negative and significant at 1%, which is consistent with the hypothesis described
in Section 3.5.6. It further improves the credibility of the tax explanation of the BHP
mispricing.
15Specific details of AR model used to estimate dividends are described in Appendix D.
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Table 3.7: Robustness tests of the GGM model
This table reports the robustness results of multivariate OLS Regression in which independent
variables are estimated price premium of BHP over Billiton ADRs estimated by the GGM. The
dependent variable PRt is the daily price premium calculated by the daily ratio of BHP ADR
price minus daily Billiton ADR price over their average. In Panel A, the independent variable
E[PRt ] is the estimated price premium of BHP over Billiton ADRs estimated by the GGM using
an estimated annual dividend by the AR model. In Panel B, monthly observations of the estimated
price premium are used. Xi stands for 23 control variables are the same as those in Table 3.5 and
not shown in this table. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by
*, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from
June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018.
PRt = β0+β1×E[PRGGM,t ]+Σ23i=2βi×Xi+εt , (3.21)










Adjusted R2 74.4% 50.2%
F-statistic 390.8 11.43
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Table 3.8: Robustness tests with ADR ownership relative difference
This table reports the robustness results of multivariate OLS Regression with ADR ownership
relative difference.










where the independent variables are effective tax difference dummy variables D1−5 and the esti-
mated price premium E[PRt ] using the GGM in Panel A and B, respectively. The dependent vari-
able PRt is the daily price premium calculated by the daily ratio of BHP ADR price minus daily
Billiton ADR price over their average. In Panel A, the independent variables are five effective tax
difference dummy variables D1−5 equaling to one after the first BHP ex-dividend date that follows
an effective tax difference change. In Panel B, the independent variable E[PRt ] is the estimated
price premium of BHP over Billiton ADRs estimated by the GGM. ADR di f f is the relative differ-
ence of ADR ownership between BHP and Billiton. Xi stand for 23 control variables are the same
as those in Table 3.5 and not shown in this table. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
sample period is from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018.
Panel Panel A Panel B
Model Eq. (3.21) Eq. (3.22)














ADR di f f -0.0037*** -0.0024***
(-9.973) (-5.036)
Observations 3281 3281
Adjusted R-squared 70% 50.5%
F-statistic 213.8 137.2
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3.7 Conclusion and original contribution
This chapter applies a multivariate time-series OLS regression to examine the effects
of tax differences between Australia and the UK on price differences (i.e., a premium)
between the BHP ADR and the Billiton ADR while controlling for market return, micro-
structure variables and macro-economic variables identified previously. This regression
uses dummy variables for different tax regimes in Australia and the UK as additional
independent variables. In separate regressions, we also use the actual premium as the
dependent variable and develop a valuation of the two dividend streams using the GGM
and the RIM as alternative estimations of our main independent variable, namely the
relative estimated valuation of the two ADRs incorporating tax effects. Our findings
indicate that the actual ADR premium is significantly and positively correlated with tax
differences in both tests.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. The results
provide direct evidence that the mysterious price premium between BHP ADR and Billi-
ton ADR addressed in the previous literature (Froot and Dabora, 1999; Bedi et al., 2003;
De Jong et al., 2009; Su et al., 2013) can be significantly explained by tax rules differences
between Australia and UK. The price of BHP ADR is higher than Billiton ADR, and this
is shown to be due to the differences in imputation (that franking credit rate is 30% in
Australia but 10% in the UK). Our findings are in opposition to Bedi et al. (2003) and
Froot and Dabora’s (1999) proposition that tax differences cannot explain the mispricing
between DLC twins. This chapter contributes to the literature to examine the price pre-
mium between DLC twins (Rosenthal and Young, 1990; Bodurtha Jr et al., 1995; Froot
and Dabora, 1999) by proposing the method of comparing the prices between ADRs of
the DLC twins to remove the currency and time zone differences.
Further, this chapter extends the comparative pricing studies literature (Walker and
Partington, 1999; McDonald, 2001; Twite and Wood, 2003; Cannavan et al., 2004; Chu
and Partington, 2008; Jun et al., 2008; Jun and Partington, 2014) by proposing a method
to compare the ADR prices of DLC twins in the comparative pricing studies of franking
credits (Walker and Partington, 1999; McDonald, 2001; Twite and Wood, 2003; Cannavan
et al., 2004; Chu and Partington, 2008; Jun et al., 2008; Jun and Partington, 2014). Our
methodology addresses some of the limitations of comparative pricing studies described
in Section 2.4.2, including the misspecified and poor estimate of the valuation of franking
credits from derivatives due to transaction costs in futures contracts (McDonald, 2001;
Cannavan et al., 2004) and the bias of focussing on the price differential around specific
ex-dividend events but ignoring the overall pricing movement in the long term (Siau et al.,
2015) as we do not use derivatives and investigate long term price movements of ADRs.
The findings also provide indirect evidence on whether the tax rules determine the prices
of ADRs in the home market rather than the US. This is consistent with Kadapakkam
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et al.’s (2010) findings but inconsistent with Jun et al. (2008) and Jun and Partington’s
(2014) findings.
Theoretically, this chapter modifies the original GGM derived by Gordon and Shapiro
(1956) and the original RIM derived by Ohlson (2001) by replacing distributed dividends
and residual income with net (after-tax) dividends and net residual income which in-
corporate personal tax rate and franking credits. This chapter extends the literature of
application of the GGM and the RIM as it provides evidence that tax factors should be
considered in these two valuation models. Empirically, our research gives traders an in-
sight into the role of taxes as an impediment to arbitrage. Arbitrageurs should consider
tax differences as well as other fundamental factors when designing their strategy. Taxa-
tion factors might prove to be more significant than other factors such as transaction costs,
liquidity constraints, and market index movement in an arbitrage.
Finally, this chapter provides direct evidence to answer the research question of the
thesis, whether franking credits are priced in the Australian market, raised in Section 1.2,
finding that tax rules significantly explain the price difference between BHP ADR twins.
Our finding is consistent with the evidence of some researchers (Brown and Walter, 1986;
Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 1994; Walker and Partington, 1999; McDonald, 2001;
Twite and Wood, 2003; Hathaway and Officer, 1995; Gray, 2008; Minney, 2010; Gray
et al., 2011; Vo et al., 2013; Ainsworth et al., 2016b; Cannavan and Gray, 2017). Our
findings also contradict the evidence of other researchers (Cannavan et al., 2004; Bellamy
and Gray, 2004; Beggs and Skeels, 2006; Feuerherdt et al., 2010).
Further research can be structured to investigate the relationship between the mispricing
and US-domiciled ownership holdings of the BHP twins. There are potentially three tax-
heterogeneous groups of investors, the first being Australian investors who are eligible for
Australian imputation credits, the second being UK investors who are eligible for the UK
imputation, and the third group being investors in other countries (e.g., especially the US)
who are not eligible for any imputation benefits. Consider an extreme case where the BHP
twins are 100% held by all US investors. There should be no tax effects of imputation in
these circumstances. On the other hand, the tax effect will be maximised when foreign
ownership of BHP and Billiton is zero. Research could be conducted to investigate the




Ownership Characteristics and the
Pricing of Franking Credits in the
Ex-Dividend Period
4.1 Introduction
Ex-dividend price drop-off studies are the most widely used approach in the existing lit-
erature, as discussed in Section 2.4.1. A considerable research literature examines the
market value of franking credits using ex-dividend price drop-off techniques by regress-
ing the ex-dividend price drop-off on cash dividends and franking credits. For instance,
Brown and Clarke (1993), Bellamy (1994), Bellamy and Gray (2004), Hathaway and Of-
ficer (1995), Gray (2008), Minney (2010), Vo et al. (2013), Cannavan and Gray (2017)
assert that the tax implications, including franking credits, of the dividend payout are of
great importance to the ex-dividend price drop. However, their claims are challenged
by other literature (Bellamy and Gray, 2004; Beggs and Skeels, 2006; Feuerherdt et al.,
2010), which argues that around the ex-dividend date there is no connection between the
dividend price drop-off and the level of franking credits. While most previous literature
focuses on the direct impact of franking credits on the price drop-off on the ex-dividend
date, its overall influence for the whole period surrounding the ex-dividend date has been
ignored to date. This chapter contributes to the existing ex-dividend date studies literature
by examining the impact of dividends and franking credits surrounding the ex-dividend
date using a longer horizon.
The research question of this chapter arises from the phenomenon of order imbalance
from the buy-side prior to the ex-dividend date and sell-side afterwards documented by
some papers (Eades et al., 1984; Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth,
Fong, Gallagher, and Partington, 2018). This phenomenon is referred to as the “ex-
dividend period irrational exuberance” (i.e., a price run-up before the ex-dividend date
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and a price run-down after the ex-dividend date) in this thesis. Accordingly, this chap-
ter extends the ex-dividend date studies by relating the ex-dividend period of irrational
exuberance with dividend clienteles and franking credits in Australia in the following
three progressive questions: (1) Does the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance exist
in the Australian equity market? (2) Do dividend clienteles exist in the Australian equity
market? (3) What is the role of franking credits in dividend clienteles?
This chapter first validates the existence of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance
in the Australian equity market. This chapter verifies the irrational exuberance by exam-
ining the abnormal adjusted returns surrounding the ex-dividend date and relates it with
dividends and franking credits. Compared with previous literature (Eades et al., 1984;
Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018) that usually use a 5-day
window, this chapter extends the existing literature by using a wider range of investigating
windows (5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day, 50-day).
This chapter further investigates the existence of dividend clienteles in the Australia
equity market. Although Miller and Morey (1996) believe that dividend policy does
not affect share prices in a perfect market, they also admit that, with market imperfec-
tions, dividend clienteles exist, suggesting that firm’s dividend policy affects share price
due to investor characteristics. The tax-induced explanation of dividend clienteles claims
that tax-incentives motivate trading decisions around the ex-dividend date (Feldstein and
Green, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Redding, 1997; Brav and Heaton, 1998; Allen
et al., 2000). In Australia, the introduction of CGT concessions in 1999 described in Sec-
tion 2.2.6 (i.e., capital gains for asset held for more than 12 months are taxed as half of the
personal income for individual investors, but two-thirds of the personal income for institu-
tional investors (Australian Taxation Office, 2018)) creates a tax-disadvantage to institu-
tional investors compared to individual investors on capital gains. This tax-disadvantage
could intuitively lead to institutional investors’ preference for dividends and franking
credits. Following Elton and Gruber’s (1970b) methodology that relates the dividend
drop-off ratio with tax-induced clienteles, a considerable number of research papers at-
tempt to confirm this tax-driven relationship. However, most existing empirical evidence
is US-based (where a classical tax system prevails). Only limited studies (Jun, Gallagher,
and Partington, 2006; Ainsworth, Fong, Gallagher, and Partington, 2016a) focus on the
Australian equity market, and the evidence is mixed. This motivates us to investigate the
existence of dividend clienteles in Australia.
Theoretically, contrary to the tax-induced explanation dividend clienteles, this chapter
proposes a behavioural finance explanation of “individual dividend clienteles” in which
individual investors overvalue the dividends and franking credits due to the “bird in the
hand” fallacy, the “behavioural life-cycle” theory, and the “information signaling” theory.
The “bird in the hand” fallacy claims that risk-averse investors prefer dividends to capital
gains as dividends are more certain than capital gains (Gordon, 1963; Lintner, 1964). In
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addition, less sophisticated investors are more likely to fall into the “bird in the hand”
fallacy given their lack of expertise and resources to observe market price movements
closely (Dennis and Strickland, 2002; Barber and Odean, 2013). The “behavioural life-
cycle” theory states that particular categories of investors (e.g., retirees) prefer dividends
as their income heavily relies on dividends (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). The “information
signaling” theory suggests that individual investors are more affected by the signaling role
of dividends due to their limited information sources (Bhattacharya, 1979).
Empirically, by examining the statistical relationship between the extent of the irra-
tional exuberance and the level of ownership holdings, we find evidence of individual
dividend clienteles that is opposite to the tax-induced explanation but consistent with the
behavioural finance explanation. In particular, firms with a higher percentage of individ-
ual investor holdings experience a more substantial ex-dividend period irrational exuber-
ance. Further, the percentage of international ownership is not related to irrational exu-
berance. Therefore, the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance can be explained by the
behavioural finance explanation of dividend clienteles. Finally, we further seek to analyse
the role of franking credits in dividend clienteles. Specifically, we incorporate franking
credits in the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance and the behavioural finance expla-
nation of dividend clienteles. Empirically, we again find that individual investors tend to
place more value on franking credits than do institutional investors.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarises related
theoretical and empirical literature on ex-dividend day pricing and dividend clienteles
leading to the hypothesis development. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 detail data collection
and methodology. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results. Section 4.6 concludes this
chapter.
4.2 Literature review
The literature review consists of six parts. Section 4.2.1 reviews the tax differences be-
tween capital gains and dividends in the Australian imputation system discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.6. Section 4.2.2 reviews the literature on the ex-dividend period irrational exuber-
ance. Section 4.2.3 reviews the literature on dividend clienteles internationally. Section
4.2.4 and Section 4.2.5 illustrate the empirical evidence and the theoretical explanations
of dividend clienteles in Australia. Section 4.2.6 states the research question.
4.2.1 Review of capital gain tax
As discussed in Section 2.2.6, after the replacement of the “indexation method” with
“discount method” in CGT rules in 1999, superannuation funds are tax-advantaged in
capital gains (23.5%) relative to dividend income (47%) while superannuation funds are
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tax-disadvantaged in capital gains (10%) relative to dividends income (15%).
4.2.2 Ex-dividend period irrational exuberance
As discussed in Section 2.4.1.2, ex-dividend date studies are most commonly used to ex-
amine the value of franking credits by regressing the ex-dividend drop-off on the value
of franking credits and dividends. This evidence is, however, mixed, and the empiri-
cal method has some limitations. One main limitation of ex-dividend date studies is the
poor estimate of franking credits’ valuation from the ex-dividend days for long-term in-
vestors (McDonald, 2001). Early studies document an abnormal exuberance during a
5-day window surrounding the ex-dividend date (Eades et al., 1984; Brown and Clarke,
1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018). Most previous literature commonly ex-
amines the direct impact of franking credits on the ex-dividend date or price movements
during a shorter window surrounding the ex-dividend date. To overcome this limitation,
this chapter investigates the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance using a wider range
of windows, including 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day, and 50-day. The following
hypotheses are made to verify the existence of the exuberance.
Hypothesis 4.1: There is an irrational exuberance surrounding the ex-dividend date.
This chapter further links the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance with dividends.
The relationship is hypothesised to be positive because investors are more likely to pur-
chase shares prior to the ex-dividend date and sell them afterwards to obtain dividends if
the level of the dividend is larger. Therefore, hypothesis 4.2 is made. If franking credits
are priced as dividends, hypothesis 4.3 can also be stated.
Hypothesis 4.2: The magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is posi-
tively correlated to the level of dividends.
Hypothesis 4.3: The magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is posi-
tively correlated to the level of franking credits.
4.2.3 Dividend clienteles internationally
The theoretical literature provides insights about dividend clienteles suggesting that insti-
tutional investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Elton and Gruber (1970b) first argue
that dividend clienteles can be caused by the differences in taxation between dividend in-
come and capital gains, and individual investor’s tax preferences. Based on previous divi-
dend clientele theories, institutional investors should prefer dividends to capital gains due
to two reasons. First, there is a tax reason; institutional investors are attracted to dividends
since they are usually tax-advantaged in dividends relative to capital gains (Feldstein and
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Green, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Redding, 1997; Brav and Heaton, 1998; Allen
et al., 2000; Felixson and Liljeblom, 2008; Rantapuska, 2008). Second, there are non-
tax reasons; institutional managers avoid holding shares in non-dividend paying firms
and prefer investing in dividend-paying firms due to the “prudent-man” rule1 and restric-
tions in the investment mandates of fiduciaries and non-profit organisations (Feldstein and
Green, 1983; Brav and Heaton, 1998).
Compared to the theoretical literature, empirical studies are more mixed, varying de-
pending on the countries and taxation systems examined. Hu and Tseng (2006) inves-
tigate order flows during the ex-dividend period on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, which
has an imputation system where the corporate tax rate is 25%, and the franking credit
rate is 33.3%. They find evidence consistent with the tax hypothesis by documenting that
tax-disadvantaged investors avoid trading around the ex-dividend date and institutional
investors purchase before and sell after the ex-dividend date. Researchers have also anal-
ysed the trading pattern of all investors in the uniquely data-rich Finnish stock market
and found that dividend tax-advantaged domestic individuals prefer cash dividends while
international investors and domestic institutions prefer capital gains, which is consistent
with tax-induced explanations (Feldstein and Green, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;
Redding, 1997; Brav and Heaton, 1998; Allen et al., 2000; Felixson and Liljeblom, 2008;
Rantapuska, 2008). However, there is also literature with contrasting findings. Grinstein
and Michaely (2005) report that institutions prefer firms with dividends, but they are not
attracted to higher dividends. Jain (2007) suggests that individual investors tend to hold
high dividend yield securities, whereas relatively lower-taxed institutional investors prefer
to invest in low and zero dividend yield stocks in the US.
4.2.4 Empirical evidence of dividend clienteles in Australia
Most of the empirical evidence of dividend clienteles is based on data drawn from US
markets. In Australia, the literature, by comparison, is scarce, albeit most of these studies
produce results that contradict the tax-induced explanation, as discussed below. Australia
is quite different from other countries with classical tax systems because franking credits
are an inevitable complication and a significant factor contributing to tax heterogeneity.
Although higher dividends might not attract more clienteles, the availability of franking
credits does. Jun et al. (2006) investigate institutional equity funds and provide evidence
that institutional investors prefer dividend-paying stocks. However, they find little ev-
idence that institutions prefer firms with higher dividends and document an inverted U
shape relationship between institutional holdings and the dividend payout ratio (or div-
idend yield). They examine the valuation of franking credits by regressing institutional
1The Prudent man rule originates from Massachusetts court formulation, which suggests that each
investment must be valued on its own merits and speculative or risky investments should be prohibited
(Del Guercio, 1996).
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ownership on a franked dummy and show that institutional investors tend to hold stocks
with fully franked dividends relative to those having no franking credits. Ainsworth et al.
(2016a) examine the trading pattern of institutional equity funds by accessing their trad-
ing records and find evidence that institutional investors prefer capital gains to dividends
and franking credits in Australia. Their results are consistent with the evidence provided
by previous literature in the US (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Jain, 2007). The avail-
ability of franking credits, changes in tax incentives, the price run-up in the cum-dividend
period, and the fund’s tax status all influence the ex-dividend day trading. To conclude,
the literature on the dividend clienteles incorporating franking credits in Australia is lim-
ited and somewhat mixed, and there is insufficient evidence to support the tax-induced
explanation of dividend clienteles.
4.2.5 Theoretical explanations of dividend clienteles in Australia
Contrary to tax-induced explanations of dividend clienteles, this chapter proposes the be-
havioural finance explanations, including the “bird in the hand” fallacy, the “behavioural
life-cycle” theory, and the “information signaling” theory, to the individual dividend clien-
teles that individual investors overvalue dividends and franking credits. The “bird in the
hand” fallacy is proposed by Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1964), who claim that risk-
averse investors prefer dividends to capital gains as dividends are more certain than capital
gains. Dennis and Strickland (2002) and Barber and Odean (2013) add that less sophis-
ticated investors are more likely to suffer from the “bird in the hand” fallacy given their
lack of expertise (such as in-depth financial knowledge in building diversified portfolios)
and resources (such as time and fees to acquire financial advice) to observe market price
movements closely. Another explanation is Shefrin and Statman’s (1984) “behavioural
life-cycle” theory that dividends are preferred by certain groups of investors (specifically,
retirees) who are likely to depend on dividends as a source of income. Dong, Robinson,
and Veld (2005) note that older people and/or those who do not have stable incomes are
likely to fall into the above category. Graham and Kumar (2006) show that older and
lower-income people prefer dividends in a study using US data. Further, the “information
signaling” theory proposed by Bhattacharya (1979) can also explain the preference. He
argues that an increase or decrease in distributed dividends signals the future performance
of a company. Individual investors are more likely to be influenced by the signaling role
of dividends as their information sources are limited.
According to the behavioural finance theories described above, individual investors pre-
fer dividends and franking credits due to the “bird in hand” fallacy, the “behavioural life-
cycle” theory, and the “information signaling” theory, thus contributing to the ex-dividend
period irrational exuberance. Therefore, the level of individual ownership should be pos-
itively related to the magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Accord-
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ingly, hypothesis 4.4 is developed to relate individual ownership with the exuberance.
Hypothesis 4.4: The magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is posi-
tively correlated to the level of individual ownership.
Compared with individual holdings, the literature investigating the impact of interna-
tional holdings on ex-dividend date studies is particularly scarce in the Australian market
for two reasons. First, the percentage of international ownership in many Australian com-
panies is generally very low (0.79%2) during the period between January 1, 2006 and
December 31, 2014, and hence it has limited influence on the share prices. Second, data
on international ownership are not readily accessible. Therefore, hypothesis 4.5 is de-
scribed below as the level of international ownership is extremely low.
Hypothesis 4.5: The magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is in-
significantly related to the percentage of international ownership of the firm.
Further, this chapter verifies the existence of individual dividend clienteles by exam-
ining the impact of individual ownership on the relationship between dividends/franking
credits and the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance addressed in hypotheses 4.2 and
4.3. According to the individual dividend clienteles discussed above, individual investors
prefer dividends/franking credits to capital gains, thus contributing to the ex-dividend
period irrational exuberance3. Therefore, hypotheses 4.6 that a firm’s individual own-
ership level strengthens the positive relationship between the irrational exuberance and
dividends/franking credits is developed.
Hypothesis 4.6: The percentage of individual ownership strengthens the positive rela-
tionship between the magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance and the
level of the dividend.
Finally, this chapter examines the role of franking credits in the individual dividend
clienteles. If hypothesis 4.6 holds and franking credits are priced as dividends in the
market, hypothesis 4.7 should hold as well.
2The rate is from Panel A in Table 4.5.1
3“Irrational exuberance” is mainly caused by domestic individual investors’ preference for franking
credits and dividends due to “bird in hand theory”, the “behavioural life-cycle” theory, and the “information
signaling” theory as described in Section 4.2.5. Domestic institutional investors are less prone to these
characteristics, as they are more rational and sophisticated. More importantly, as individual investors buy
shares during the cum-dividend period, other investors, including domestic institutional investors reduce
their holding as a natural consequence. Individual “irrational exuberance” should be related to the investors’
marginal tax rate. For example, investors with a marginal tax rate that is lower than the franking credit tax
rate could have a higher preference to franking credits as they are eligible for a cash refund of the difference
as a part of their tax calculation.
From Fig. 4.2, we find that firms with a higher individual investors have larger price rises during the cum-
dividend period. This indicates that the main cause of the price increase is domestic individual investors
rather than Australian domestic superannuation investors. Further, in Table 4.3, the positive and significant
coefficient on INDO (the percentage of individual ownership during the cum-dividend period) and the
negative and significant coefficient on EX*INDO (the percentage of individual ownership during the ex-
dividend period) also support this argument.
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Hypothesis 4.7: The percentage of individual ownership strengthens the positive rela-
tionship between the magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance and the
level of franking credits.
4.2.6 Research question
Does the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance exist in the Australian equity market?
This chapter extends the previous literature (Eades et al., 1984; Brown and Clarke, 1993;
Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018) by identifying the exuberance using a longer ex-
amining window surrounding the ex-dividend date. Do dividend clienteles exist in the
Australian equity market? The literature regarding this question is limited and mixed (Jun
et al., 2006; Ainsworth et al., 2016a). This chapter provides evidence as to the existence
of behavioural finance explanations of individual dividend clienteles. What is the role
of franking credits in the dividend clienteles? The answer to this question extends the
existing ex-dividend date studies literature that examines the valuation of franking credits
(Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 1994; Bellamy and Gray, 2004; Hathaway and Of-
ficer, 1995; Bellamy and Gray, 2004; Beggs and Skeels, 2006; Gray, 2008; Feuerherdt
et al., 2010; Minney, 2010; Vo et al., 2013; Cannavan and Gray, 2017). Overall, this
chapter extends the existing ex-dividend date studies literature by verifying the existence
of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance using a longer examining window, provid-
ing evidence on the dividend clienteles, further examining the role of franking credits in
dividend clienteles, and therefore ultimately providing evidence to the debate on whether
franking credits are priced in the Australian equity market.
4.3 Data collection
The study is based on all dividend-paying stocks traded on ASX over the period Jan-
uary 1, 2006 through to December 31, 2014. Dividend data including the ex-dividend
date, the dollar amount of dividend per share, the franking level, and franking credits
per share are sourced from Australian Share Price and Price Relative (SPPR) Database
held within the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). In addition,
the split ratio that contains splits, rights, and entitlements is also collected from SPPR.
SPPR database provides monthly share prices, dividends including franking credits, ad-
justments for share issues and reconstructions, the number of shares on issue, and price
relatives. Also, ticker changes and merger/delisting information are provided from 1973
for all Australian listed and previously listed companies. During the sample period, there
were 10,332 ex-dividend events for 1,207 firms. A sample inclusion screen was used: for
a dividend event to be included, the stock must have closing prices on the ex-dividend
date and the cum-dividend date. This screen reduces the number of ex-dividend days to
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9,699 for 1,122 firms. Among all ex-dividend events, 5,936 events are fully franked, 628
are partly franked, and 3,135 are unfranked. The average franking level is 64.42%.
End of day data including the close prices of securities and Australian All Ordinar-
ies Accumulation Index (XAOA) and full order book data are sourced from Thomson
Reuters Tick History (TRTH) and Australian Equities Tick History (AETH). TRTH is a
nearly real-time historical market database that provides millisecond-time stamped tick
data going back to 1996 for 45 million global active OTC and exchange-traded instru-
ments. AETH offers a narrower pool of Australian equities but a longer history that
goes back to 1991. The daily close prices of securities and the index, together with split
ratio, are used to calculate the daily abnormal adjusted return, as described in Section.
4.4.1.1. The number of shares held by individual investors, institutional investors, do-
mestic investors, and international investors on a daily basis are obtained from the ASX’s
Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System (CHESS) database. CHESS provides an
electronic sub-register for shares traded on ASX. Investors are divided into nine cate-
gories, namely banks, other deposit-taking institutions, nominees, insurance companies,
super funds, trusts, governmental agencies, incorporated companies, and individuals. The
number of shares held by institutional investors is the sum of all holdings in the first eight
categories, while the number of shares held by individual investors is the last category.
In addition, these nine categories are further divided into domestic versus international
investors leading to 18 categories in total. The calculation of shareholdings is imple-
mented by ASX after ASX approved a confidential data request lodged with the SIRCA
Data Consult team4. The calculation of the percentage of individual ownership and inter-
national ownership is described in 4.4.1.2. Accounting data including total shareholders’
equity (TSE), market capitalisation (MC), and earnings per share (EPS) are obtained from
Thomson Reuters DataStream.
4Tanza (2014) also analyses franking balance and measures the percentage of international ownership
of firms in S&P/ASX100 in Australia provided by CHESS from 1996 to 2003. His findings show that
the percentage of international ownership averages at 0.30%, which is at a similar level as our findings of
0.79%. More importantly, CHESS holdings represent legal ownership of equity and are thus an extremely
validated source of data. While some errors might have occurred in the word-searching algorithm used
by ASX to form categories of ownership, and while the beneficial ownership of holdings in the nominee
category is unclear, CHESS data remain as an accurate daily record of ownership of Australian listed firms.
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4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Variable description
4.4.1.1 Abnormal adjusted return
Daily abnormal adjusted return (AAR) is the return of daily closing prices after adjusting







where AARs,d is the daily abnormal adjusted return for security s on date d, CLSs,d is the
daily close price for security s on date d, DPSs,d is dividend5 per share for security s on
date d, SRs,d is the split ratio for security s on date d, XAOAd is the price of XAOA on
date d.
The average abnormal adjusted return AAR around the ex-dividend date is used to proxy
for the magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance, after controlling for the
influence of dividends, splits, rights, and entitlements as well as the impact of the market
return. AAR consists of average returns over three periods including the cum-dividend
period (AARcum), the ex-dividend period (AARex), and the ex-dividend date (AARdiv).






where AARs,n,p,i is the average daily abnormal adjusted return for security s and dividend n
during period p with interval i, p can be the cum-dividend period, the ex-dividend period,
or the ex-dividend date, i is the interval of average return that could be 5-day, 10-day, 20-
day, 30-day, 40-day, and 50-day for the cum-dividend period or the ex-dividend period
but will always be one day for the ex-dividend date, DAT ESs,n,p,i is a set of all dates for
security s for dividend n during period p with interval i, NDAT ESs,n,p,i is the number of dates
in particular DAT ESs,n,p,i.









AARs,n,div,i = AARs,div, (4.5)
5Dividend represents cash dividends only and not cash dividend plus franking credits.
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where AARs,n,cum,i is the average daily abnormal adjusted return for security s and div-
idend n during the cum-dividend period with interval i, AARs,n,ex,i is the average daily
abnormal adjusted return for security s and dividend n during the ex-dividend period with
interval i, AARs,n,div,i is the average daily abnormal adjusted return for security s and divi-
dend n on the ex-dividend date, DAT ESs,n,cum,i is the set of all dates for security s for div-
idend n during the cum-dividend period with interval i, DAT ESs,n,ex,i is the set of all dates
for security s for dividend n during the ex-dividend period with interval i, NDAT ESs,n,cum,i
is the number of dates in particular DAT ESs,n,cum,i, NDAT ESs,n,ex,i is the number of dates in
particular DAT ESs,n,ex,i, AARs,div is the abnormal adjusted return on the ex-dividend date.
In particular, Eq. (4.3), Eq. (4.4), and Eq. (4.5) describe that average daily abnormal
adjusted returns for cum-dividend period, ex-dividend period, and the ex-dividend date
are calculated by the sum of abnormal adjusted returns divided by the number of dates in
the cum-dividend period, ex-dividend period and the ex-dividend date respectively.
4.4.1.2 Ownership holdings
The percentage of individual ownership (INDO) is the percentage of individual ownership
calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned by individual investors over the





where NSINDs,d is the number of shares held by individual investors for security s on
date d, NSOUTs,d is the number of shares outstanding for security s on date d. INDO
serves as the proxy for the level of individual ownership. The percentage might not be a
completely accurate measure of total ownership as only shares registered on the CHESS
sub-register are taken into account6. Similarly, the percentage of international ownership
(INTO) is used as the proxy for the level of international ownership. INTO is the per-
centage of international ownership calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned





where NSINTs,d is the number of shares held by international investors for security s on
date d.
In addition, the sample is sorted into terciles depending on INDO and INTO, respec-
tively. We construct the dummy variable (DINDOs,d/DINTOs,d) that takes the value one if
INDO/INTO is above the higher (67%) tercile and zero if it is below the lower (33%)
6It is possible to remove this bias by retrospective inspection of the firm’s share register. This is, how-
ever, extremely costly and hence not practical.
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tercile across all firms for each year.
DINDOs,d =
0, INDO is below the lower (33%) tercile of INDO1, INDO is above the higher (67%) tercile of INDO, (4.8)
DINTOs,d =
0, INTO is below the lower (33%) tercile of INTO1, INTO is above the higher (67%) tercile of INTO. (4.9)
4.4.1.3 Dividend variables
Following the existing empirical literature, we use the dividend payout ratio (DPR)7 and
the dividend yield (DY ) to proxy for dividends (Jun et al., 2006; Ainsworth et al., 2016a).






where DPS is dividend per share for security s on date d, PEPS is earnings per share of
the previous year for security s on date d.
DY is measured by the dollar amount of dividend per share, divided by the cum-dividend





4.4.1.4 Franking credits variables
We follow previous studies to measure franking credits by franking credits per share
(FPS), franking credits dividend ratio (FDR), franking level (FL), franked dummy (FD),
and franking credit yield (FCY ) (Jun et al., 2006; Ainsworth et al., 2016a).
FPS is the dollar amount of franking credits per share.
FDR is the dollar amount of franking credits per share divided by the dollar amount of





where FPS is franking credits per share for security s on date d.
FL is 0 if the dividend is unfranked while it is 100 if the dividend is fully franked. It can
range between 0 and 100 if the dividend is partly franked.
FD is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the dividend is fully franked and
7If earnings per share are negative, the dividend payout ratio would be one; if the dividend payout ratio
is higher than 10, it would be set to 10.
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zero if it is unfranked or partly franked shown as:
FDs,d =
1, FL > 00, FL = 0. (4.13)







EX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the return is during the ex-
dividend period and zero if it is during the cum-dividend period.
EXd =
0, date is in the cum-dividend period1, date is in the ex-dividend period (4.15)
4.4.1.6 Control variables
Log of market capitalisation (LMC) is defined as the natural log of market capitalisation
on December 31 of the previous year. A log-transformation is used as a proxy for firm size
because market capitalisation is highly skewed. Firm size is controlled for because small-
cap firms have been shown to have higher returns, i.e., the “small-cap” anomaly (Fama and
French, 1995). Book to market ratio (BM) is the ratio of the book value of equity to the
market value of a firm’s equity. The book to market ratio is added in the controls because
it has been shown that stock returns are higher for firms with higher book to market ratio,
i.e., the “growth vs. value” anomaly (Fama and French, 1995). Quoted spread (QSP)
is used to proxy for transaction costs. The time-weighted quoted spread is measured as
the time-weighted average of limit order bid-ask spread based on the approach adopted
in McInish and Wood (1992). Intraday volatility (IVOL) is calculated as the standard
deviation of the return based on mid-point price for each quote update.
4.4.2 Model Specification
4.4.2.1 Model one
The first model validates the existence of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance
and examines its relationship with dividends/franking credits. The OLS regression model
regresses the average daily abnormal adjusted return AAR on EX , dividend variables DV ,
franking credits variables FCV , and their interactions while controlling for microstructure
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and accounting variables.
AARs,n,d =β0 +β1 ∗EXs,n,d +β2 ∗DV +β3 ∗EXs,n,d ∗DV +β4 ∗FCV +β5 ∗EXs,n,d ∗FCV
+β6 ∗LMCs,d +β7 ∗BMs,d +β8 ∗QSPs,d +β9 ∗ IVOLs,d + εs,d.
(4.16)
According to hypothesis 4.1, β0 is expected to be positive and β1 is expected to be nega-
tive. According to hypothesis 4.2, β2 is expected to be positive and β3 is expected to be
negative. According to hypothesis 4.3, β4 is expected to be positive and β5 is expected to
be negative.
4.4.2.2 Model two
The second model examines the relationship between the ex-dividend period irrational
exuberance and ownership holdings. The OLS regression model regresses the average
daily abnormal adjusted return AAR on EX , INDO / INTO and their interactions with EX
while controlling for dividend, microstructure, and accounting variables.
AARs,n,d =β0 +β1 ∗EXs,n,d +β2 ∗ INDOs,d +β3 ∗EXs,n,d ∗ INDOs,d
+β4 ∗ INTOs,d +β5 ∗EXs,n,d ∗ INTOs,d +β6 ∗DYs,d
+β7 ∗LMCs,d +β8 ∗BMs,d +β9 ∗QSPs,d +β10 ∗ IVOLs,d + εs,d.
(4.17)
According to hypothesis 4.4, β2 is expected to be positive and β3 is expected to be nega-
tive. According to hypothesis 4.5, β4 and β5 are expected to be insignificant.
4.4.2.3 Model three
The third model validates the existence of the individual dividend clienteles by examining
the impact of individual ownership on the relationship between dividends/franking credits
and the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. The OLS regression model regresses
the average daily abnormal adjusted return AAR on EX , individual ownership dummy
DINDO, dividend variables DV , franking credits variables FCV , and their interactions
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while controlling for dividend variable, microstructure, and accounting variables.
AARs,n,d =β0 +β1 ∗EXs,n,d +β2 ∗DV +β3 ∗EXs,n,d ∗DV +β4 ∗FCV +β5 ∗EXs,n,d ∗FCV
+β6 ∗DINDOs,d +β7 ∗EXs,n,d ∗DINDOs,d
+β8 ∗DV ∗DINDOs,d +β9 ∗EXs,n,d ∗DV ∗DINDOs,d
+β10 ∗FCV ∗DINDOs,d +β11 ∗EXs,n,d ∗FCV ∗DINDOs,d
+β12 ∗LMCs,d +β13 ∗BMs,d +β14 ∗QSPs,d +β15 ∗ IVOLs,d
+ εs,d.
(4.18)
According to hypothesis 4.6, β8 is expected to be positive and β9 is expected to be nega-




Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the dividend events in our sample. The magnitudes
and dispersions of the variables are examined. The full sample contains 9,699 dividend
events, among which 5,936 (61.2%) are fully franked dividends, 3,135 (32.3%) are un-
franked dividends, with the remaining 628 (6.4%) being partly franked dividends. Panel
A shows the statistics for the full sample. The average amount of dividends is 13.2680
cents, with a dividend payout ratio of 60.7305%. The average amount of franking credits
is 3.9197 cents, and the franking credits dividend ratio is 27.6102%. The average AAR
in the 50-day window is 0.1203% during the cum-dividend period, -0.0052% during the
ex-dividend period, and 0.5109% on the ex-dividend date. The finding is consistent with
previous findings of order imbalance from the buy-side (Eades et al., 1984; Brown and
Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018) and thus confirms the existence of
the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Panel B provides the statistics for the sam-
ple of fully franked dividends in which the average AAR during the 50-day cum-dividend
period, during the 50-day ex-dividend period and on the ex-dividend date are 0.1312%,
-0.0197%, and 0.3428% respectively. Compared with the full sample, the sample of fully
franked dividends with a higher amount of dividends and franking credits have a higher
average AAR before the ex-dividend date but a lower average AAR after the ex-dividend
date. Panel C describes the statistics for the sample of partly franked dividends. The
average AAR during the 50-day window shifts from 0.1567% to -0.027% after stocks go
ex-dividend. For unfranked dividends shown in Panel D, the average AAR during the
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50-day window decreases from 0.0924% to 0.027% after the ex-dividend date. Overall,
all panels provide evidence that the magnitude of the ex-dividend period irrational exu-
berance decreases with the level of franking credits attached with dividends (from fully
franked dividends to unfranked dividends). Overall, the results of the summary statistics




































































Table 4.1: Summary statistics
This table reports mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of dividend data, ownership data, and return data. Dividend is the dollar amount
of dividend. Dividend payout ratio is the dollar amount of dividend per share divided by earnings per share. Dividend yield is the dollar amount of dividend per
share divided by the cum-dividend closing price. Franking level would be 0 if the dividend is unfranked while it would be 100 if the dividend is fully franked, and
it could be between 0 and 100 if the dividend is mixed. Franking credits per share is the dollar amount of franking credits per share. Franking credits dividend
ratio is the dollar amount of franking credits to the dollar amount of dividend per share. Franking credits yield is the dollar amount of franking credits divided
by the closing price on the ex-dividend date. Average abnormal adjusted return is the average daily abnormal adjusted return on the ex-dividend date, during the
cum-dividend period, and the ex-dividend period using a 50-day window. The percentage of individual ownership is the ratio of the number of shares owned by
individual investors over the number of shares outstanding. The percentage of international ownership is the ratio of the number of shares owned by international
investors over the number of shares outstanding. The sample contains 9699 dividend events between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014.
Variable Mean Median Std. Min. Max. N.
Panel A: full sample
Dividend (cents) 13.2680 5.0000 38.2628 0.0200 2800.0000 9699
Dividend payout ratio (%) 60.7305 37.8305 100.7562 0.0012 1000.0000 9699
Dividend yield (%) 3.5311 2.4060 26.3959 0.0232 2366.8421 9699
Franking level (%) 64.4237 100.0000 46.5345 0.0000 100.0000 9699
Franking credits per share (cents) 3.9197 1.0329 15.5275 0.0000 1200.0000 9699
Franking credits dividend ratio (%) 27.6102 42.8571 19.9433 0.0000 42.8571 9699
Franking credits yield (%) 0.8586 0.6878 2.7146 0.0000 207.6923 9699
Percentage of individual ownership (%) 44.5891 41.3808 25.1800 0.0273 99.9969 9699
Percentage of international ownership (%) 0.7946 0.3209 2.5776 0.0003 85.2861 9699
50-day cum-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.1203 0.0566 1.9200 -2.9941 132.4200 9669
Ex-dividend date abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.5109 0.1193 4.3397 -31.4609 145.3322 9444
50-day ex-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) -0.0052 -0.0224 1.4786 -3.7177 141.0012 9657
Panel B: fully franked dividend sample
Dividend (cents) 13.7645 5.0000 45.2022 0.0200 2800.0000 5936
Dividend yield (%) 3.1280 2.4691 7.8573 0.0893 484.6154 5936




































































Franking level (%) 100.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100.0000 5936
Franking credits per share (cents) 5.8991 2.1429 19.3724 0.0086 1200.0000 5936
Franking credits dividend ratio (%) 42.8571 42.8571 0.0000 42.8571 42.8571 5936
Franking credits yield (%) 1.3406 1.0582 3.3674 0.0383 207.6923 5936
Percentage of individual ownership (%) 45.1497 43.0906 21.7379 0.0273 99.8755 5936
Percentage of international ownership (%) 0.7821 0.3296 2.2479 0.0103 51.5779 5936
50-day cum-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.1312 0.0728 1.5930 -2.2859 84.9535 5922
Ex-dividend date abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.3428 0.0560 3.7241 -31.4609 102.8603 5792
50-day ex-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) -0.0197 -0.0259 0.3706 -3.7177 10.8117 5931
Panel C: partly franked dividend sample
Dividend (cents) 21.9908 11.0000 29.9447 0.1000 257.8500 628
Dividend yield (%) 2.7288 2.2039 2.9716 0.1382 58.9744 628
Dividend payout ratio (%) 72.3558 40.6966 116.7087 0.1231 1000.0000 628
Franking level (%) 47.5267 49.4700 23.4284 0.0447 99.3500 628
Franking credits per share (cents) 4.6367 1.6287 7.3994 0.0017 50.8014 628
Franking credits dividend ratio (%) 20.3686 21.2014 10.0407 0.0192 42.5786 628
Franking credits yield (%) 0.5437 0.4412 0.5632 0.0002 8.6766 628
Percentage of individual ownership (%) 35.8629 30.9774 22.8204 0.0486 95.3087 628
Percentage of international ownership (%) 0.9775 0.3648 3.2422 0.0059 44.8016 628
50-day cum-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.1567 0.0253 2.0830 -1.6690 41.6303 625
Ex-dividend date abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.4870 0.1010 3.3994 -13.4985 44.3819 621
50-day ex-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) -0.0270 -0.0011 0.3022 -2.7135 0.9238 626
Panel D: unfranked dividend sample
Dividend (cents) 10.5563 4.2500 21.2444 0.0200 325.0000 3135
Dividend yield (%) 4.4655 2.3204 45.2846 0.0232 2366.8421 3135
Dividend payout ratio (%) 61.2688 33.9889 101.4573 0.0012 1000.0000 3135
Franking level (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3135
Franking credits per share (cents) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3135




































































Franking credits yield (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3135
Percentage of individual ownership (%) 45.4389 38.6718 31.3406 0.0486 99.9969 3135
Percentage of international ownership (%) 0.7771 0.2669 3.0787 0.0003 85.2861 3135
50-day cum-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.0924 0.0316 2.3952 -2.9941 132.4200 3122
Ex-dividend date abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.8370 0.2532 5.4462 -10.9342 145.3322 3031
50-day ex-dividend period average abnormal adjusted return (%) 0.0270 -0.0259 2.5552 -2.3776 141.0012 3100
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4.5.2 Descriptive graphs
Fig. 4.1 plots the accumulated AAR for fully franked dividends, partly franked dividends,
and unfranked dividends terciles during the 100-day window surrounding the ex-dividend
date for our sample. It is clear that the accumulated AAR during the cum-dividend pe-
riod increases faster and reaches a higher point for the fully franked dividends than partly
franked and unfranked dividends. This result provides initial visual evidence to support
hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 about the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Fig. 4.2
plots the accumulated AAR for higher, medium, and lower individual ownership terciles.
The figure indicates that firms with a higher or medium level of individual ownership
(i.e., lower level of institutional investors) have a higher accumulated AAR before the ex-
dividend date but a lower accumulated AAR after the ex-dividend date relative to firms
with a lower level of individual ownership. The result provides indirect support for hy-
pothesis 4.4 about the positive relationship between the extent of the ex-dividend period
irrational exuberance and individual ownership. Fig. 4.3 is the same as Fig. 4.2 except
it divides the sample into terciles by international ownership instead of individual owner-
ship. Fig. 4.3 indicates that firms with a higher international ownership level (i.e., lower
domestic ownership level) have higher accumulated AAR prior to the ex-dividend date.
However, this finding cannot be used to make inferences about hypothesis 4.5 as the level
of international ownership is negligible in the sample, and hence all these plots are of
similar magnitude.
Fig. 4.1. This figure plots the accumulated AAR during the 100-day window surrounding the
ex-dividend date for fully franked dividends, partly franked dividends, and unfranked dividends
terciles. The sample contains 9699 dividend events between January 1, 2006 and December 31,
2014.
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Fig. 4.2. This figure plots the accumulated AAR during the 100-day window surrounding the ex-
dividend date for the samples of higher, medium, and lower individual ownership terciles. The
sample contains 9699 dividend events between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014.
Fig. 4.3. This figure plots the accumulated AAR during the 100-day window surrounding the ex-
dividend date for the samples of higher, medium, and lower international ownership terciles. The
sample contains 9699 dividend events between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014.
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4.5.3 Regression results
Table 4.2 reports the OLS regression results of Eq. (4.16). It first validates hypothesis
4.1. The table shows that the intercepts are all positive, and all of them are significant at
10% level for all windows except the 5-day and 10-day windows while the coefficients
on EX are all negative and significant at 1% level. The findings confirm the previous
literature about the anomaly surrounding the ex-dividend date (Eades et al., 1984; Brown
and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018) and extends the literature by
using a wider window of 50-day to confirm hypothesis 4.1 regarding the existence of the
ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Eq. (4.16) also investigates hypothesis 4.2. The
coefficients on dividend payout ratio DPR are positive during the cum-dividend period
and negative during the ex-dividend period. It confirms hypothesis 4.2 that the level of the
ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is positively correlated to the level of dividends.
According to Table E.1 in Appendix E, the sign of coefficients on dividend variables
remain the same, but the coefficients become insignificant when the dividend payout ratio
is replaced with dividend yield. Eq. (4.16) further examines hypothesis 4.3. Similarly,
the coefficients on franking credit dividend ratio FDR during the cum-dividend period and
the ex-dividend period are positive and negative, respectively. It verifies hypothesis 4.3
that franking credits are also positively correlated with the ex-dividend period irrational
exuberance. The robustness test is also shown in Table E.1 in Appendix E by replacing
the franking credit dividend ratio with other franking variables. When franking credits
level FL and franked dummy FD are used, the results still hold.
Table 4.3 presents the OLS regression results of Eq. (4.17). The coefficients on the
percentage of individual ownership INDO during the cum-dividend period are positive
and significant at 1% level from a 5-day window to a 20-day window. The coefficients
become negative and significant at 5% level from a 5-day window to a 40-day window
during the ex-dividend period. The finding is consistent with hypothesis 4.4 that the level
of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance is positively correlated to the level of
individual ownership. Further, the coefficients on the percentage of international own-
ership INTO are all insignificant. The finding verifies hypothesis 4.5 that international
ownership characteristics have no significant statistical impact on the ex-dividend period
irrational exuberance. The results are robust to replacing the percentage of individual
ownership INDO and the percentage of international ownership INTO with the owner-
ship dummy variables (DINDO/DINTO) in Table E.2 in Appendix E. Overall, the findings
are similar.
Table 4.4 shows the results of Eq. (4.18). This model examines the existence of the
behavioural finance individual dividend clienteles by examining the impact of individual
ownership on the positive relationship between dividends/franking credits and the ex-
dividend period irrational exuberance. From this table, most coefficients on DPR/FDR
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for both ex-dividend and cum-dividend period are insignificant, indicating that the rela-
tionship between dividends/franking credits and the ex-dividend period irrational exuber-
ance addressed in hypothesis 4.4 does not hold for firms with lower individual ownership.
After interacting with individual ownership dummy, the coefficients on DINDO ∗DPR are
positive, and EX ∗DINDO ∗DPR are negative. The finding indicates the relationship in
hypothesis 4.4 holds for firms with higher individual ownership and confirms hypothe-
sis 4.6 that individual ownership strengthens the relationship between dividends and the
ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Similarly, the coefficients on DINDO ∗ FDR
changes from positive to negative from 5-day window to 20-day window after the ex-
dividend date, indicating that individual ownership also strengthens the relationship be-
tween franking credits and the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. This finding
confirms hypothesis 4.7. The test is also robust to replacing dividend variables and frank-
ing credits variables. Overall, the findings are similar when the dividend payout ratio is
used, but there is no obvious evidence when the dividend yield is used according to Table




































































Table 4.2: OLS model estimates of the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from Eq. (4.16) between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014. EX takes the value of one when the return is
during the ex-dividend period and zero if it is during the cum-dividend period. DPR is the dollar amount of dividend per share divided by earnings per share
during the previous year. FDR is the dollar amount of franking credits per share divided by the dollar amount of dividend per share. AAR is the average daily
abnormal adjusted return on the ex-dividend date, during the cum-dividend period and the ex-dividend period using 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day and
50-day windows. LMC is the log of market capitalisation. BM is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of a firm’s equity. QSP is the time-
weighted average of limit order bid-ask spread. IVOL is the standard deviation of the return based on the mid-point price for each quote update. The regression
uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **
and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
CONST 0.01 (0.95) 0.09 (0.41) 0.12 (0.07)* 0.36 (0.02)** 0.35 (0.01)** 0.32 (0)***
EX -0.28 (0)*** -0.13 (0)*** -0.10 (0)*** -0.11 (0)* -0.08 (0)* -0.08 (0)*
DPR 0.14 (0)*** 0.10 (0)*** 0.04 (0)*** 0.03 (0)*** 0.02 (0)** 0.02 (0)**
EX ∗DPR -0.15 (0)*** -0.13 (0)*** -0.06 (0)*** -0.03 (0)** -0.03 (0)** -0.02 (0)**
FDR 0.09 (0.48) 0.19 (0.02)** 0.29 (0.06)* 0.20 (0.08)* 0.27 (0.02)** 0.20 (0)***
EX ∗FDR -0.16 (0.33) -0.37 (0)*** -0.38 (0.02)** -0.28 (0.02)** -0.34 (0.01)*** -0.19 (0.01)***
LMC 0 (0.7) 0 (0.64) 0 (0.2) -0.01 (0.02)** -0.01 (0.01)** -0.01 (0)***
BM 0.01 (0.51) 0 (0.87) 0 (0.54) 0.01 (0.56) 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.33)
QS 0 (0.23) 0 (0.3) 0 (0.76) 0 (0.26) 0 (0.67) 0 (0.62)




































































Table 4.3: OLS model estimates of effects of ownership holdings on the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from Eq. (4.17) between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014. EX takes the value of one when the return
is during the ex-dividend period and zero if it is during the cum-dividend period. INDO is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as the ratio of the
number of shares owned by individual investors over the number of shares outstanding. INTO is the percentage of international ownership calculated as the
ratio of the number of shares owned by international investors over the number of shares outstanding. AAR is the average daily abnormal adjusted return on the
ex-dividend date, during the cum-dividend period and the ex-dividend period using 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day and 50-day windows. DY is the dollar
amount of dividend per share, divided by the cum-dividend day closing price. LMC is the log of market capitalisation. BM is the ratio of the book value of
equity to the market value of a firm’s equity. QSP is the time-weighted average of limit order bid-ask spread. IVOL is the standard deviation of the return based
on the mid-point price for each quote update. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
CONST 0.19 (0.37) 0.14 (0.27) 0.40 (0.04)** 0.59 (0.01)** 0.61 (0.00)*** 0.49 (0.00)***
EX -0.16 (0.02)** -0.12 (0.00)*** -0.13 (0.10) -0.12 (0.09)* -0.08 (0.16) -0.10 (0.00)***
INDO 0.30 (0.02)** 0.32 (0.00)*** 0.18 (0.00)*** 0.09 (0.36) 0.20 (0.19) 0.13 (0.13)
EX ∗ INDO -0.54 (0.00)*** -0.46 (0.00)*** -0.31 (0.00)*** -0.22 (0.01)** -0.30 (0.05)** -0.14 (0.12)
INTO 0.49 (0.56) 0.27 (0.68) -0.71 (0.34) -0.17 (0.76) -0.53 (0.37) -0.05 (0.88)
EX ∗ INTO -2.36 (0.05)** -0.87 (0.28) 0.33 (0.70) -0.09 (0.89) 0.37 (0.55) 0.21 (0.59)
DY -0.32 (0.31) -0.04 (0.78) -0.14 (0.17) -0.08 (0.30) -0.03 (0.74) -0.00 (0.96)
LMC -0.01 (0.51) -0.00 (0.45) -0.01 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)***
BM 0.01 (0.53) 0.00 (0.65) 0.01 (0.70) 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.28) 0.01 (0.27)
QSP -0.01 (0.30) -0.01 (0.10)* 0.00 (0.41) -0.00 (0.47) -0.00 (0.44) -0.00 (0.23)




































































Table 4.4: OLS model estimates of the behavioural finance dividend clientele
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from Eq. (4.18) between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014. EX takes the value of one when the return is during the
ex-dividend period and zero if it is during the cum-dividend period. DPR is the dollar amount of dividend per share divided by earnings per share during the previous year. FDR
is the dollar amount of franking credits per share divided by the dollar amount of dividend per share. DINDO takes the value of one when INDO j,t is above the higher tercile of
INDOt across all companies in year t and zero when INDO j,t is below the lower tercile. DINTO takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the higher tercile of INTOt across
all companies in year t and zero when INTO j,t is below the lower tercile. AAR is the average daily abnormal adjusted return on the ex-dividend date, during the cum-dividend
period and the ex-dividend period using 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day and 50-day windows. LMC is the log of market capitalisation. BM is the ratio of the book value of
equity to the market value of a firm’s equity. QSP is the time-weighted average of limit order bid-ask spread. IVOL is the standard deviation of the return based on the mid-point
price for each quote update. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
CONST 1.22(0.07)* 0.92(0.01)** 0.51(0.08)* 0.46(0.04)** 0.43(0.01)** 0.36(0.01)***
EX -0.23(0.15) -0.04(0.76) -0.01(0.90) -0.01(0.84) -0.00(0.94) -0.04(0.17)
DPR 0.05(0.55) 0.02(0.72) 0.03(0.27) 0.02(0.35) 0.02(0.24) 0.02(0.04)**
EX ∗DPR -0.17(0.19) -0.12(0.28) -0.07(0.32) -0.04(0.27) -0.03(0.44) -0.02(0.45)
FDR -0.59(0.11) -0.15(0.52) -0.09(0.50) -0.03(0.76) 0.07(0.45) 0.07(0.24)
EX ∗FDR 0.95(0.04)** 0.02(0.95) 0.01(0.95) -0.10(0.48) -0.21(0.08)* -0.09(0.31)
DINDO -0.55(0.09)* -0.36(0.07)* -0.04(0.71) 0.03(0.75) 0.01(0.88) 0.04(0.47)
Ex∗DINDO 0.39(0.32) 0.31(0.19) 0.04(0.75) -0.11(0.34) -0.03(0.80) 0.00(0.97)
DINTO 0.08 (0.49) 0.05 (0.50) 0.05 (0.29) 0.02 (0.67) 0.02 (0.53) 0.03 (0.21)
Ex∗DINTO -0.19 (0.22) -0.19 (0.05)** -0.11 (0.08)* -0.04 (0.47) -0.03 (0.47) -0.05 (0.10)
DINDO ∗DPR 0.39(0.12) 0.31(0.04)** 0.10(0.07)* 0.09(0.12) 0.08(0.09)* 0.05(0.11)
Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR -0.25(0.37) -0.27(0.14) -0.12(0.20) -0.09(0.17) -0.12(0.05)** -0.09(0.03)**
DINDO ∗FDR 1.82(0.02)** 0.96(0.04)** 0.42(0.15) 0.16(0.50) 0.10(0.62) -0.01(0.94)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FDR -2.35(0.01)** -1.14(0.05)** -0.64(0.08)* -0.12(0.69) -0.10(0.72) -0.04(0.83)
LMC -0.05 (0.05)* -0.04 (0.03)** -0.02 (0.06)* -0.02 (0.04)** -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.00)***
BM -0.02 (0.20) -0.01 (0.68) 0.00 (0.98) 0.01 (0.50) 0.01 (0.20) 0.01 (0.18)
QSP -0.02 (0.15) -0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.57) 0.01 (0.18) 0.00 (0.38)
IVOL 47.63 (0.26) -5.54 (0.48) -5.29 (0.62) -6.06 (0.52) -8.86 (0.31) -10.53 (0.15)
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4.6 Conclusion and original contribution
Empirically, this chapter investigates the effects of franking credits on the ex-dividend pe-
riod irrational exuberance and dividend clienteles for all dividend-paying securities listed
on ASX during the period between 2006 and 2014. This chapter first validates the exis-
tence of ex-dividend period irrational exuberance (a price run-up before the ex-dividend
date and price run-down after the ex-dividend date) by examining the movement of the
abnormal adjusted return surrounding the ex-dividend date. It extends the existing litera-
ture (Eades et al., 1984; Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bellamy, 2002; Ainsworth et al., 2018)
by applying a wider range of examining window (5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-
day, 50-day) surrounding the ex-dividend date. In addition, this chapter finds a positive
relationship between the level of dividends/franking credits and the ex-dividend period
irrational exuberance.
This chapter then verifies the existence of the individual dividend clienteles in two
steps. This chapter relates the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance with the firm’s
ownership characteristics and finds that individual investors are the net buyers before the
ex-dividend date and net sellers after the ex-dividend date while institutional investors are
their counterparties. There is no direct evidence to show a significant impact of inter-
national investors on the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. Further, this chapter
finds that an increase in the percentage of individual investors holdings strengthens the
positive relationship between dividends/franking credits and the ex-dividend period irra-
tional exuberance. The results contradict Jun et al.’s (2006) finding but are consistent with
Ainsworth et al.’s (2016a) finding that the evidence of tax-induced explanation dividend
clienteles is limited in Australia.
Theoretically, this chapter proposes behavioural finance explanations of dividend clien-
teles to explain the relationship among individual ownership, dividends/franking credits,
and the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance. The theory states that individual in-
vestors prefer dividends and franking credits to capital gains due to the “bird in the hand”
fallacy that individual investors are more likely to be attracted by more stable income
(Gordon, 1963; Lintner, 1964; Dennis and Strickland, 2002; Barber and Odean, 2013),
the “behavioural life-cycle” theory that dividends and franking credits are preferred by
certain groups of investors (specifically, retirees) whose source of income depends heav-
ily on dividends (Shefrin and Statman, 1984; Dong et al., 2005), and the “information
signaling” theory that individual investors are inclined to be impacted by the signaling
role of dividends as their information sources are limited (Bhattacharya, 1979).
As discussed in Section 2.4.1.4, one main limitation of the ex-dividend date studies is
that the estimate of the franking credits from the drop-off ratio is driven more by short-
term investors rather than a firm’s marginal investors (Cannavan et al., 2004; Siau et al.,
2015; Miller and Scholes, 1982; Poterba, 1986; McDonald, 2001). This chapter addresses
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this limitation by investigating the influence of franking credits in a longer window instead
of only on the ex-dividend date.
In summary, this chapter proposes a behavioural finance explanation of dividend clien-
tele that individual investors purchase shares before the ex-dividend date and sell them
after the ex-dividend date as their preference for dividends/franking credits exists for mul-
tiple reasons (i.e., the “bird in the hand” fallacy, the “behavioural life-cycle” theory, and
the “information signaling” theory), thus contributing to the ex-dividend period irrational
exuberance. This chapter contributes to the debate by providing evidence that franking
credits are priced in the Australian equity market.
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Chapter 5
The Valuation and Determinants of
Franking Account Balances
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, although the debate on whether franking credits are priced
in the Australian market has attracted much attention, the literature on whether undis-
tributed franking credits (franking credit balances) are priced is scarce to date. Corporate
tax-paying entities keep an account called a “franking account”. The franking credits ac-
count records the amount of undistributed franking credit at each year end. The franking
credit balances accumulate when the corporate entity receives franking credits or pays cor-
porate taxes. In contrast, the franking credit balances decrease when the corporate entity
distributes franking credits or receives a tax refund (Australian Taxation Office, 2020e).
Although companies that distribute more franking credits than their franking credit bal-
ances will receive a penalty as described in rule 5 in Section 2.2.4, they can choose not
to distribute all available franking credits through partly franked or unfranked dividends,
thus accumulating their franking credit balances.
Theoretically, companies should distribute all available franking credits because the
valuation of franking credits reduces the longer they remain undistributed. However,
the significant build-up of franking credit balances for Australian companies becomes a
puzzle in the existing literature. What are the determinants contributing to the level of
franking credit balances? Heaney (2009) proposes a size effect and an international focus
effect such that large firms with higher international ownership tend to build up their
franking credit balances. He finds evidence of the size effect. However, he is unable to
find evidence to confirm the international focus effect due to the difficulty of identifying
ownership constituents. This chapter extends Heaney’s (2009) work by replacing the ratio
of non-resident revenue to total revenue (the proxy that used by Heaney (2009)) with the
percentage of international ownership as a direct measure of international focus, thus
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addressing the limitation of his measure. The fixed effects panel data analysis provides
strong evidence of the size effect and weak evidence of the international focus effect.
The international focus effect is based on the fact that international investors are not
eligible for franking credits, and firms would choose their dividend policy depending on
their ownership structure if the marginal investors can influence firms’ dividend policy.
The extant literature usually separates investors into two main groups (resident investors
and international investors) depending on their eligibility for franking credits. However,
the literature ignores the fact that different investor communities might value franking
credits differently for many reasons (e.g., individual dividend clientele) even though they
are all eligible for franking credits. Accordingly, this chapter relates the determinants of
franking balances with the individual dividend clientele addressed in ex-dividend studies
documented in Chapter 4. This gives rise to the individual dividend clientele effect that
firms choose to reduce their franking credit balances when the firms are held by more
individual investors with irrational preference to franking credits. This chapter provides
strong evidence of the individual dividend clientele effect.
Are franking credit balances priced in the market? This chapter further conducts value
relevance studies to explore this question. The foundation of these studies is Monkhouse’s
(1993) theoretical framework that if franking credits are priced in the market, franking
credit balances that represent the ability of future distribution of franking credits should
also be reflected in the share price. Monkhouse (1993) derives a CAPM, which assumes
that franking credit balances are priced in the market, and the market valuation of frank-
ing credit balances is equal for all companies in the context of the Australian imputation
system. Heaney (2009) conducts the first empirical value relevance test to examine the
market valuation of franking credits. He uses a sample of firms that report franking credit
balances in their annual report on ASX between 2001 and 2006. He applies the fixed
effects panel analysis and finds that franking credit balances are of value to marginal
investors in small companies, but there is no evidence of value in large companies. Fol-
lowing his research, Tanza (2014) combines Heaney (2009) and Ohlson’s (1995) research
by incorporating franking credit balances in the residual income model and finds that
one dollar of franking credit balances is worth 1.34 dollars in the market using a sam-
ple of securities in ASX 100 from 1996 to 2013. This chapter extends Tanza’s (2014)
model by expanding the sample period and sample constituents and by applying a log-
transformation to reduce the skewness of the sample. Additionally, earnings or future
earnings are used alternately in the model to deal with the multicollinearity between the
independent variables in the model. The fixed effects panel data regression examines the
market valuation of franking credit balances by measuring the sensitivity of the logarithm
of market capitalisation to the logarithm of franking credit balances. There is evidence
that franking credit balances are priced in the market using the sample of securities in
ASX 200 from 2000 to 2018. Each dollar of franking credit balances is found to the
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valued at approximately $1.4. Accordingly, this result is consistent with Tanza’s (2014)
findings of $1.34.
This chapter further relates the market valuation of franking credit balances with firm
size and international focus. Heaney (2009) provides evidence that franking credit bal-
ances are priced in small companies but not in large companies, indicating a negative
relationship between firm size and the market valuation of franking credit balances. He
proposes that large companies attract more international investors who are not eligible for
franking credits, thus leading to lower valuation of franking credit balances. This chap-
ter first examines the relationship between firm size and the market valuation of frank-
ing credits by adding market capitalisation dummies in the value relevance models. The
analysis initially finds results that investors in large firms place a higher valuation on
franking credit balances. Due to the lack of ownership data, Heaney (2009) could not test
this proposition. This chapter then verifies Heaney’s (2009) proposition by splitting the
proposition into two partitions. Firstly, large firms attract more international investors.
Secondly, international investors place a lower valuation of firms with higher franking
credit balances. This chapter tests both sub-propositions. The Pearson correlation test
verifies the first sub-proposition, and shows that firm size is negatively correlated with the
percentage of international ownership holdings1. This chapter then examines the second
sub-proposition by adding international ownership dummies in the value relevance mod-
els and finds evidence to support this sub-proposition. Overall, the findings are consistent
with the second sub-proposition but inconsistent with the first sub-proposition. In partic-
ular, the evidence shows that large firms have a higher percentage of domestic resident
ownership who place a higher valuation on franking credit balances. The market valuation
of franking credit balances is positively correlated with firm size but negatively correlated
with international focus.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature
on the determinants and valuation of franking credit balances. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 de-
scribe data collection and methodology. Section 5.5 reports the empirical results. Section
5.6 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Literature review
As mentioned in Section 2.4.4, although the contention as to whether franking credits are
priced is topical, there is little attention directed to the market valuation of franking credit
balances in Australia. Section 5.2.1 illustrates the theoretical literature. Section 5.2.2
1This is due to the use of the percentage of international ownership as the proxy for the international
holdings. If the number of shares held by international investors is used, the relationship between firm size
and international holdings becomes positive. Although large firms attract more international investors in
terms of the number of shares holdings, the percentage of international ownership does not increase as the
more significant increase in the total number of shares outstanding.
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reviews the empirical literature.
5.2.1 Theoretical literature
Monkhouse (1993) develops the theoretical framework of franking credit balances studies
by deriving a CAPM that incorporates both distributed franking credits and undistributed
franking credits as shown below:
E(R jt) = r f t +β j[E(Rmt)− r f t ]−θ dj D jFjt−θ rmRIC j, (5.1)
where E(R jt) is the expected return for security j at time t, r f t is the risk-free rate, E(Rmt)
is the expected return on the market portfolio, θ dj is the utilisation factor of distributed
franking credits for security j, D j is the gross dividend distributed by security j, Fjt is the
franking credit rate of security j, θ rm is the utilisation factor of franking credit balances
for the entire market, and RIC j is the level of undistributed franking credits retained by
security j.
According to Monkhouse’s (1993) CAPM model, both distributed and undistributed
franking credits reduce the required rate of returns of firms with a utilisation ratio of θ dj
and θ rm respectively. One fundamental assumption in his model is that the utilisation of
franking credit balance (θ rm) is equal for all firms. He comments that these parameters
cannot be measured theoretically but have to be estimated empirically.
5.2.2 Empirical literature
5.2.2.1 Determinants of level of franking credit balances
The first stream of empirical literature analyses the determinants of franking credit bal-
ances. In an efficient market that is frictionless, information is costless and simultaneously
available, and companies are expected to distribute all available franking credits to attract
investors because the market valuation of undistributed franking credit is expected to be
less than that of distributed franking credits due to time value of money (Nigol, 1992;
Monkhouse, 1993). However, franking credit balances accumulate over time where dis-
tributed dividends do not attach all available franking credits in Australia after 19872 due
to many factors (Wood, 1997). Heaney (2009) proposes the size effect and the interna-
tional focus effect that the level of franking credit balances is positively related to firm
size and international holdings. Heaney (2009) and Tanza (2014) find consistent evidence
for the size effect. If franking credit balances are valuable to shareholders, it is expected
that firms will choose to manipulate the level of franking credits attached with dividends
depending on whether their marginal investors can benefit from franking credits. If the
2The sum of franking credit balances of all Australian companies was estimated to be $100 billion in
2010 (Kerin, 2010).
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firm’s marginal investors are resident investors, the firm is more likely to distribute more
franking credits, thus reducing the level of its franking credit balances. However, if the
firm’s marginal investors are international investors, the firm tends to avoid distributing
franking credits, thus building up its franking credit balances. However, Heaney (2009)
cannot verify the international focus effect due to the difficulty of identifying the owner-
ship characteristics of firms. Abraham (2013) and Tanza (2014) extend Heaney’s (2009)
work by using international ownership as the proxy for the international focus and find
evidence to support the international focus effect. The size effect and the international
focus effect are stated in the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5.1: The level of franking credit balances is positively correlated with the
size of the firm.
Hypothesis 5.2: The level of franking credit balances is positively correlated with the
percentage of international ownership of the firm.
According to Section 2.2.3, this chapter recognises four classes of investors accord-
ing to their tax brackets under the current tax regulations in Australia. The first three
communities are Australian tax-paying residents, Australian superannuation funds, and
Australian tax-exempt residents who are eligible for franking credits after the introduc-
tion of tax rebate in July 2000 described in rule 4 in Section 2.2.5. The last investment
community is international shareholders who are not eligible for franking credits. The
existing literature mainly divides the investors into two classes, resident investors and
international investors, depending on their eligibility to receive franking credits (Wood,
1997). However, the tax differences among the first three communities are ignored in the
extant literature. According to the findings of individual dividend clienteles evidenced in
Chapter 4 and other ex-dividend studies literature (Ainsworth et al., 2016a), individual in-
vestors irrationally place a higher valuation on dividends and franking credits than capital
gains compared with institutional investors. Does the individual dividend clientele impact
firms’ decision to distribute franking credits? This chapter proposes the individual divi-
dend clientele effect hypothesis that companies would choose to distribute more franking
credits if the marginal investors are individual investors who prefer franking credits to
optimise the absorption of franking credits. This gives rise to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.3: The level of franking credit balances is negatively correlated with the
percentage of individual ownership of the firm.
5.2.2.2 Market valuation of franking credit balances
Are franking credit balances priced in the market? The second stream of empirical lit-
erature examines the market valuation (utilisation ratio θ rm introduced in Section 5.2.1)
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of franking credit balances. The accumulation of franking credit balances for Australian
companies after 1987 provides researchers with a platform to conduct empirical franking
credit balances studies. Following Monkhouse’s (1993) theoretical work, Heaney (2009)
conducts the first empirical franking credit balances value relevance study. In particular,
Heaney (2009) implements the fixed effects analysis to examine the sensitivity of the level
of market capitalisation to the level of franking credit balances based on over 3000 yearly
observations of firms listed on ASX from 2001 to 2006. The findings suggest that the level
of franking credit balances is uncorrelated with the firms’ market capitalisation using the
sample of the 100 largest listed companies. Tanza (2014) attempts to replicate Heaney’s
(2009) findings by incorporating franking credit balances as the independent variable in
the residual income model (Ohlson, 1995). In contrast with Heaney’s (2009) findings, his
findings suggest that one dollar of franking credit balances is worth 1.34 dollars of market
capitalisation using the sample of securities in ASX 100. However, there are two limi-
tations, named multicollinearity and skewness, in Tanza’s (2014) value relevance model
described in Section 5.4. To reconcile the conflicting results, this chapter extends Tanza’s
(2014) value relevance model by addressing the limitations to verify the value relevance
hypothesis using a more recent period and an expanded sample of firms.
Hypothesis 5.4: The market capitalisation of firms is positively correlated with the level
of franking credit balances.
Although Heaney (2009) does not find a positive market valuation of franking credit
balances using the sample of large companies, he finds a positive valuation of franking
credit balances in the full sample and relatively small companies that do not fall within
the largest 100. It indicates a negative relationship between firm size and the market
valuation of franking credit balances. This chapter examines Heaney’s (2009) findings by
relating the market valuation of franking credit balances (the relationship between market
capitalisation and franking credit balances) with firm size.
Hypothesis 5.5: The market valuation of franking credit balances is negatively corre-
lated with firm size.
Heaney (2009) argues that this inconsistent result depending on firm size can be ex-
plained by the proposition that the marginal shareholders of large companies are foreign
investors who do not value franking credits, whereas the marginal investors of smaller
companies are Australian resident investors. His proposition consists of two parts. Firstly,
firm size is positively correlated with international ownership. The evidence of interna-
tional investors’ preference in large and international companies has been found in Taiwan
and Sweden (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Lin and Shiu, 2003). Heaney (2009) ar-
gues that it is intuitive to apply the relationship in Australia. Secondly, the market value
of franking credit balances documented in hypothesis 5.4 should be negatively correlated
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with the percentage of international investors. Due to the lack of ownership holdings data,
Heaney (2009) cannot verify this explanation. This chapter tests this proposition through
the following two hypotheses using unique ownership constituent data.
Hypothesis 5.6: The size of firms is positively correlated with the international owner-
ship holdings.
Hypothesis 5.7: The market valuation of franking credit balances is negatively corre-
lated with the international ownership holdings.
5.3 Data collection
The initial data set contains the constituents of the S&P/ASX 200 index over the pe-
riod 1 January 2001 through to 31 December 2018. The constituents of ASX 200 are
derived from Bloomberg. Franking credit balances of each company are collected from
Bloomberg with gaps filled manually from the notes in annual reports from DatAnalysis
Premium, Connect4 databases, and company websites. Accounting data including total
assets, total liabilities, total revenue, net income, research and development expenditure,
the ratio of foreign income to net income, and the market capitalisation are collected
from Thomson Reuters Datastream database. To replace the proxy of international focus
in Heaney’s (2009) paper, ownership data are collected. The number of shares held by
individual investors, institutional investors, Australian resident investors, international in-
vestors, and the total number of shares outstanding on a daily basis are obtained from the
ASX’s CHESS database. The detailed information of the CHESS database is described
in Section 4.3.
5.4 Methodology
This chapter applies fixed-time effects and fixed-company effects multivariate panel OLS
regressions to examine the hypotheses described above in Section 5.2.2.
5.4.1 Determinants of level of franking credit balances
This chapter extends Heaney (2009) and Tanza’s (2014) model to analyse the determinants
of franking credit balances through an examination of the size effect, the international
focus effect, and the individual dividend clientele effect. To verify these three effects
in hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively, the tests using the fixed-time and fixed-
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company effects panel data regression as follows:
LFB jt =β j,0 +βt,0 +β1LBVA j,t +β2INTO j,t +β3INDO j,t +β4PROFj,t +β5LEVj,t
+β6GO j,t + ε j,t ,
(5.2)
where LFB j,t is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances of company j at time
t, LBVA j,t is the natural logarithm of book value of assets of company j at time t to
proxy for firm size, INTO j,t is the percentage of international ownership of company j at
time t to proxy for international focus, INDO j,t is the percentage of individual ownership
of company j at time t, PROFj,t is profitability (net profit after tax to total revenue) of
company j at time t, LEVj,t is leverage (total liabilities to book value of assets) of company
j at time t, GO j,t is growth option (research and development (R&D) expenditure to total
revenue) of company j at time t.
According to the size effect, the international focus effect, and the individual dividend
clientele effect described in hypotheses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, β1, β2 are expected to be positive
and β3 is expected to be negative.
5.4.2 Market valuation of franking credit balances
If franking credit balances are priced in the market, the level of franking credit balances
should be positively correlated with firm value. This chapter follows Heaney (2009) and
Tanza’s (2014) work to examine the market valuation of franking credits. Tanza (2014)
applies a panel regression based on Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model to measure
the sensitivity of the market value of the firm to the level of franking credit balances,
which is shown as below.
MC jt = α j,0 +αt,0 +β1FB j,t +β2NTA j,t +β3EARN j,t +β4EARN j,t+1 + ε j,t , (5.3)
where MC jt is the market capitalisation of company j at time t, FB j,t is franking credit
balances of company j at time t, NTA j,t is net assets of company j at time t, EARN j,t is
earnings of company j at time t, and EARN j,t+1 is future earnings of company j at time
t +1.
Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model states that the market value of firm depdends on
the book value of firm and the future residual income. In Tanza’s (2014) value relevance
model, NTA j,t is used to proxy for the book value of firm, and EARN j,t and EARN j,t+1
are used to proxy for the future residual income. One limitation of Tanza’s (2014) model
is that market capitalisation, and franking credit balances are extremely right-skewed ac-
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cording to Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.1. The highly skewed dependent and independent variables
make the OLS regression inappropriate as the OLS regression model estimates the mean,
while the mean is not an appropriate proxy of central tendency in a skewed distribution.
This chapter improves Tanza’s (2014) model by applying a log-transformation. After the
log-transformation, variables become less skewed and more normally distributed. An-
other limitation of Tanza’s (2014) model is the multicollinearity between EARN j,t and
EARN j,t+1 shown in Table 5.2. This chapter improves Tanza’s (2014) model by avoiding
using both LEARN j,t and LEARN j,t+1 in one model. Alternately, Eq. (5.4) uses LEARN j,t
or LEARN j,t+1 exclusively as the proxy for future earnings. The log-transformation model
is shown as below:
LMC jt = α j,0+αt,0+β1LFB j,t +β2LNTA j,t +β3LEARN j,t or LEARN j,t+1+ε j,t , (5.4)
where LMC jt is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of company j at time t,
LFB j,t is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances of company j at time t, LNTA j,t
is the natural logarithm of net assets of company j at time t, LEARN j,t is the natural
logarithm of earnings of company j at time t, and LEARN j,t+1 is the natural logarithm of
future earnings of company j at time t +1.
Eq. (5.5) further extends Eq. (5.4) by adding interaction terms between market capi-
talisation dummies and franking credit balances to verify Heaney’s (2009) findings of a
negative relationship between firm size and the market valuation of franking credit bal-
ances documented in hypothesis 5.5. The market capitalisation dummies are constructed
for each year so as to avoid foresight bias. For example, D2MC j,t is equal to one when the
market capitalisation for the company j at time t is above the median of market capitali-
sation across all companies at time t and zero otherwise.
LMC jt =α j,0 +αt,0 +β1LFB j,t +β2D1MC j,t ∗LFB j,t +β3D2MC j,t ∗LFB j,t
+β4D3MC j,t ∗LFB j,t +β5LNTA j,t +β6LEARN j,t or LEARN j,t+1 + ε j,t ,
(5.5)
where D1MC j,t takes the value of one when MC j,t is above the lower (25%) quartile of MCt
across all companies in year t and zero otherwise, D2MC j,t takes the value of one when
MC j,t is above the median of MCt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise, and
D3MC j,t takes the value of one when MC j,t is above the upper (75%) quartile of MCt across
all companies in year t and zero otherwise.
Heaney (2009) raises the proposition that the marginal investors of large firms are more
likely to be international investors who tend to place less value on franking credits to
explain his findings. To verify this proposition, this chapter first verifies hypothesis 5.6
by examining the correlation between size and the percentage of international ownership.
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This chapter further examines hypothesis 5.7 by using Eq. (5.6), which incorporates in-
teraction terms between international ownership percentage dummy and franking credit
balances. Similar to D2MC j,t , D2INTO j,t is equal to one when the percentage of interna-
tional ownership for the company j in year t is above the median of the percentage of
international ownership across all companies in year t and zero otherwise.
LMC jt =α j,0 +αt,0 +β1LFB j,t +β2D1INTO j,t ∗LFB j,t +β3D2INTO j,t ∗LFB j,t
+β4D3INTO j,t ∗LFB j,t +β5LNTA j,t +β6LEARN j,t or LEARN j,t+1 + ε j,t ,
(5.6)
where D1INTO j,t takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the lower (25%) quartile
of INTOt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise, D2INTO j,t takes the value
of one when INTO j,t is above the median of INTOt across all companies in year t and
zero otherwise, D3INTO j,t takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the upper (75%)
quartile of INTOt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise.
5.5 Empirical results
5.5.1 Summary statistics
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for all companies in ASX 200 from 2000 to 2018.
The magnitudes and dispersions of the variables are examined. This table shows that the
average of franking credit balances (dollars in millions) is 212.9061, with a median of
27.8480 through the sample period. The mean is much greater than the median, showing
that the distribution is right-skewed. Fig. 5.1 confirms that the distribution of franking
credit balances is highly right-skewed with skewness of 11.38. Similar to franking credit
balances, the distribution of market capitalisation is also right-skewed with a mean of
7379.3916 that is much greater than the median of 1740.0035. Fig. 5.3 shows a right-
skewness of 5.95. In short, franking credit balances and market capitalisation are not
normally distributed. The mean and median of franking credit balances after applying
log-transformation are 3.3852 and 3.3803, respectively. Similarly, the logarithm of market
capitalisation averages 7.4143 with a medium of 7.4616. Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.4 indicate
that the skewness of franking credit balances and the market capitalisation after applying
log-transformation reduce to -0.4127 and -0.4953 respectively. Overall, the closer mean
and median of variables and the reducing skewness suggest that these two variables follow
a lognormal distribution. The log-transformation improves the reliability of panel data
OLS regression.
The average of the logarithm of total assets of firms as the proxy of firm size is 7.3758.
For ownership data, the percentage of international ownership has an average at 0.48%,
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with a standard deviation of 0.28%. The percentage of individual ownership is much
higher, with a mean of 34.94% and a standard deviation of 30.68%. For control vari-
ables in the determinant analysis, the profitability, leverage, and growth options across all
firms are 2.7070, 0.5084, and 0.0075. Control variables in value relevance tests are the
logarithm of net assets with a mean and a standard deviation of 6.5815 and 1.9903, the
logarithm of earnings with a mean and a standard deviation of 4.7034 and 1.8249, and the
logarithm of future earnings with a mean and a standard deviation of 4.7988 and 1.7849.
5.5.2 Pearson correlation matrix
The Pearson correlation matrix results shown in Table 5.2 indicate that many variables
are marginally correlated with statistical significance of 1% and 5%. For example, the
logarithm of franking credits balances is positively correlated with the logarithm of the
book value of total assets but negatively correlated with the percentage of international
ownership. This provides initial evidence consistent with hypotheses 5.1 but contradicts
hypothesis 5.2. The correlation between the logarithm of market capitalisation and the
logarithm of franking credit balances is positive and significant, which is as expected as
per hypothesis 5.4. For hypothesis 5.6, the logarithm of market capitalisation is nega-
tively correlated with the percentage of international ownership holdings at 1% signifi-
cance level, which contradicts Heaney’s (2009) proposition that large firms attract more
international investors documented in Taiwan (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001) and Swe-
den (Lin and Shiu, 2003). The contradictory findings are due to the use of the percentage
of international ownership holdings rather than the number of shares held of interna-
tional ownership as the proxy for international focus3. LEARNt and LEARNt+1 are highly
correlated as expected, which might cause the multicollinearity in Tanza’s (2014) value
relevance model as discussed in Section 5.4.2.
3The correlation between the logarithm of market capitalisation and the number of shares held by inter-
national investors is 0.3667 with significance at 1%. This is consistent with Heaney’s (2009) proposition.
However, using the number of shares held by international investors as the proxy for international focus
does not consider the changes in the total number of shares outstanding. Therefore, the percentage of
























































Table 5.1: Summary statistics
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and the number of observations for ASX 200 firms between 2000 and 2018. FB is
the dollar value of franking credit balances in millions. LFB is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances. LBVA is the natural logarithm of the book value
of assets. INTO is the percentage of international ownership calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned by international investors over the number
of shares outstanding. INDO is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned by individual investors over the
number of shares outstanding. PROF is calculated as net profit after tax to total revenue as the proxy for profitability. LEV is calculated as total liabilities to book
value of assets as the proxy for leverage. GO is calculated as Research and development (R&D) expenditure to total revenue as the proxy for growth options. MC
is the market capitalisation. LMC is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. LNTA is the natural logarithm of net assets. LEARNt is the natural logarithm
of earnings. LEARNt+1 is the natural logarithm of future earnings.
Variable Mean Median Std. Min. Max. N.
FB 212.9061 27.8480 997.5150 -51.6000 18290.0000 1838
LFB 3.3852 3.3803 2.0898 -4.7105 9.8141 1799
LBVA 7.3758 7.4942 2.2805 -3.5405 13.7906 2680
INTO 0.0048 0.0028 0.0171 0.0000 0.5959 1998
INDO 0.3494 0.3068 0.2156 0.0038 0.9852 2168
PROF 2.7070 0.0964 113.1710 -496.3333 4234.0690 2670
LEV 0.5084 0.4794 0.3915 -0.3519 10.4344 2680
GO 0.0075 0.0000 0.0343 0.0000 0.7240 2903
MC 7397.3916 1740.0035 19945.0761 0.9900 243187.1000 2538
LMC 7.4143 7.4616 1.8514 -0.0101 12.4016 2538
LNAT 6.5815 6.7629 1.9903 -3.8167 11.4241 2646
LEARNt 4.7034 4.6778 1.8249 -5.1160 10.0811 2251
LEARNt+1 4.7988 4.7637 1.7849 -5.1160 10.0811 2278
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Fig. 5.1. The figure plots the histogram of franking credit balances in million dollars for firms in
ASX 200 from 2000 to 2018. The skewness of franking credit balances is 11.38.
Fig. 5.2. The figure plots the histogram of the logarithm of franking credit balances in million
dollars for firms in ASX 200 from 2000 to 2018. The skewness of the logarithm of market capi-
talisation is -0.4127.
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Fig. 5.3. The figure plots the histogram of market capitalisation in million dollars for firms in ASX
200 from 2000 to 2018. The skewness of market capitalisation is 5.95.
Fig. 5.4. The figure plots the histogram of the logarithm of market capitalisation in million dollars

























































Table 5.2: Pearson correlation matrix
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of variables for a sample of ASX 200 firms between 2000 and 2018. LFB is the natural logarithm of franking
credit balances. LBVA is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. INTO is the percentage of international ownership calculated as the ratio of the
number of shares owned by international investors over the number of shares outstanding. INDO is the percentage of individual ownership calculated as the
ratio of the number of shares owned by individual investors over the number of shares outstanding. PROF is calculated as net profit after tax to total revenue as
the proxy for profitability. LEV is calculated as total liabilities to book value of assets as the proxy for leverage. GO is calculated as research and development
(R&D) expenditure to total revenue as the proxy for growth options. LMC is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. LNTA is the natural logarithm of net
assets. LEARNt is the natural logarithm of earnings. LEARNt+1 is the natural logarithm of future earnings. The numbers shown in underlined and bold indicate
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
LFB LBVA INTO INDO PROF LEV GO LMC LNTA LEARNt LEARNt+1
LFB 1
LBVA 0.6272 1
INTO -0.1156 -0.1193 1
INDO -0.0382 -0.2179 -0.1083 1
PROF 0.0514 -0.0033 -0.0068 -0.0592 1
LEV 0.3030 0.5818 -0.0295 0.0519 -0.0998 1
GO -0.1794 -0.2546 0.2140 0.0804 -0.0135 -0.1209 1
LMC 0.6762 0.8753 -0.1407 -0.2360 0.0122 0.3525 -0.1403 1
LNTA 0.6337 0.9483 -0.1362 -0.2959 0.0210 0.3231 -0.2614 0.9047 1
LEARNt 0.6433 0.8614 -0.1331 -0.2125 0.0036 0.3752 -0.1810 0.9224 0.8798 1
LEARNt+1 0.6500 0.8671 -0.1108 -0.2331 0.0203 0.3752 -0.1841 0.9304 0.8902 0.9219 1
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5.5.3 Regression results
To analyse the determinants of franking credit balances, Eq. (5.2) is applied to validate
the size effect, the international focus effect, and the individual dividend clientele effect
described in hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Table 5.3 provides the OLS regression results
of Eq. (5.2). Panel A examines the size effect and the international focus effect using
the sample from 1996 to 20134. Panel B examines these effects using the extended sam-
ple from 2000 to 2018. Panel C examines the individual dividend clientele effect using
the sample from 2000 to 2018. The coefficients on firm size (LBVA) are positive and
statistically significant at 5% in all panels, providing strong evidence of the size effect.
The coefficients on logarithm variables measure the elasticity of the dependent variable
with respect to the independent variable. The coefficient on LBVA of 0.4922 in Panel B
represents the elasticity of franking credit balances with respect to firm size. It indicates
that one percent increase in firm size contributes to a half percent increase in the level
of franking credit balances. The evidence of the size effect described in hypothesis 5.1
is consistent with Heaney (2009) and Tanza’s (2014) findings. In the examination of the
international focus effect, this chapter cannot replicate Tanza’s (2014) findings using the
sample of ASX 200 with the same examining period from 1996 to 2013 according to Panel
A. However, the analysis finds weak evidence of the international focus effect using the
sample from 2000 to 2018 according to the international ownership coefficient of 30.36
that is significant at 10% in Panel B. The findings are consistent with Tanza’s (2014)
findings. According to Panel C, the coefficient on the percentage of individual owner-
ship (INTO) is negative and statistically significant at 1%, providing strong evidence to
support the individual dividend clientele documented in hypothesis 5.3.
This chapter further conducts franking credit balances value relevance analysis by ex-
amining the sensitivity of firms’ market capitalisation to franking credit balances. Table
5.4 reports the estimated coefficients in Eq. (5.3) and Eq. (5.4). We cannot replicate
Tanza’s (2014) findings by applying Eq. (5.3) using the sample of ASX 200 and the same
examining period as used by Tanza (2014). From Panel A, the coefficients on FB are sta-
tistically insignificant. The difference in the franking credit balances coefficients between
Tanza’s (2014) results and results in Panel A could be caused by the sample selection5.
After applying the two main improvements to reduce the skewness and the multicollinear-
ity in Eq. (5.4), the analysis finds that coefficients on LFB are positive and statistically
significant at 5% and 1% in Panel B and Panel C, respectively. The evidence confirms hy-
pothesis 5.4 that franking credit balances are priced in the market, which confirms Tanza’s
(2014) findings but contradicts Heaney’s (2009) findings using a sample of large firms.
4Panel A examines the period from 1996 to 2013 to replicate Tanza’s (2014) work.
5Some outlier firms with large franking credit balances might affect the coefficient significantly. A
positive coefficient of 0.8556 with significance at 1% on FB is obtained after excluding BHP from the
sample.
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The LFB coefficient that measures the elasticity of firm value with respect to franking
credit balances is 0.04 in Panel B. It suggests that one percent increase in franking credit
balances is associated with 0.04 percent increase in firm value. The elasticity of 0.04 can
be interpreted that each dollar of franking credit balances is worth at approximately 1.4
dollars using the mean of franking credit balances and market capitalisation in summary
statistics6.
Table 5.5 reports the coefficients in Eq. (5.5) that incorporates the size interaction
terms. From Panel A and Panel B, the coefficients on FB are statistically insignificant,
and the coefficients on D2MC ∗ LFB are positive and statistically significant at 1%. It
indicates that the market valuation of franking credit balances is positive for firms with a
market capitalisation above the median. Panel C and Panel D provide deeper insights into
the relationship between the market valuation of franking credit balances and firm size by
dividing the sample into quartiles based on market capitalisation. The coefficient on FB is
negative and statistically significant, and the coefficients on D1MC∗LFB, D2MC∗LFB and
D3MC ∗LFB are all positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the firms with
a market capitalisation below the lower quartile (25%) have a negative market valuation
of franking credit balances. However, the market valuation of franking credit balances
increases significantly and turns from negative into strongly positive with the increase of
firm size. The findings verify hypothesis 5.5 and contradict Heaney’s (2009) results.
Table 5.6 presents the coefficients in Eq. (5.6) that incorporates the international fo-
cus interaction terms. From Panel A and Panel B, the coefficients on LFB shift from
positive and statistically significant to insignificant when interacting with D2INTO. When
all three international ownership dummies are incorporated into the model, the results
provide more insights. For firms with international ownership below the lower quan-
tile (25%), franking credit balances are marginally priced in the market. However, the
market valuation of franking credit balances drops significantly with the increase of inter-
national ownership holdings, especially when the firm’s international ownership is above
the lower quartile (25%). It indicates that the market valuation of franking credit balances
decreases with the international holdings when the international ownership exceeds the
25% percentile. The findings are consistent with hypothesis 5.7 and the second part of
Heaney’s (2009) proposition.
6The estimated utilisation ratio in dollar value of franking credit balances is derived by using the elas-
ticity of 0.04 with a mean of FB at 212 and a mean of MC at 7397 presented in Table 5.1. One percentage
increase in FB with a mean of 212 represents an increase of 2.12 dollars in FB. 0.04 percentage increase
in MC with a mean of 7397 represents an increase of 2.96 dollars in MC. Therefore, one dollar increase
in franking credit balances leads to a 1.4 dollars increase in market capitalisation. The market valuation of
franking balance at more than $1 is somewhat unexpected and warrants further investigation. It is possi-
ble that franking credit balances are a signal or indicator of the future dividend policy. Specifically, firms
with higher franking credit balances might have strong current and expected future earnings and hence will
have larger dividends and more franking credits to distribute in the future. It is also possible the franking
























































Table 5.3: Fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS model estimates of franking credit balances determinant
analysis
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS model Eq. (5.2). LFB is the dependent variable. LFB is
the natural logarithm of franking credit balances. LBVA is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. INTO is the percentage of international ownership
calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned by international investors over the number of shares outstanding. INDO is the percentage of individual
ownership calculated as the ratio of the number of shares owned by individual investors over the number of shares outstanding. PROF is calculated as net profit
after tax to total revenue as the proxy for profitability. LEV is calculated as total liabilities to book value of assets as the proxy for leverage. GO is calculated as
research and development (R&D) expenditure to total revenue as the proxy for growth options. Panel A examines the size effect and international focus effect
using the sample from 1996 to 2013. Panel B examines the size effect and the international focus effect using the sample from 2000 to 2018. Panel C examines
the individual dividend clientele effect using the sample from 2000 to 2018. The regression uses both time, and firm clusters and significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
LFB Panel A Panel B Panel C
Sample period 1996-2013 2000-2018 2000-2018
CONST 0.7571 (0.5982) 0.0507 (0.0602) 1.5139 (3.1073)
LBVA 0.426 (2.4084)** 0.4922 (4.3681)*** 0.3435 (5.2396)***
INTO 19.525 (0.9804) 30.3679 (1.6808)*
INDO -0.9420 (-2.5832)***
LEV -1.0071 (-1.5666) -0.9078 (-1.5214) -0.8234 (-2.1061)**
PROF 0.0024 (5.975)*** 0.0009 (3.4194)*** 0.001 (1.164)
GO -0.8327 (-0.3536) -0.2871 (-0.2159) -0.1089 (-0.1244)
No of observations 753 1319 1407
























































Table 5.4: Fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS model estimates of franking credit balances valuation relevance
analysis
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS Eq. (5.4). LMC is the dependent variable. LMC is the
natural logarithm of market capitalisation. MC is the market capitalisation. LFB is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances. FB is the franking credit
balances. LNTA is the natural logarithm of net assets. LEARNt is the natural logarithm of earnings. EARNt is earnings. LEARNt+1 is the natural logarithm of
future earnings. EARNt+1 is future earnings. Panel A examines the market valuation of franking credit balances by applying Tanza’s (2014) method using the
sample from 1996 to 2013. Panel B examines the market valuation of franking credit balances after log-transformation with LEARNt as the proxy for future
residual income using the sample from 2000 to 2018. Panel C examines the market valuation of franking credit balances after log-transformation with LEARNt+1
as the proxy for future residual income using the sample from 2000 to 2018. The regression uses both time, and firm clusters and significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Dependent variable MC Dependent variable LMC LMC
Sample period 1996-2013 Sample period 2000-2018 2000-2018
CONST 1522.7922 (1.5029) CONST 2.7775 (8.0877)*** 2.2643 (7.1192)***
FB 0.2776 (0.1136) LFB 0.0395 (1.9981)** 0.0526 (2.7443)***
NTA 0.7232 (2.4639)** LNTA 0.5058 (7.9326)*** 0.5811 (10.3742)***
EARNt 5.0306 (2.4825)** LEARNt 0.2797 (7.182)***
EARNt+1 2.2748 (3.0639)*** LEARNt+1 0.2613 (8.0351)***
No of observations 1035 1533 1531
























































Table 5.5: Fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS model estimates of franking credit balances valuation relevance
analysis with the size effect
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS Eq. (5.5). LMC is the dependent variable. LMC is the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation. LFB is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances. MC is the market capitalisation. D1MC takes the value of one when
MC j,t is above the lower (25%) quartile of MCt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise. D2MC takes the value of one when MC j,t is above the median of
MCt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise. D3MC takes the value of one when MC j,t is above the upper (75%) quartile of MCt across all companies in
year t and zero otherwise. LNTA is the natural logarithm of net assets. LEARNt is the natural logarithm of earnings. LEARNt+1 is the natural logarithm of future
earnings. Panel A uses LEARNt as the proxy for future residual income and D2MC as the firm size dummy in the interaction terms. Panel B uses LEARNt+1 as
the proxy for future residual income and D2MC as the firm size dummy in the interaction terms. Panel C uses LEARNt as the proxy for future residual income and
D1MC, D2MC, D3MC as the firm size dummies in the interaction terms. Panel D uses LEARNt+1 as the proxy for future residual income and D1MC, D2MC, D3MC
as the firm size dummies in the interaction terms. The regression uses both time, and firm clusters and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by
*, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
LMC Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
CONST 2.8452 (8.0257)*** 2.325 (6.8453)*** 2.9259 (22.3844)*** 2.3902 (18.3049)***
LFB 0.0004 (0.0156) 0.0131 (0.6193) -0.0522 (-3.6676)*** -0.0304 (-2.1995)**
D1MC ∗LFB 0.0706 (5.7704)*** 0.0632 (5.108)***
D2MC ∗LFB 0.0606 (3.5518)*** 0.0627 (3.7051)*** 0.0431 (4.3951)*** 0.0458 (4.6213)***
D3MC ∗LFB 0.0254 (2.6048)*** 0.019 (1.8996)*
LNTA 0.4988 (7.8403)*** 0.5715 (9.8928)*** 0.4892 (22.1845)*** 0.562 (26.4955)***
LEARNt 0.2734 (7.1424)*** 0.264 (19.0969)***
LEARNt+1 0.2595 (8.0686)*** 0.2531 (18.5956)***
No of observations 1533 1531 1533 1531
























































Table 5.6: Fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS model estimates of franking credit balances valuation relevance
analysis with the international focus effect
This table reports the estimates of coefficients from fixed company and fixed time effects panel OLS Eq. (5.6). LMC is the dependent variable. LMC is the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation. LFB is the natural logarithm of franking credit balances. INTO is the percentage of international ownership calculated as the
ratio of the number of shares owned by international investors over the number of shares outstanding. D1INTO takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the
lower (25%) quartile of INTOt across all companies in year t and zero otherwise, D2INTO takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the median of INTOt
across all companies in year t and zero otherwise, D3INTO takes the value of one when INTO j,t is above the upper (75%) quartile of INTOt across all companies
in year t and zero otherwise. LNTA is the natural logarithm of net assets. LEARNt is the natural logarithm of earnings. LEARNt+1 is the natural logarithm of
future earnings. Panel A uses LEARNt as the proxy for future residual income and D2INTO as the international ownership dummy in the interaction terms. Panel
B uses LEARNt+1 as the proxy for future residual income and D2INTO as the international ownership dummy in the interaction terms. Panel C uses LEARNt as
the proxy for future residual income and D1INTO, D2INTO, D3INTO as the international ownership dummies in the interaction terms. Panel D uses LEARNt+1 as
the proxy for future residual income and D1INTO, D2INTO, D3INTO as the international ownership dummies in the interaction terms. The regression uses both
time, and firm clusters and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
LMC Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
CONST 2.778 (8.0971)*** 2.2651 (7.1104)*** 2.7804 (20.7675)*** 2.2702 (17.0463)***
LFB 0.0384 (1.8651)* 0.0531 (2.6835)*** 0.0461 (4.1668)*** 0.0639 (5.9328)***
D1INTO -0.0158 (-1.9636)** -0.0235 (-2.8699)***
D2INTO 0.0027 (0.2808) -0.0014 (-0.1395) 0.0088 (1.1209) 0.0081 (1.0146)
D3INTO -0.003 (-0.3261) -0.0049 (-0.5173)
LNTA 0.5054 (7.9232)*** 0.5812 (10.3701)*** 0.5059 (22.2889)*** 0.5805 (26.8416)***
LEARNt 0.2802 (7.1268)*** 0.2792 (19.682)***
LEARNt+1 0.2611 (7.9887)*** 0.2617 (18.8147)***
No of observations 1533 1531 1533 1531
R-squared 87.55% 87.58% 87.39% 87.45%
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5.6 Conclusion and original contribution
In the franking credit balances determinants analysis, Heaney (2009) and Tanza’s (2014)
find consistent evidence of a size effect and mixed evidence of an international focus
effect. This chapter improves Heaney’s (2009) model by using the percentage of interna-
tional ownership as the proxy of international focus. The fixed company and fixed time
effects panel data OLS regression uses the sample of ASX 200 from 2000 to 2018 and
provides strong evidence of the size effect that the level of franking credit balances in-
creases with firm size and weak evidence of the international focus effect that the level
of franking credit balances increases with international ownership. This chapter proposes
the individual dividend clientele effect hypothesis that firms with higher individual own-
ership are less likely to accumulate their franking credit balances as individual investors
irrationally prefer franking credits to capital gains, as documented in Chapter 4. There is
strong evidence of the individual dividend clientele effect.
In the value relevance tests, this chapter improves Tanza’s (2014) value relevance model
by applying a log-transformation to reduce the skewness of variables and using only one
earnings variables to eliminate the multicollinearity and finds that franking credit balances
are priced in the market. A one percent increase in the level of franking credit balances
leads to a 0.04 percent increase in firm value. One dollar of franking credit balances is
worth $1.4 dollars in firm value. The findings are consistent with Tanza’s (2014) findings
that using the sample of ASX 100, but contradict Heaney’s (2009) findings that franking
credit balances are not valued for his sample of large firms.
This chapter further relates the market valuation of franking credit balances with firm
size and international focus. The findings suggest that the market valuation of franking
credit balances increases with firm size, which contrasts Heaney’s (2009) findings. To ver-
ify Heaney’s (2009) proposition that large firms tend to attract more international investors
who place less value to franking credit balances, this chapter provides evidence that the
market valuation of franking credit balances decreases with the international ownership
holdings. This is consistent with part of Heaney’s (2009) argument. However, overall the
data reveals a negative relationship between firm size and the percentage of international
ownership holdings. The market valuation of franking credit balances is more significant
in large firms, as large firms have a lower percentage of international investors who place
a lower valuation on franking credit balances.
To conclude, as discussed in Section 2.4.4, franking credit balances studies are scarce
in extant literature. This chapter provides insights into whether franking credit balances
are priced in the market through value relevance tests and the determinant analysis. The
panel data analysis provides direct evidence of the size effect, the international focus ef-
fect, and the individual dividend clientele effect in the determinant analysis. The analysis
also suggests that franking credit balances are priced in the market, and that their valuation
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is positively related to the firm size but negatively related to international focus. Accord-
ingly, the building up of franking credit balances over time in Australian firms provides a
significant notional tax benefit to resident investors. The findings provide insights into the
marked differences in the literature of the valuation of franking credits and provide direct





The imputation system in Australia, as an important mechanism that supports the inte-
gration of corporate and personal tax systems, is playing a vital role in the Australian
economy in terms of avoiding double taxation of corporate earnings, protecting the wel-
fare of eligible investors and improving the attractiveness of Australian firms to certain
investors (Australian Government, 2015). On the other hand, according to Australian
Government (2014), this system is under the risk of being modified or even completely
revoked due to its unattractiveness to international investment communities and thus the
increased required rate of return of foreign investors. The topic of whether or not the
imputation system should be modified is controversial among academics and practition-
ers. The question central to this debate—“Are franking credits attached in the imputation
system priced in the market?”—has raised broad attention in the literature with consen-
sus yet to be reached. This thesis aims to shed light on this question and examines the
pricing of franking credits through three interrelated studies, namely, the pricing BHP
Billiton ADR twins, the pricing of equities in the ex-dividend period, and the valuation of
franking credit balances.
Chapter 3 investigates the role of the tax imputation system in the price premium of
BHP Billiton ADR twins. In particular, BHP in Australia and Billiton in the UK form a
Dual-Listed Company (DLC) and their ADRs are traded on the NYSE. Despite the same
US dollar dominated dividends, the BHP ADR generally sells at a premium to the Billiton
ADR with a considerable time variation. With the application of Gordon Growth Model
(GGM) (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956) and Residual Income Model (RIM) (Ohlson, 1995)
for price estimation and multivariate OLS regression models, we find that imputation tax
differences significantly explain the time variation in the premium of the ADR prices and
thus are an important determinant of the premium.
Chapter 4 explores the implications of franking credits on the ex-dividend period irra-
tional exuberance in the context of the Australian equity market. Specifically, we validate
the existence of the exuberance and the dividend clienteles which potentially lead to the
exuberance, and further investigate the role of franking credits in the dividend cliente-
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les. We find that individual investors irrationally overvalue dividends and franking credits
due to behavioural finance reasons, and hence shifts from a long position to a short po-
sition during an ex-dividend event. These behaviours thus contribute to the ex-dividend
period exuberance. In addition, there is no evidence relating foreign ownership with the
valuation of franking credits.
Chapter 5 examines the valuation of franking balance for Australian firms through a
determinant analysis and value relevance studies. The determinant analysis investigates
the factors that contribute to the increasing cumulative level of franking credit balances in
Australia. The fixed company and fixed time effects panel data OLS regression provides
strong evidence of the size effect that the level of franking credit balances increases with
firm size and weak evidence of the international focus effect that the level of franking
credit balances increases with international ownership. Value relevance studies explore
whether franking credit balances are priced in the market. With extensions and improve-
ments based on Tanza’s (2014) value relevance model, we find significant evidence that
franking credit balances are priced in the market and one dollar of franking credit is worth
1.4 dollars in firm value. In addition, this chapter relates the market valuation of franking
credit balances to firm size and international focus and suggests that the market valua-
tion is positively correlated with the firm size and negatively correlated with international
focus.
Overall, the above three studies address different aspects regarding the question of
whether franking credits are priced in the Australian and international equity markets, and
thus provide insights on the debate of whether the imputation system in Australia should
be abandoned or modified. Significant evidence is provided, which shows that franking
credits are priced and are providing massive benefits to Australian resident investors. Our
findings suggest that the imputation system should not be removed without a change in
other tax rules, in which case share prices in the Australian equity market are expected to
drop sharply with a substantial loss of resident investors’ welfare.
This thesis contributes to several different streams of literature. First, it contributes to
the two main streams of literature that investigate the pricing of franking credits, namely,
comparative pricing studies and ex-dividend drop-off studies. Chapter 3 extends the com-
parative pricing studies by proposing a new approach that compares the prices of two
instruments which are same in their underlying but differ in their entitlement to franking
credits (i.e. ADRs of DLC twins). It provides the first direct evidence that imputation tax
credits are capitalised into equity prices. Chapter 4 extends the ex-dividend drop-off stud-
ies literature by examining the overall influence of dividends and franking credits for the
whole ex-dividend period. While most existing ex-dividend drop-off studies intentionally
restrict their investigation window to short periods around the ex-dividend day, we apply
a wider range of the examining window (5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day, 50-day)
surrounding the ex-dividend date.
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Second, this thesis contributes to the literature on the valuation of franking credit bal-
ances, which has been scarce to date with Heaney (2009) and Tanza (2014) being the
only closely relevant studies. In the analysis of determinants contributing to the level of
franking credit balances, Heaney (2009) fails to find evidence to confirm the international
focus effect due to the difficulty in identifying ownership constituents. Chapter 5 extends
Heaney’s (2009) work by replacing the ratio of non-resident revenue to total revenue with
the percentage of international ownership as the proxy of international focus to address
the original limitation of the inability to access ownership data. In addition, Chapter 5 ex-
tends Tanza’s (2014) value relevance model by applying the log-transformation to reduce
the skewness of the sample and using earnings or future earnings in the model to deal
with the multicollinearity between the independent variables in the model. These exten-
sions significantly improve the statistical properties of investigated variables and model
performance.
Third, this thesis contributes to the literature on applications of GGM and RIM as it
provides evidence that tax factors should be considered in these two valuation models. In
particular, Chapter 3 modifies the original GGM and RIM by replacing distributed divi-
dends and residual income with after-tax dividends and after-tax residual income which
incorporate personal tax rates and franking credits. The improved models successfully
capture the impacts of tax factors on the price estimation of invested securities.
Finally, this thesis also contributes to the literature on dividend clienteles. In contrast
to the classic tax-induced explanation of dividend clienteles (Feldstein and Green, 1983;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Redding, 1997; Brav and Heaton, 1998; Allen et al., 2000),
Chapter 4 proposes a behavioural finance explanation of dividend clienteles in which indi-
vidual investors overvalue the dividends and franking credits due to the “bird in the hand”
fallacy, the “behavioural life-cycle” theory, and the “information signaling” theory, and
thus prefer to take a long position before the ex-dividend date and to sell those securities
afterwards. This forms an important factor that contributes to the ex-dividend period irra-
tional exuberance. Chapter 5 further presents strong evidence of the individual dividend
clientele effect that firms with higher individual ownership are less likely to accumulate
their franking credit balances as individual investors irrationally prefer franking credits to
capital gains.
While this thesis makes important novel contributions to the literature, there are some
limitations, and potential future extensions can be identified in the following ways. For
Chapter 3.1, further research can be structured to investigate the relationship between the
mispricing and US-domiciled ownership holdings of the BHP twins. There are potentially
three tax-heterogeneous groups of investors, the first being Australian investors who are
eligible for Australian imputation credits, the second being UK investors who are eligible
for the UK imputation, and the third group being investors in other countries (e.g., espe-
cially the US) who are not eligible for any imputation benefits. Consider an extreme case
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where the BHP twins are 100% held by all US investors. There should be no tax effects
of imputation in these circumstances. On the other hand, the tax effect will be maximised
when foreign ownership of BHP and Billiton is zero. Research could be conducted to
investigate the proportion of the BHP twins held by ADR investors in the US and the
mispricing of the twins. Chapter 5 investigates the impact of franking credit balances on
share prices, while its impact on the cost of equity is unclear. Future research can be
conducted by combining franking credit balances studies and the required rate of return
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Appendix A
Historical tax rate in Australia
Table A.1: History of tax rates in Australia
The table reports the history of tax rates including corporate tax rates, top personal income tax rates, medicare levy rates and capital gain tax rates for individual
investors, income tax rate and capital gain tax rate for superannuation funds, in Australia from 1985 to 2020. Capital gain tax rate is half of the personal income
tax rate for individual, and two thirds of the income tax rate for superannuation funds. All of the tax rates are in the top level tax brackets (The Treasury, 2012;
Australian Taxation Office, 2020c,i,j,l,k).
.
year Company Individual Superannuation funds
corporate tax rate top income tax rate Medicare levy Capital gain tax rate income tax rate Capital gain tax rate
1985-1986 46% 60% 1% 61% 15% 15%
1986-1987 49% 57.08% 1.25% 58.33% 15% 15%
1987-1988 49% 49% 1.25% 50.25% 15% 15%
1988-1989 39% 49% 1.25% 50.25% 15% 15%
1989-1990 39% 48% 1.25% 49.25% 15% 15%
1990-1991 39% 47% 1.25% 48.25% 15% 15%
1991-1992 39% 47% 1.25% 48.25% 15% 15%
1992-1993 39% 47% 1.25% 48.25% 15% 15%
1993-1994 33% 47% 1.4% 48.4% 15% 15%





























1995-1996 36% 47% 1.5% 48.5% 15% 15%
1996-1997 36% 47% 1.7% 48.7% 15% 15%
1997-1998 36% 47% 1.5% 48.5% 15% 15%
1998-1999 36% 47% 1.5% 48.5% 15% 15%
1999-2000 36% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2000-2001 34% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2001-2002 30% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2002-2003 30% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2003-2004 30% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2004-2005 30% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2005-2006 30% 47% 1.5% 24.25% 15% 10%
2006-2007 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2007-2008 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2008-2009 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2009-2010 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2010-2011 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2011-2012 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2012-2013 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2013-2014 30% 45% 1.5% 23.25% 15% 10%
2014-2015 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
2015-2016 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
2016-2017 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
2017-2018 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
2018-2019 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
2019-2020 30% 45% 2% 23.5% 15% 10%
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Appendix B
Comparison of historical tax rates
between Australia and the UK
Table B.1 and Table B.2 report the historical corporate tax rate, franking credits tax rate,
the top marginal personal dividend tax rate, Medicare levy, and the effective tax rate
from 2001 to 2018 in Australia and the UK respectively. Table B.3 reports the dividend
information including the dividend announcement date, the ex-dividend date, the dividend
payment date, and dividend amount (in USD) of BHP from 2001 to 20181.
Table B.1: Change of historical tax rate in Australia
The table reports historical corporate tax rate (τc), franking credits tax rate (F), top marginal personal
income tax rate (τp), medicare levy (τm), and the effective tax rate for dividends (τe)2 in Australia from
2001 to 2018.
Date from Date to τc F τp τm τe
Jul 1, 2001 Jun 30, 2006 30% 30% 47% 1.5% 26.43%
Jul 1, 2006 Jun 30, 2014 30% 30% 45% 1.5% 23.57%
Jul 1, 2014 Jun 30, 2018 30% 30% 45% 2% 24.29%
1BHP dividends for the examining period are all fully franked according to the annual reports. The same
amount of dividend per share is declared for both BHP in Australia and Billiton in the UK.
2The calculation of effective tax rate in Australia is described in Eq. (3.5) in section 3.5.2.
3The calculation of effective tax rate in the UK is described in Eq. (3.4) in section 3.5.2.
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Table B.2: Change of historical tax rate in the UK
The table reports historical corporate tax rate (τc), franking credits tax rate (F), top marginal personal
income tax rate (τp), and the effective tax rate for dividends (τe)3 in the UK from 2001 to 2018.
Date from Date to τc F τp τe
Apr 6, 2001 Apr 5, 2008 30% 10% 32.5% 25%
Apr 6, 2008 Apr 5, 2009 28% 10% 32.5% 25%
Apr 6, 2010 Apr 5, 2011 26% 10% 42.5% 36.11%
Apr 6, 2011 Apr 5, 2012 24% 10% 42.5% 36.11%
Apr 6, 2012 Apr 5, 2013 23% 10% 42.5% 36.11%
Apr 6, 2013 Apr 5, 2014 21% 10% 37.5% 30.56%
Apr 6, 2014 Apr 5, 2016 20% 10% 37.5% 30.56%
Apr 6, 2016 Apr 5, 2018 19% 10% 38.1% 31.22%
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Table B.3: Dividend information of BHP
The table reports the ex-dividend date, the dividend announcement date, the dividend payment date, and the








Nov 7, 2001 Nov 13, 2001 Dec 5, 2001 $ 0.065
May 3, 2002 Jun 4, 2002 Jul 3, 2002 $ 0.065
Oct 31, 2002 Nov 12, 2002 Dec 4, 2002 $ 0.07
May 7, 2003 Jun 10, 2003 Jul 2, 2003 $ 0.075
Oct 29, 2003 Nov 10, 2003 Dec 3, 2003 $ 0.08
Mar 23, 2004 Apr 13, 2004 May 5, 2004 $ 0.085
Aug 18, 2004 Sep 1, 2004 Sep 22, 2004 $ 0.095
Feb 28, 2005 Mar 2, 2005 Mar 23, 2005 $ 0.135
Aug 24, 2005 Sep 7, 2005 Sep 28, 2005 $ 0.145
Feb 15, 2006 Mar 1, 2006 Mar 22, 2006 $ 0.175
Aug 23, 2006 Sep 6, 2006 Sep 27, 2006 $ 0.185
Feb 7, 2007 Feb 28, 2007 Mar 20, 2007 $ 0.2
Aug 22, 2007 Sep 12, 2007 Sep 28, 2007 $ 0.27
Feb 6, 2008 Feb 27, 2008 Mar 18, 2008 $ 0.29
Aug 18, 2008 Sep 3, 2008 Sep 25, 2008 $ 0.41
Feb 4, 2009 Feb 25, 2009 Mar 17, 2009 $ 0.41
Aug 12, 2009 Sep 2, 2009 Sep 25, 2009 $ 0.41
Feb 10, 2010 Mar 3, 2010 Mar 23, 2010 $ 0.42
Aug 25, 2010 Sep 8, 2010 Sep 30, 2010 $ 0.45
Feb 16, 2011 Mar 9, 2011 Mar 31, 2011 $ 0.46
Aug 24, 2011 Sep 7, 2011 Sep 29, 2011 $ 0.55
Feb 8, 2012 Feb 29, 2012 Mar 22, 2012 $ 0.55
Aug 22, 2012 Sep 5, 2012 Sep 28, 2012 $ 0.57
Feb 20, 2013 Mar 6, 2013 Mar 28, 2013 $ 0.57
Aug 20, 2013 Sep 4, 2013 Sep 25, 2013 $ 0.59
Feb 18, 2014 Mar 5, 2014 Mar 26, 2014 $ 0.59
Aug 19, 2014 Sep 3, 2014 Sep 23, 2014 $ 0.62
Feb 24, 2015 Mar 11, 2015 Mar 31, 2015 $ 0.62
Aug 25, 2015 Sep 9, 2015 Sep 29, 2015 $ 0.62
Feb 23, 2016 Mar 9, 2016 Mar 31, 2016 $ 0.16
Aug 16, 2016 Aug 31, 2016 Sep 20, 2016 $ 0.1
Feb 21, 2017 Mar 8, 2017 Mar 28, 2017 $ 0.4
Aug 22, 2017 Sep 7, 2017 Sep 26, 2017 $ 0.43
Feb 20, 2018 Mar 8, 2018 Mar 27, 2018 $ 0.55




C.1 Derivation of residual income model
This section introduces the derivation from dividend discount model to residual income








where Pt is the price of the firm’s equity at time t, DIVt+τ is the net dividend paid at time
t + τ , r is the (assumed constant) discount rate. The clean surplus accounting relation is
shown as:
bt = bt−1 +Xt−DIVt , (C.2)
that can be rearranged to
DIVt = bt +Xt−bt−1, (C.3)
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where bt is the book value of equity at time t, Xt is the earnings for the period from t−1

























































































The final term Et [bt+∞](1+r)∞ in the Eq. C.4 is assummed to be zero, and ’residual income’ or
’abnormal earnings’ is defined as
Xt a = Xt− r ∗bt−1. (C.5)
So that the price can be expressed as the sum of book value and the present value of future
abnormal earnings:







Xt+τ a = Xt+τ − r ∗bt+τ−1, (C.7)
where Xt+τ a is residual income at time t +τ , Xt+τ is net income at time t +τ , r is the cost
of equity, bt+τ−1 is the book value of equity at time t+τ−1. Then the model incorporates
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We cannot simply cross out −E[bt+1]∗(1−πt+1)(1−Ft+1)(1+r) +
E[bt+1]∗(1−πt+1)
(1−Ft+1)(1+r) to get the short cut shown in
Eq. C.9 since the personal tax rates change across years. Therefore we cannot simply use
































C.2 The violations of the clean surplus relation
The clean surplus relation states that total closing equity equals total opening equity plus net income minus dividends and share buy-back. However,
the relation does not hold perfectly in reality. This paper identifies the clean surplus violations (e.g., transactions with owners as owners, total
changes in outside equity owners, contributed equity, Accrued employee entitlement to share awards) of BHP from 2001 to 2015. However, the
violations during the period are immaterial (The percentage of the total violations of shareholders’ equity is normally less than one per cent) except
in years (2003 and 2015) where there are major restructurings.
Table C.1: The violations of the clean surplus relation
The table reports total opening equity, total closing equity, net income dividends, share buy-back and specific violating of the clean surplus relation of BHP from 2001 to 2015.
Accounting data is collected from the Annual Report.
Total opening Net income Dividends Share Other Total closing
equity buy-back adjustments equity
2001-2002 12,232 1,673 -784 -19
Transactions with owners as owners 104
Total changes in outside equity interests -53
Total clean surplus violation 51
The percentage of total violations of net income 3.0484%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 0.4018%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
13,153
2002-2003 13,153 1,927 -900 -20
Transactions with owners as owners -1,489
Contributed equity 98
Total changes in outside equity interests -8
Total adjustments -1,399
The percentage of total violations of net income -72.5999%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -10.7973%


























2003-2004 12,761 3,451 -1,025
Contributed equity 66
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 96
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -25
Total changes in outside equity interests 23
Underestimation of reserves in Annual Report 2003 78
Total adjustments 238
The percentage of total violations of net income 6.8966%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 1.6888%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
15,425
2004-2005 15,425 6,016 -1,409 -1,777
Contributed equity 56
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 109
Cash settlement of share awards -3
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -47
Total changes in outside equity interests -6
Total adjustments 109
The percentage of total violations of net income 1.8118%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 0.6452%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
18,364
2005-2006 17,575 10,511 -1,938 -2,029
Adjustment for adoption of IAS 39/AASB 139 201
Contributed equity 24
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 61
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -187
Total adjustments 99

























The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 0.4738%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
24,218
2006-2007 24,218 13,596 -2,269 -5,802
Contributed equity 6
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 97
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -231
Total adjustments -128
The percentage of total violations of net income -0.5590%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -0.2821%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
29,667
2007-2008 29,667 15,004 -3,133 -3,075
Transactions with owners as owners 17
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 72
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -165
Total adjustments -76
The percentage of total violations of net income -0.8531%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -0.3765%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
38,329
2008-2009 38,335 6,146 -4,563
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 185
Purchases of shares made by ESOP trusts -149
Total adjustments 36
The percentage of total violations of net income 0.5857%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 0.0920%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
39,954

























Transactions with owners as owners -150
Contributed equity 123
Employee share awards reserve 146
Financial assets reserve -9
Hedging reserve 123
Non-controlling interest contribution reserve 350
Foreign exchange -9
Total adjustments 451
The percentage of total violations of net income 3.5406%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 1.0195%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
48,525
2010-2011 48,525 23,637 -5,126 -9896
Share buy-back and cancelled -90
Treasury shares -98
Contributed equity -285
Employee share awards reserve 123
Financial assets reserve -72
Share buy-back reserve 46
Non-controlling interest contribution reserve -21
Foreign exchange 19
Total adjustments -378
The percentage of total violations of net income -1.5992%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -0.7180%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
56,762
2011-2012 56,762 15,287 -5,894 -83
Share buy-back and cancelled 2
Treasury shares 90

























Foreign currency translation reserve 19
Employee share awards reserve 17
Financial assets reserve -46
Share buy-back reserve 1
Hedging reserve -80
Total adjustments -202
The percentage of total violations of net income -1.3214%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -0.3294%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
65,870
2012-2013 65,870 10,962 -6,076
Treasury shares -7
Divestment of jointly controlled entities 18
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards -161
Foreign currency translation reserve 2
Employee share awards reserve -92
Financial assets reserve -90
Hedging reserve 207
Non-controlling interest contribution reserve 31
Total adjustments -92
The percentage of total violations of net income -0.8393%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity -0.1348%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
70,664
2013-2014 70,667 13,901 -6,276
Treasury shares -47
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards -59
Foreign currency translation reserve -1
Employee share awards reserve -6


























Non-controlling interest contribution reserve 987
Total adjustments 851
The percentage of total violations of net income 6.1219%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 1.1361%
(The average of total opening equity and closing equity)
79,143
2014-2015 79,143 1,865 -6,296
Share buy-back and cancelled -12
Treasury shares 511
Accrued employee entitlement to share awards 114
Foreign currency translation reserve -2
Employee share awards reserve -227
Financial assets reserve -106
Share buy-back reserve 12
Hedging reserve 12
Non-controlling interest contribution reserve -59
Transfer within equity on demerger 59
BHP Billiton Plc shares cancelled -501
Demerger of aluminium, coal, manganese, nickel and silver assets -9,445
Total adjustments -9,644
The percentage of total violations of net income -517.1046%
The percentage of total violations of shareholders’ equity 13.4027%




Simple AR model to estimate dividends
Estimated dividends at time t +1 is stated as:
E(DIVt+1) = DIVt−1 ∗ (1+gt), (D.1)
where DIVt is dividend flows at time t, gt is the growth rate during the period t. We apply
two main steps to estimate dividends. The conditional growth rate of dividend at time t is
estimated by Autoregressive model of order 1 (AR(1)) using the sample of previous three
dividends:
DIVt = ϕ ∗DIVt−1 + εt , (D.2)
where ϕ is the coefficient of the model. The estimated dividend at time t +1 is calculated
by using dividend at time t multiplying the coefficient ϕ in Eq. D.2:
E(DIVt+1) = ϕ ∗DIVt . (D.3)
The dividend on Mar 9, 2016 is excluded from the sample of the AR model because it is an
outlier caused by a tailings dam collapse that led to an unexpected drop in the dividend1.
1BHP abandoned its progressive dividend policy and slashed its interim dividend by 75 percent due to




The appendix reports the results of robustness tests in section 4.5.3 from chapter 4. Ta-
ble E.1 replicates the OLS regression in Table 4.2 using multiple dividend variables and
franking credit variables rather than dividend payout ratio DPR and frankming credits
dividend ratio FDR. Table E.2 replicates the OLS regression in Table 4.3 by replacing
the percentage of individual ownership INDO and the percentage of international owner-
ship INTO with the ownership dummy variables DINDO/DINTO. Table E.3 replicates the
OLS regression in Table 4.4 using multiple dividend variables and franking credit vari-
ables rather than DPR and FDR. Overall, the results of robustness tests are similar to the





















Table E.1: Robustness tests of Table 4.2
This table replicates Table 4.2 (OLS regressions for the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance) using multiple dividend variables and franking credits variables.
DPR is the dollar amount of dividend per share divided by earnings per share during the previous year. DY is the dollar amount of dividend per share, divided
by the cum-dividend day closing price. FDR is the dollar amount of franking credits per share divided by the dollar amount of dividend per share. FL is 0 if
the dividend is unfranked while it is 100 if the dividend is with fully franked. It can range between 0 and 100 if the dividend is partly franked. FD is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the dividend is fully franked credits and zero if it is unfranked or partly franked. FPS is the dollar amount of franking
credit per share. FCY is the dollar amount of franking credit per share, divided by the cum-dividend closing price. AAR is the average daily abnormal adjusted
return on the ex-dividend date, during the cum-dividend period and the ex-dividend period using 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day and 50-day windows.
The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
Panel A
DY 0.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.94) 0.03 (0.92) 0.01 (0.94) 0.02 (0.88) 0.01 (0.80)
EX ∗DY -0.19 (0.85) -0.13 (0.86) -0.08 (0.83) -0.05 (0.77) -0.03 (0.82) -0.01 (0.82)
FL -0.00 (0.81) 0.00 (0.06)* 0.00 (0.06)* 0.00 (0.06)* 0.00 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.00)***
EX ∗FL -0.00 (0.77) -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.02)** -0.00 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.01)***
Panel B
DY 0.05 (0.93) 0.04 (0.94) 0.03 (0.92) 0.01 (0.93) 0.02 (0.88) 0.02 (0.80)
EX ∗DY -0.19 (0.85) -0.13 (0.86) -0.08 (0.84) -0.05 (0.77) -0.03 (0.82) -0.01 (0.82)
FD -0.06 (0.27) 0.04 (0.23) 0.10 (0.06)* 0.12 (0.01)** 0.13 (0.00)*** 0.09 (0.00)***
EX ∗FD 0.06 (0.42) -0.12 (0.01)*** -0.13 (0.03)** -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.09 (0.00)***
Panel C
DY 0.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.94) 0.02 (0.93) 0.01 (0.96) 0.01 (0.91) 0.01 (0.81)
EX ∗DY -0.19 (0.85) -0.13 (0.86) -0.07 (0.84) -0.04 (0.78) -0.02 (0.84) -0.01 (0.83)
FPS -0.19 (0.31) 0.27 (0.04)** 0.45 (0.01)*** 0.28 (0.02)** 0.21 (0.11) 0.15 (0.02)**






















DY 0.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.94) 0.03 (0.92) 0.01 (0.94) 0.02 (0.88) 0.01 (0.80)
EX ∗DY -0.19 (0.85) -0.13 (0.86) -0.08 (0.83) -0.05 (0.77) -0.03 (0.82) -0.01 (0.82)
FDR -0.03 (0.81) 0.15 (0.06)* 0.28 (0.06)* 0.21 (0.06)* 0.27 (0.02)** 0.20 (0.00)***
EX ∗FDR -0.05 (0.77) -0.35 (0.00)*** -0.37 (0.02)** -0.31 (0.01)*** -0.34 (0.00)*** -0.20 (0.01)***
Panel E
DY 0.03 (0.96) -0.00 (1.00) -0.00 (0.92) -0.01 (0.86) -0.00 (0.96) -0.00 (0.99)
EX ∗DY -0.12 (0.90) -0.05 (0.91) -0.02 (0.80) -0.01 (0.84) -0.00 (0.97) 0.01 (0.96)
FCY 0.97 (0.88) 1.92 (0.74) 1.15 (0.72) 0.90 (0.71) 0.76 (0.68) 0.65 (0.53)
EX ∗FCY -3.63 (0.58) -3.62 (0.57) -2.31 (0.51) -1.44 (0.55) -0.85 (0.69) -0.79 (0.55)
Panel F
DPR 0.14 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.00)*** 0.03 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.05)** 0.02 (0.01)**
EX ∗DPR -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.13 (0.00)*** -0.06 (0.00)*** -0.03 (0.02)** -0.03 (0.03)** -0.02 (0.03)**
FL 0.00 (0.48) 0.00 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.06)* 0.00 (0.08)* 0.00 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.00)***
EX ∗FL -0.00 (0.33) -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.02)** -0.00 (0.02)** -0.00 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.01)***
Panel G
DPR 0.14 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.00)*** 0.03 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.06)* 0.02 (0.02)**
EX ∗DPR -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.13 (0.00)*** -0.06 (0.00)*** -0.03 (0.02)** -0.03 (0.04)** -0.02 (0.04)**
FD -0.01 (0.82) 0.06 (0.12) 0.11 (0.07)* 0.11 (0.01)** 0.13 (0.01)*** 0.09 (0.00)***
EX ∗FD 0.01 (0.84) -0.12 (0.01)*** -0.13 (0.04)** -0.14 (0.01)*** -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.09 (0.01)***
Panel H
DPR 0.14 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.08)* 0.01 (0.03)**





















FPS -0.31 (0.09)* 0.16 (0.24) 0.40 (0.02)** 0.23 (0.06)* 0.18 (0.18) 0.13 (0.04)**
EX ∗FPS 0.34 (0.16) -0.09 (0.60) -0.28 (0.19) 0.00 (1.00) 0.03 (0.87) 0.11 (0.20)
Panel I
DPR 0.14 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.00)*** 0.03 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.05)** 0.02 (0.01)**
EX ∗DPR -0.15 (0.00)*** -0.13 (0.00)*** -0.06 (0.00)*** -0.03 (0.02)** -0.03 (0.03)** -0.02 (0.03)**
FDR 0.09 (0.48) 0.19 (0.02)** 0.29 (0.06)* 0.20 (0.08)* 0.27 (0.02)** 0.20 (0.00)***
EX ∗FDR -0.16 (0.33) -0.37 (0.00)*** -0.38 (0.02)** -0.28 (0.02)** -0.34 (0.01)*** -0.19 (0.01)***
Panel J
DPR 0.13 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.10)* 0.01 (0.04)**
EX ∗DPR -0.14 (0.00)*** -0.12 (0.00)*** -0.05 (0.00)*** -0.03 (0.04)** -0.03 (0.07)* -0.02 (0.07)*
FCY 0.77 (0.89) 1.68 (0.75) 1.03 (0.74) 0.77 (0.73) 0.68 (0.69) 0.59 (0.51)





















Table E.2: Robustness tests of Table 4.3
This table replicates Table 4.3 (OLS regressions for effects of ownership holdings on the ex-dividend period irrational exuberance) replacing the percentage of
individual ownership INDO and the percentage of international ownership INTO with the ownership dummy variables DINDO/DINTO. DINDO takes the value
of one when INDO j,t is above the higher quartile of INDOt across all companies in year t and zero when INDO j,t is below the lower quartile. DINTO takes the
value of one when INTO j,t is above the higher quartile of INTOt across all companies in year t and zero when INTO j,t is below the lower quartile. LMC is the
log of market capitalization. BM is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of a firm’s equity. QSP is the time-weighted average of limit order
bid-ask spread. IVOL is the standard deviation of the return based on the mid-point price for each quote update. The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
CONST 0.44(0.55) 0.56(0.12) 0.46(0.09)* 0.37(0.09)* 0.41(0.02)** 0.42(0.00)***
EX -0.16(0.15) -0.10(0.11) -0.06(0.20) -0.05(0.18) -0.07(0.03)** -0.08(0.00)***
DINDO 0.20(0.10)* 0.13(0.06)* 0.15(0.00)*** 0.13(0.00)*** 0.10(0.00)*** 0.07(0.00)***
Ex∗DINDO -0.41(0.01)*** -0.23(0.01)** -0.24(0.00)*** -0.22(0.00)*** -0.15(0.00)*** -0.08(0.01)**
DINTO 0.05(0.64) 0.04(0.59) 0.05(0.29) 0.03(0.46) 0.03(0.34) 0.04(0.11)
Ex∗DINTO -0.14(0.33) -0.17(0.06)* -0.10(0.12) -0.05(0.34) -0.03(0.42) -0.05(0.14)
DY 6.43(0.19) 2.88(0.19) 0.33(0.82) 0.69(0.52) 0.26(0.77) -0.47(0.46)
LMC -0.03(0.36) -0.02(0.13) -0.02(0.07)* -0.02(0.07)* -0.02(0.01)** -0.02(0.00)***
BM -0.02 (0.27) -0.01 (0.76) 0.00 (0.93) 0.01 (0.44) 0.01 (0.18) 0.01 (0.19)
QSP -0.01 (0.45) -0.01 (0.34) 0.01 (0.46) 0.00 (0.62) 0.01 (0.27) 0.00 (0.51)





















Table E.3: Robustness tests of Table 4.4
This table replicates Table 4.4 (OLS regressions for the behaviourval finance dividend clientele) using multiple dividend variables and franking credits variables.
DINDO takes the value of one when INDO j,t is above the higher quartile of INDOt across all companies in year t and zero when INDO j,t is below the lower
quartile. DPR is the dollar amount of dividend per share divided by earnings per share during the previous year. DY is the dollar amount of dividend per share,
divided by the cum-dividend day closing price. FDR is the dollar amount of franking credits per share divided by the dollar amount of dividend per share. FL is 0
if the dividend is unfranked while it is 100 if the dividend is with fully franked. It can range between 0 and 100 if the dividend is partly franked. FD is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the dividend is fully franked credits and zero if it is unfranked or partly franked. FPS is the dollar amount of franking
credit per share. FCY is the dollar amount of franking credit per share, divided by the cum-dividend closing price. AAR is the average daily abnormal adjusted
return on the ex-dividend date, during the cum-dividend period and the ex-dividend period using 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 40-day and 50-day windows.
The regression uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
AAR 5-day 10-day 20-day 30-day 40-day 50-day
Panel A
DINDO ∗DY 23.31(0.06)* 9.02(0.11) 5.05(0.06)* 5.97(0.00)*** 5.34(0.01)*** 3.37(0.01)***
Ex∗DINDO ∗DY -14.90(0.30) -10.33(0.10)* -8.79(0.02)** -8.42(0.00)*** -6.94(0.00)*** -3.72(0.03)**
DINDO ∗FL 0.01(0.01)** 0.00(0.03)** 0.00(0.17) 0.00(0.40) 0.00(0.45) 0.00(0.94)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FL -0.01(0.01)*** -0.01(0.03)** -0.00(0.09)* -0.00(0.59) -0.00(0.33) -0.00(0.51)
Panel B
DINDO ∗DY 22.90(0.07)* 8.79(0.12) 4.94(0.06)* 5.93(0.00)*** 5.32(0.01)*** 3.38(0.01)***
Ex∗DINDO ∗DY -14.55(0.31) -10.15(0.10) -8.70(0.02)** -8.40(0.00)*** -6.94(0.00)*** -3.77(0.02)**
DINDO ∗FD 0.48(0.08)* 0.19(0.28) 0.05(0.67) 0.01(0.93) -0.00(0.99) -0.01(0.83)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FD -0.66(0.08)* -0.34(0.13) -0.17(0.25) -0.03(0.84) -0.07(0.53) -0.07(0.38)
Panel C
DINDO ∗DY 22.20(0.08)* 8.68(0.13) 4.89(0.06)* 5.90(0.00)*** 5.41(0.01)*** 3.47(0.00)***
Ex∗DINDO ∗DY -13.25(0.36) -9.99(0.11) -8.61(0.02)** -8.49(0.00)*** -7.08(0.00)*** -3.81(0.02)**





















Ex∗DINDO ∗FPS -3.98(0.08)* -0.95(0.48) -0.34(0.70) -0.03(0.97) 0.31(0.59) 0.56(0.20)
Panel D
DINDO ∗DY 23.31(0.06)* 9.02(0.11) 5.05(0.06)* 5.97(0.00)*** 5.34(0.01)*** 3.37(0.01)***
Ex∗DINDO ∗DY -14.90(0.30) -10.33(0.10)* -8.79(0.02)** -8.42(0.00)*** -6.94(0.00)*** -3.72(0.03)**
DINDO ∗FDR 1.88(0.01)** 0.94(0.03)** 0.38(0.17) 0.19(0.40) 0.14(0.45) 0.01(0.94)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FDR -2.35(0.01)*** -1.18(0.03)** -0.61(0.09)* -0.16(0.59) -0.24(0.33) -0.12(0.51)
Panel E
DINDO ∗DY 0.73(0.95) -3.17(0.62) 2.03(0.59) 4.22(0.19) 4.56(0.15) 3.56(0.06)*
Ex∗DINDO ∗DY 10.67(0.49) 3.92(0.61) -4.78(0.30) -6.57(0.09)* -4.68(0.19) -2.21(0.33)
DINDO ∗FCY 70.09(0.01)*** 34.77(0.01)** 7.60(0.39) 3.68(0.59) 0.20(0.98) -2.12(0.60)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FCY -84.81(0.01)*** -36.74(0.03)** -6.03(0.58) 1.48(0.86) -1.00(0.89) -1.11(0.83)
Panel F
DINDO ∗DPR 0.39(0.12) 0.31(0.04)** 0.10(0.07)* 0.09(0.12) 0.08(0.09)* 0.05(0.11)
Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR -0.25(0.37) -0.27(0.14) -0.12(0.20) -0.09(0.17) -0.12(0.05)** -0.09(0.03)**
DINDO ∗FL 0.01(0.02)** 0.00(0.04)** 0.00(0.15) 0.00(0.50) 0.00(0.62) -0.00(0.94)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FL -0.01(0.01)** -0.00(0.05)** -0.00(0.08)* -0.00(0.69) -0.00(0.72) -0.00(0.83)
Panel G
DINDO ∗DPR 0.39(0.12) 0.31(0.04)** 0.10(0.08)* 0.09(0.12) 0.08(0.10)* 0.05(0.11)
Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR -0.25(0.36) -0.27(0.14) -0.12(0.20) -0.09(0.18) -0.12(0.05)* -0.09(0.03)**
DINDO ∗FD 0.48(0.10)* 0.22(0.26) 0.07(0.55) 0.01(0.96) -0.01(0.89) -0.01(0.85)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FD -0.66(0.09)* -0.34(0.16) -0.20(0.21) -0.02(0.88) -0.01(0.90) -0.04(0.58)
Panel H





















Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR -0.24 (0.40) -0.27 (0.15) -0.12 (0.22) -0.09 (0.19) -0.13 (0.05)* -0.09 (0.03)**
DINDO ∗FPS -0.35 (0.86) -1.84 (0.17) -0.99 (0.16) -1.00 (0.09)* -1.05 (0.03)** -0.86 (0.02)**
Ex∗DINDO ∗FPS -2.64 (0.27) 0.11 (0.94) -0.02 (0.99) 0.24 (0.74) 0.78 (0.22) 0.81 (0.08)*
Panel I
DINDO ∗DPR 0.39 (0.12) 0.31 (0.04)** 0.10 (0.07)* 0.09 (0.12) 0.08 (0.09)* 0.05 (0.11)
Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR -0.25 (0.37) -0.27 (0.14) -0.12 (0.20) -0.09 (0.17) -0.12 (0.05)** -0.09 (0.03)**
DINDO ∗FDR 1.82 (0.02)** 0.96 (0.04)** 0.42 (0.15) 0.16 (0.50) 0.10 (0.62) -0.01 (0.94)
Ex∗DINDO ∗FDR -2.35 (0.01)** -1.14 (0.05)** -0.64 (0.08)* -0.12 (0.69) -0.10 (0.72) -0.04 (0.83)
Panel J
DINDO ∗DPR -0.02 (0.94) 0.14 (0.26) 0.01 (0.84) 0.01 (0.81) 0.02 (0.70) 0.02 (0.49)
Ex∗DINDO ∗DPR 0.11 (0.68) -0.05 (0.75) 0.06 (0.52) 0.03 (0.58) -0.01 (0.80) -0.02 (0.65)
DINDO ∗FCY 73.19 (0.01)** 25.27 (0.04)** 10.97 (0.11) 9.88 (0.02)** 6.31 (0.14) 1.76 (0.52)

























Table F.1: Variable specification
This table specifies the definition, formula, measure and literature of the variables used in the thesis. The dependent variable is the daily
relative price premium. Independent variables are effective tax rate premium dummy and estimated price premium. Control variables include
lagged log return premium, log returns of index and exchange rate, bid-ask spread, lagged turnover ratio and log returns of GDP, CPI, imports,
exports, current account and unemployment rate. This table is developed for this research.
Variable Definition Formula Measure
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Price Premium (PRt) Relative price premium
between BHP ADR and
Billiton ADR
PRt = BHPADRt−BillitonADRt(BHPADRt+BillitonADRt)/2 Mispricing between the BHP
twins (Grossmann et al.,
2007)
Panel B: Independent Variables
Effective tax rate difference
dummy (Di)
Dummy equal to one affter
the effective tax rate differ-
ence dummy change date
Di =

1 after the effective tax rate
difference dummy change date
0 before the effective tax rate
difference dummy change date
where i is from 1 to 5 stands for five tax rate
changes
Tax factors difference be-
tween Australia and the UK
Estimated price premium
(E(PRt))
Relative estimated price dif-
ference between BHP and





porating tax factors between
the BHP twins using GGM
(Gordon and Shapiro, 1956)





















Panel C: Control Variables
Lagged log return premium
(LLRPRt)
Premium of lagged log return
of BHP ADR over Billiton
ADR




Index log return (rindext ) Natural log value of index re-
turn for ASX 200, FTSE 100,
and S&P 500
rindext = log(Pindext/Pindext−1),
where Pindext is the price of index on date t,
index are ASX 200, FTSE 100 and S&P 500.
Market return (Froot and
Dabora, 1999)
Exchange rate log return
(rAUDt/rGBXt )
Natural log of exchange rate
of AUD and GBX
rAUDt = log(PAUDt/PAUDt−1),
rGBXt = log(PGBXt/PGBXt−1),
where PAUDt is the price of AUD on date t,
PGBXt is the price of GBX on date t.





































ws is the weight of security s
determined by the eigenvector,
AskPrs,t,n is the ask price for security s
on date t for quote n,
BidPrs,t,n is the bid price for security s
on date t for quote n,
Dus,t is the duration for security s on date t for
quote n,
n stands for quote number,
s are BHP ADR, Billiton ADR, BHP ASX, and
Billiton LSE.
Transaction cost (McInish
























The lagged turnover ratio
of BHP ASX, Billiton LSE,





where Trade Volumes,t−1 is the trading volume
for security s on date t−1,
Shares Outstandings,t−1 is the number of
shares outstanding for security s on date t−1,





Natural log return of GDP for
Australia and the UK
rGDP,AUt = log(GDPAUt/GDPAUt−1),
rGDP,UKt = log(GDPUKt/GDPUKt−1),
where GDPAUt is the gross domestic product of
Australia on date t,
GDPUKt is the gross domestic product of the
UK on date t.




Natural log return of CPI for
Australia and the UK
rCPI,AUt = log(CPIAUt/CPIAUt−1),
rCPI,UKt = log(CPIUKt/CPIUKt−1),
where CPIAUt is the consumer price index of
Australia on date t,
CPIUKt is the consumer price index of the UK
on date t.
























Natural log return of imports
for Australia and the UK
rImports,AUt = log(ImportsAUt/ImportsAUt−1),
rImports,UKt = log(ImportsUKt/ImportsUKt−1),
where ImportsAUt is the imports of Australia on
date t,
ImportsUKt is the imports of the UK on date t.




Natural log return of exports
for Australia and the UK
rExports,AUt = log(ExportsAUt/ExportsAUt−1),
rExports,UKt = log(ExportsUKt/ExportsUKt−1),
where ExportsAUt is the exports of Australia on
date t,
ExportsUKt is the exports of the UK on date t.
Economic indicator (Su et al.,
2013)
Current account log return
(rCA,AUt/rCA,UKt )
Natural log return of current




where CAAUt is the CA of Australia on date t,
CAUKt is the CA of the UK on date t.
Economic indicator (Su et al.,
2013)
Unemployment rate log re-
turn (rUR,AUt/rUR,UKt )
Natural log return of unem-




where URAUt is the UR of Australia on date t,
URUKt is the UR of the UK on date t.
Economic Indicator (Su et al.,
2013)
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